Prologue

The following essay is an overlong, mildly confused, and rather rambling attempt to develop my PhD work on Wittgenstein.

As it stands, the essay can best be described as 'undigested' — it should have been shut up in a box at completion and taken out and re-written – in a much shortened form — several years later, once the author had gained some objectivity upon it.

My retrospective assessment of the work is that it did catch sight of a genuine 'physiognomy', but that it did not get clear enough about the interrelationship of the elements (mainly because I was working things out as I went along). I therefore wish to warn prospective readers that unless it is worked-through seriously – i.e., unless the reader himself tries to make up for the essay's defects (and the author is not sure it is worth the effort this would take) – it may well end up making for more confusion about the distinctions that it declares it aims to clarify!

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Wittgenstein's Conception of Intentionality

Introduction

Our aim in this essay is to interpret and obtain a clearer understanding of Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality – or at least, to get clearer about the concepts in terms of which we may begin to obtain such an understanding. This statement of our aim raises the question, though, of whether or in what sense we may speak of a single conception of intentionality held to by Wittgenstein. Furthermore, alongside this main aim and connected with the way we try to achieve it, we have two further aims. These are: to make clearer the concept of intentionality 'as such' – and so without immediate consideration as to whether or not we are representing Wittgenstein's views; and to present an overview (under the aspect of intentionality), or to bring into view the 'physiognomy', of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Our stated aim is thus complicated, and because these complications need to be taken into account while reading the essay, we shall mainly concern ourselves in this introduction with discussing them.

First, though, let us deal with this preliminary. We take over the use of the terms, 'intention', 'intend', etc. from Wittgenstein's use in the *Philosophical Remarks*, and so without direct committment to the usage established by the scholastics and revived by Brentano. The term 'intention' has the colloquial, restricted meaning of purpose, and then the wider, more technical meaning of denoting what is involved in speaking 'with meaning' (or thinking) or in acting with a purpose (or willing). The fact that the more colloquial meaning is essentially contained within the second, technical meaning means we need not be overconcerned if there is ambiguity between the two in the passages we quote. What more exactly intention in its technical sense may mean is of course what this essay is about; for now it is sufficient to equate the technical sense of 'to intend' with *to mean* – but with the implication that we are interested in the role of the

subject (ego) in such 'action' of meaning.

Next let us give some motivation and substance to this introduction by considering the following. When a scientist describes a subject – a human being – then he or she does so in naturalistic terms – the terms of physics, chemistry, biology, roughly. In other words, he or she describes the subject as limited (or finite) and as subject to causal laws. In making this description the scientist – who of course is also a subject – makes use of, or presupposes the use of, concepts which seem to 'transcend' the naturalistic and finite. Most obviously, the concepts of mathematics, especially that of the infinite. Thus there seems – at first sight, anyway – to be a disjunction between the subject which is captured by theory, and the subject who understands and applies the theory. It appears as though theory does not and cannot capture an aspect which we take to be essential to the subject.

[One might want to see this as a secondary version of the more primary disjunction between brain processes (studied by the scientist) and consciousness (or experience). The problem with this other distinction, though, is that it tends to lead us straight to the dead-end of accepting the supervenience (or whatever) of the one upon the other as a 'fact of nature' which is so basic it cannot be explained.]

The idea of a disjunction between these two ways in which the subject makes itself known will turn out to be a theme of this essay. (Although not in this form. We do not attempt to approach Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality from the side of his philosophy of logic and mathematics.) What is characteristic about it comes out if we consider the two alternatives that present themselves. First, let us suppose we try to overcome the disjunction by arguing that reducing the subject to naturalistic categories does not leave out anything essential. This option would naturally require us to downplay or argue to be illusory the subject's supposed grasp of at least some concepts. That attitude is of course strongly reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein. (Which is not to imply that Wittgenstein's later views are *consequent* upon anything like a naturalistic (e.g. behaviorist) conception of the subject.) Secondly, let us suppose we opt for the alternative of arguing that any theory of the subject (which works with naturalistic categories) necessarily leaves out something

essential. This option is of course strongly reminiscent of the Tractatus idea that certain things cannot be said, or described, but 'show' themselves. And in the Tractatus we do read that the subject 'does not belong to the world' but rather is a 'limit of the world', and hence is something that can only be shown.

[One might want to argue for a middle way between these two, which would be to theorise about the subject, but not by way of naturalistic categories. We shall tend to identify this option with traditional philosophy or with the idea of a theory of meaning. Of course, both early and later Wittgenstein deny the possibility of such a third way construed as *theory* – whence the later characterisation of a grammatical investigation as description rather than explanation.]

Neither the idea of a disjunction nor of a connection with Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy is a straightforward matter. But given that what we have here is a theme of the essay, it raises the question of what right we have to speak of Wittgenstein's – rather than always the early Wittgenstein's against the later Wittgenstein's – conception of intentionality. Now there is clearly a sense in which we cannot speak of a single conception. Thus the later Wittgenstein tells us: 'It isn't true that thinking is a kind of speaking, as I once said. The concept 'thinking' is categorically different from the concept 'speaking'.' (RPPII #7); and, in obvious contradiction with Tractatus doctrine, '... Thought and intention are neither 'articulated' nor 'non-articulated' (PI IIxi, p.217). In spite of this, though, we want to argue that there is a similarity between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophies which within the limited scope of the essay allows us to make use of the notion of 'Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality' in the way that we do.

In order to make clearer what we mean by a similarity between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophies, let us consider the second of the two alternatives above. It appeals to the distinction that Wittgenstein saw as the basic idea of the Tractatus, between what can be said and what can only be shown. In the later writings this distinction either no longer holds or no longer plays the foundational role that it does in the early philosophy. (Thus for example the Tractatus solution to Russell's paradox, which depends upon the saying-showing distinction, is later rejected by Wittgenstein.) How-

ever, if we ask what the earlier distinction is based upon, the answer is clear: it is that in order for language to represent the world (or assert facts) it must presuppose the existence of something further which it does not – and according to Wittgenstein cannot – represent. Wittgenstein identifies this essential presupposition with what he calls 'logic' (his use of this term being somewhat idiosyncratic). But now consider this remark from the later writings:

> It seems therefore, that our concepts, the use of our words, are constrained by a factual framework. But how *can* that be?! How could we describe the framework if we did not allow for the possibility of something else? – One is inclined to say you are making all logic into nonsense!
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> [RPP II #190]

This remark might have come straight from the *Notebooks 1914-16*. We may note too that Wittgenstein is reported to have said his fundamental ideas came to him very early in life. And of course there are many later remarks which, in accordance with the spirit of the earlier distinction, imply there is a special difficulty with directly expressing or communicating philosophical truths.

We shall return in a moment to the idea of a difficulty of expression and to the suggestion that it is indicative of a deep similarity between the early and later philosophies. Before we do so, let us take another example of similarity between early and later Wittgenstein, one which illustrates more forcefully the point we want to make. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argues that concepts such as number, and certain concepts of concepts, do not have content aside from the instances (i.e. the concepts) that fall under them. He gives to these concepts the title of 'formal concepts' and defines them by saying they can only be expressed by a variable. An example that Wittgenstein elucidates in the *Philosophical Remarks* is the (formal) concept of colour. The Wittgensteinean view is that the concept colour just *is* its instances (the values of the variable, namely the (phenomenologically) primary colours, and then their derivations): it is constructed *by* these rather than signifying a common property

by reference to which they are collected. According to Wittgenstein, the opposing view (which in the Tractatus he associates with the Frege-Russell logic) illustrates a characteristic error. In a similar fashion to Kant, Wittgenstein sees human beings as subject to an impulse to 'misunderstand the logic of our language' – that is, to try to go beyond the limits of what can be expressed. In the Tractatus this equates to the impulse to try to say what can only be shown. (In the later philosophy Wittgenstein speaks of the impulse to explain rather than describe.) In the particular case of formal concepts, the attempt to predicate a formal concept upon its instances as though this *says* something (i.e. says they all have the formal concept as property) falls into the error of trying to say what properly should show itself.

What does this quick digest of formal concepts remind us of? The later notion of family resemblance concepts, of course. That is not to say the two are the same – the later conception of overlap from which family resemblance concepts get their name is an obvious departure. But we want to argue that the similarity between the two goes deeper than the differences.

[The idea that formal concepts do not signify a common property does not mean that their instances are externally related – rather the opposite, as the example of colour makes very clear. Thus Wittgenstein speaks in some passages of the formal/family resemblance concept *welding* its instances together.]

It may be said that these two examples merely illustrate something that in any case is not contentious – namely, that there are similarities between the early and later Wittgenstein. What really needs to be made clearer is what we mean by saying the similarity between early and later Wittgenstein goes deeper than the differences; for it is only this claim that can give real significance to our talk of the Wittgensteinean conception of intentionality. So what do we mean by this? It seems to me two things. One is the idea that there is a distinct physiognomy which is characteristic of Wittgenstein's philosophy irrespective of the qualifications early, (middle) and later, and that one cannot separate off (because it is not an *accidental* feature) this physiognomy from the content of the philosophy. It is in the nature of the concept of physiognomy that it needs to be seen or

pointed to (along the way) rather than arrived at straightforwardly through an argument – note the similarity with the notion of showing – and so the appeal to a deeper similarity as physiognomy is something that is both an assumption of the essay, and something to be justified along the way.

The second thing we mean by a deeper similarity is connected with the other subsidiary aim mentioned in the opening paragraph – that of getting clearer about 'the' concept of intentionality. The point here is that a conception of intentionality can be thought of as having two parts: there is the concept or phenomenon insofar as it is already given, and which is conceived as problematic and as requiring an account or theory; and there is the account itself, or the 'philosophy' within which it is supposed to become comprehensible (such as, in the guise of a 'theory' of the proposition, we have in the Tractatus). The first part must to some degree or in some way determine the latter; and so, insofar as the first is the same for early and later Witgenstein, we may speak of something common to the early and later Wittgenstein's conceptions of intentionality. It seems to me – and again this is both assumption and something to be justified along the way – there is something common to the early and later conceptions of intentionality prior to the philosophical account. Our aim is much more to make progress in clarifying this common, prior conception – although the idea of a distinction of conception into parts is not one which we shall work with in practice.

The above two paragraphs make clearer the role of our two subsidiary aims, but are likely also to lead to the idea that any clarification we achieve must be more in line with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. The limitation upon our main aim expressed in the above paragraph especially seems to imply this, by way of the middle or later Wittgensteinean idea – connected in an obvious way with the concept of showing – that a philosophical or 'grammatical' account should be no more than the form of any possible account. However, there is a sense in which our account is really more in line with the early Wittgenstein, and it is worth setting out the two reasons why this is so. The first is to do with the most striking difference between the Tractatus and the later philosophy. In the later philosophy Wittgenstein's concern is to 'teach differences' and

avoid simplification, whereas in the Tractatus it might almost be said that Wittgenstein holds simplicity to be the criterion of truth. This difference may be connected with a comment that Wittgenstein made in conversation (with the Vienna Circle) about the justification for the 'dogmatic' style of the Tractatus, where he says, 'Such a [dogmatic] procedure is legitimate only if it is a matter of capturing the features of the physiognomy, as it were, of what is only just discernible – and that is my excuse. I saw something from far away and in a very indefinite manner, and I wanted to elicit from it as much as possible.' We may add to this Wittgenstein's remarks (to Drury) that his fundamental ideas came to him very early in life; and that every sentence in the Tractatus should be seen as the heading of a chapter, needing further exposition. These statements taken together with the fact that at one time he considered having the *Philosophical Investigations* published side by side with the Tractatus allow the implication that the later writing can be seen almost as a commentary upon or an unpacking of the Tractatus – or the Tractatus taken as an object of comparison by way of which the later philosophy can be understood better. (Perhaps in the way that deviations from a set of distinctions – such as those which form a tradition or ritual – require the latter to be simpler or more deeply entrenched in order for the former to have meaning.) In an area such as intentionality, where it is easy to fall into conceptual confusion, it seems to me there is an advantage to simplicity, even if it comes at the cost of over-simplification. One way in which our account is more in line with the Tractatus, then, is in its focus on trying to establish simple distinctions; although, unlike the Tractatus, we view this simplicity in terms of a focus on sense rather than truth. (That is to say, we want to clarify *a* concept – so that even if one wants to argue it doesn't apply in actuality, we are at least clearer about what we mean when we say this.) In particular, we are least concerned in our account with accuracy of interpretation of Wittgenstein. It seems to me that concern with accuracy or with following the letter of the argument can work against understanding (against physiognomical understanding).

The second reason why our account may be thought of as more in line with the early Wittgenstein is to do with the way we approach what we have said is a theme of the essay: the idea of the two

alternatives in how one may conceive of the subject. There is a sense in which we ally ourselves (for the purposes of discussion, anyway,) much more with the second of the two alternatives – or the one which we have associated with the early Wittgenstein. The rationale for doing this will become clearer as we proceed.

In our motivating example we introduced the alternative with which we shall ally ourselves in conjunction with the saying-showing distinction. However, in the essay we do not make this connection (or not straightforwardly). One reason for this is, as we have said, that we take the distinction to signify something common to the early and later philosophies (in its spirit if not its Tractatus letter). The other reason is to do with the fact that the distinction, by its very meaning, cannot be one distinction amongst others. Our other example of something common, that of formal/family resemblance concepts, illustrates this by itself being an illustration of the saying-showing distinction. (It may also be noted that the argument for a *deeper* similarity in relation both to a physiognomy and to a common prior conception in effect rests upon the saying-showing distinction.) The distinction has thus to be accorded special significance if it is to be taken seriously at all. Because of this necessarily special significance we end this introduction by saying something about it.

In the Tractatus the saying-showing distinction contains the thought that one cannot describe the essential properties of language because these properties are presupposed by any description – including the description by means of which one makes the attempt. This thought, it has to be said, is not at all obvious, and the arguments Wittgenstein gives in the Tractatus either have not been understood or have been found to be unconvincing. Perhaps one reason for this is the way the saying-showing distinction is tied up with Wittgenstein's early interpretation of the significance of the various logical or semantic paradoxes, and so with the conclusions he drew from these about set theory. Russell's device of distinguishing types or levels (or some variation of this) quickly became the accepted solution to the paradoxes insofar as they affect set theory (admittedly, with some residual dissatisfaction about its expediency) – with the result that the Tractatus seemed to be bypassed by events. And because the connection with the paradoxes provides the most obvious point

of purchase upon the saying-showing distinction, the tendency has been to regard the distinction more as an early idiosyncrasy than as central to an understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole.

As we have said, our aim is to approach Wittgenstein's philosophy not from the side of his philosophy of logic and mathematics, but (therefore) from the side of his philosophy of mind. However, before we begin the essay it is worth considering what Russell says in his introduction to the Tractatus about how his conception of levels of language might be a solution to the difficulties of expression that illustrate the saying-showing distinction. The passage we want to comment upon is the following:

> These difficulties suggest to my mind some such possibilty as this: that every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, *in the language*, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit.
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> [TLP xxii]

The solution here is essentially that one deals with the difficulty of describing things at one level by ascending to the next level – the meta level, relative to the level below. Russell accepts that this leads to an infinite regress, but implies this does not matter: nothing essential is lost in terms of what can and cannot be described. We might use the analogy of looking at the space before you – you cannot look at the space where you are, because you occupy that space, but if you take a step back you can see where you were, and not (as before) where you are; but with nothing lost thereby.

We have said that Wittgenstein's arguments against this idea in the Tractatus either are not clear or have not been found persuasive. One thing that is clear, though, is that Wittgenstein sees a contravention of the saying-showing distinction as involving a vicious

circle rather than as leading to a harmless infinite regress.

What is the relevance of this to an investigation into Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality? There are two connections that are important for our discussion. First, the semantic paradox whereby a definition of truth leads to contradiction has a correlate in Frege's well known argument against defining truth – the argument being that in practice no definition could be applied because it would presuppose its own verification (and hence itself). Here, where the question of practice or application comes in, the question whether an infinite regress is vicious or harmless becomes sharper – and one can begin to see the possibility of a connection with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Second, there is an analogy that one can make between language (which describes the world) and the subject (who experiences and thinks about the world) with regard to the notion of levels. In each case there is the question of the significance of ascending to the 'meta level' and from there attempting to deal with (the essential features of) language or the subject. Of course, it hardly needs to be said that the analogy is complicated by the fact that the meaning of the term 'subject' is neither clear nor (since Kant) unambiguous.

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Part One

The passage that we shall take as the primary text for our discussion comes from the *Philosophical Remarks*, a set of writings that Wittgenstein produced shortly after his return to Cambridge and philosophy in the late 1920's. In this work, particularly in the early chapters, Wittgenstein is concerned both with summarising some of the main insights of the Tractatus, and with exploring how, once these insights are freed from their Tractatus expression, they might be argued for or developed. In doing this he connects his conception of philosophy as grammar with (and distinguishes it from) the

notion of phenomenology. Although it is not wholly clear what he means by phenomenology (for example, how far he takes it over from Husserl), we shall take this connection as a hint in our interpretation. The passage we want to interpret occurs towards the beginning of the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion of intentionality, and involves Wittgenstein distinguishing two conceptions of what it means to say someone is in an intentional state. The passage is the following:

> What does it mean to say 'Admittedly I can't see any red, but if you give me a paint-box, I can point it out to you'? How can you *know* that you will be able to point it out if...; and so, that you will be able to recognise it when you see it?
>
> This might mean two different kinds of things: it might express the expectation that I shall recognise it if I am shown it, in the same sense that I expect a headache if I'm hit on the head; then it is, so to speak, an expectation that belongs to physics, with the same sort of grounds as any other expectation relating to the occurrence of a physical event.– Or else it has nothing to do with expecting a physical event, and for that reason neither would my proposition be falsified if such an event should fail to occur. Instead, it's as if the proposition is saying that I possess a paradigm that I could at any time compare the colour with. (And the 'could' here is logical possibility.)
>
> > Taking the first interpretation: if, on looking at a certain colour, I in fact do give a sign of recognition, how do I know it is the colour I *meant*?
> >
> > [...]
>
> [PhR #11]

We shall set aside for now the criticism of the first interpretation implied by the final paragraph, and begin by thinking about the question of how to characterise the two conceptions of intentionality that Wittgenstein has introduced in this pas-

sage. The comparison with physics of the first interpretation implies that here Wittgenstein intends the idea of a naturalistic description of what is going on. We may therefore connect this conception – more or less directly – with such concepts as behaviour, causality, 'wide' propositional attitudes, the third person or view 'from outside', and (by way of Davidson) the logical notion of meta. We may also connect it – in obvious ways but with considerable reservation, at this stage – with the later Wittgenstein. The second interpretation, which the wider context of the passage indicates has Wittgenstein's support in the *Philosophical Remarks*, suggests by its use of the term 'paradigm' a psychologically oriented approach to intentionality. It is therefore natural to connect this conception with the concepts of mental picture, 'narrow' propositional attitudes, the first person or view 'from inside'; and (by way of the concept of picture, in the first instance) with the early Wittgenstein.

The two sets of concepts which we have connected with Wittgenstein's two interpretations are of course problematic. Thus it may be argued that a behavioural interpretation of the intentional subject must run up against the problem of holism (or underdetermination of meaning), while the notion of a meta theory raises the question of the relation to this theory of the intentional subject it is supposed to characterise. It may also be pointed out that although it is more natural to associate the later Wittgenstein with this first conception, we would need to add the proviso that the later philosophy (like the earlier) argues that causal explanations and meta theories cannot contribute anything to our understanding of philosophical problems. Likewise, the second set of concepts faces arguments that purport to show that 'subjective' (psychological) intentional states cannot by themselves yield an adequate account of objective reference. And although it is more natural to associate the second interpretation with the early Wittgenstein, here we would need to add the proviso that the Tractatus argues for the existence of a non-psychological conception of the

first person (and so of meaning).

The above paragraph suggests that any attempt to understand Wittgenstein's distinction of interpretation should do so in a way that as far as possible avoids assimilating it to our pre-existing conceptual distinctions. On the other hand, of course, those concepts are there and form the context within which we interpret Wittgenstein. At first sight this seems to be a difficulty, but it need not be if Wittgenstein is right in his assertion that conceptual mistakes themselves contain (or point towards) the solution to the problems one is trying to solve. The approach we take in trying to interpret this starting passage is determined to a large extent by an attempt to recognise the relationship between Wittgenstein and this conceptual context.

Our aim in this essay is to get clearer about Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein argues for the second of the two conceptions we have distinguished – that is, the first person or psychological conception – and so accordingly (and in line with our bias towards the early Wittgenstein) it is this that we shall think of as the Wittgensteinean conception. We shall begin our discussion of it from the fact that Wittgenstein introduces this conception in the passage alongside and in contrast to the naturalistic conception (as we may call it). We have already made a tentative connection between this latter conception and Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and in the beginning passages of the *Philosophical Investigations* we can see some justification for doing this. In these passages Wittgenstein presents a series of 'primitive' language games, in which the notions of action and behaviour are given primacy over approaches to meaning that are either psychological, or reminiscent of his Tractatus theory. These language games may therefore be taken to illustrate what, in terms of the broad division of concepts that we are working with, is a naturalistic conception of intentionality. We want to try to understand the first person conception in part by how it contrasts with the naturalistic conception, and so for this reason we begin our interpretation of our starting

passage with the following quotations from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> [...] Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers – I assume that he knows them by heart – up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. – It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. – "But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?" – Well I assume that he acts as I have described. [...]
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> [PI #1]

> [...] Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; – B brings the stone that he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete primitive language.
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> [PI #2]

> Let us now look at an extension of language (2). Besides the four words "block", "pillar", etc., let it contain a series of words used as the shopkeeper in (1) used the numerals (it can be the series of letters of the alphabet); further, let there be two words, which may as well be "there" and "this" (because this roughly indicates their purpose), that are used in connection with a pointing

> gesture; and finally a number of colour samples. A gives an order like: "d-slab-there". At the same time he shows the assistant a colour sample, and when he says "there" he points to a place on the building site. From the stock of slabs B takes one for each letter of the alphabet up to "d", of the same colour as the sample, and brings them to the place indicated by A. – On other occasions A gives the order "this-there". At "this" he points to a building stone. And so on.
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> [PI #8]

The above passages belong within the context of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and any attempt to interpret them should do so from within or by reference to that context. What we want to do, though, is not to interpret these passages, but rather to make use of them. We want to take up a criticism that is sometimes made of the language games they contain, which is to the effect that these language games are too primitive to cast any light on our fully fledged language. (Compare too Z ## 98, 99.) We shall now agree in a certain sense with this criticism by taking these language games towards a limit, our aim being to try to bring out what – from the perspective of our basic distinction of concepts – is missing from them.

Let us then imagine the following variant on language game (8). The assistant we now imagine as something of a slave, because we are conceiving his grasp of language to be primitive in the kind of way that Wittgenstein describes, but supposing his master's grasp to be like ours. The master is technologically advanced, and in order to avoid or simplify the matter of training, he gives to the slave a mechanism or machine which is designed to make easier the slave's operations with signs. The master types into the machine the order he wishes the slave to obey. We may suppose that it appears on a screen, so the situation is analogous to Wittgenstein's in that the *signs* are common to both men. The slave takes the machine with

him to the quarry and carries out the order to bring such and such a consignment of building stones. But this time it is the machine that does (most of) the linguistic work. The machine can recognise which is the correct kind of building stone and signal it to the slave (for example, by way of a pointer or a flashing light); and in similar fashion can determine and signal which stones are of the required colour; and also when the slave has collected together the required number of stones. All the slave has to do is act in accordance with the machine. His linguistic ability may be supposed to be no more than the capacity to respond in this minimal way to the signals given by the machine.

Now let us ask the question: what is it about this machine mediated semantic encounter that fails to correspond to what we, as 'fully fledged' language users, take to be characteristic of intentionality? The answer we shall give comes out if we consider the following. We are assuming that when the slave gets to the quarry he behaves (with the help of the machine) in accordance with the order. However, prior to his arriving at the quarry and carrying out the order, the slave does not know what it is that he is to do. He has to wait upon the dictates of the machine to find that out. We might say that the slave only discovers the content of the order through the process of actually carrying it out.

Next let us try to carry over the slave's situation to our 'fully fledged' use of language. Of course, it may be said there is a disanalogy in that when someone gives a genuine (intentional) subject a propositional sign – say, the sentence 'Will you go and see if my copy of the Tractatus is on the table in the other room' – then he does not at the same time hand over a machine or mechanism fully primed to determine the semantic issue. But suppose we take the brain to work as such a machine. Or, to put it another way, let us try to make sense of the idea that through his receiving the propositional sign, the subject is thereby equally primed to act in the correct way; and that his being thus primed is the whole of the story that we need to tell. Now we can see very clearly what is left out. Ex hypothesi the

subject behaves correctly in the sense that he enters the room and looks over to the table and says 'yes' or 'no' accordingly. But what is the situation *prior* to his saying 'yes' or 'no'? If we suppose the analogy with the slave applies, then we must say that up until the point of positive verification the subject is, as it were, 'semantically blind'; and if the verification is negative then he remains so. In other words, it would seem as though the subject does not discover that the proposition is true (or false) – that is, that the copy of the Tractatus is (or is not) on the table; instead, he discovers (or does not discover) what the propositional sign *means*. We might even imagine him saying at the point of positive verification, 'Ah, so that's what N was talking about when he handed me this propositional sign'! That is to say, it would seem as though the subject might even be *surprised* when at the semantic encounter it is revealed (with his saying 'yes') that *this* – as opposed to some other – is the fact that satisfies the proposition.

We should say straightaway that our aim in making the analogy with the slave is not to criticise a naturalistic conception of intentionality. Rather, it is to bring into view what we shall take to define a first person conception. The point we wanted to make on behalf of the Wittgensteinean conception is, that if the semantic value of the 'mechanism' – of the intentional state – is thought purely in terms of its producing the right action at the right time, and not in terms of the concept of *prior*, then we lose what is essential to our (first person) concept of intentionality. We lose sight of the fact that the subject does not – in the way of the slave – learn what the propositional sign means through the semantic encounter itself. In Tractatus terms we may express this by saying that the verification of truth is not at the same time a discovery of sense.

[The concept of prior reminds one of Heidegger of *Being and Time*. And of course in the simple and pragmatic kind of case that we are focussing upon, the logical distinction between sense and truth does manifest itself in futural terms. The difference between the master and the slave is that, on the basis of the signs, the master *anticipates* that such and such

a consignment of building stones will shortly be brought to him; whereas for the slave, the signs are merely an on–going stimulus (via the machine) to make the right decision at the right time. One should compare here PI ## 222, 223, 232.]

[We should also note that we adhere to the convention that 'sense' signifies in the head; 'reference' signifies in the world; and 'meaning' is left as ambiguous or in accordance with context. The ambiguities in this area of course express the problem that forms the basis of our discussion, but it seems to me that care with terminology alone is not sufficient to bring out the nature of the conceptual distinctions, and we shall often prefer to remain with ambiguity. In any case we shall not take great pains to be terminologically precise.]

The contrast that we have made with the naturalistic conception by way of the analogy with the slave may have raised a doubt in our minds on one particular point: that of meaningfulness. The issue of meaningfulness is an important one, and we shall say something about it in relation to the contrast we are making here later in the essay. At this initial stage of our discussion, though, all we are trying to do is place in the foreground of our interpretation the phenomenological meaning of the concept of prior. What is important to recognise about this is that the naturalistic conception can incline us to overlook or misunderstand the notion of a prior semantic knowledge. It does this when, in contravention to its proper 'view from outside', we allow it to encroach upon our understanding of the first person phenomenon. This is easily done because – in part under the influence of the later Wittgenstein – we associate linguistic capability with training in the use of signs, which can seem to allow a 'smooth' transition from such training through bodily knowledge to (purposive) action and then to thought. What we are pointing out by way of the contrast with the naturalistic conception is that this way of thinking overlooks important distinctions. The naturalistic conception naturally focuses on the subject's behaviour at the semantic encounter; but from a first person perspective what is important is that the knowledge *manifested* through that

behaviour *exists* prior to the encounter; and that this prior knowledge is misconceived if it is assimilated to the slave's semantically opaque mechanism. The naturalistic conception defines intentionality in terms that relate to later action, and thus passes over the concept of prior meaning. Hence Wittgenstein's question in the final paragraph of our starting passage:

> Taking the first interpretation: if, on looking at a certain colour, I in fact do give a sign of recognition, how do I know it is the colour I *meant*?

We may also compare this passage from later on in the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion:

> How is a [proposition] meant? [It is not the case] that the way the [proposition] is meant only emerges when it elicits a certain reaction, for the intention is already expressed in the way I *now* compare the [proposition] with reality.
>
> [...]
>
> [PhR #24]

[Strictly, of course, phrases such as 'prior semantic knowledge' should have the term 'knowledge' placed in scare quotes. For what we are speaking of is not genuine knowledge (of the facts) but something better described as the limiting case of that knowledge. This is something we bring out and comment upon as the discussion progresses.]

Our interpretation of our starting passage so far has been marked by two features. First, by its phenomenological intent (or what we are calling (more by courtesy) 'phenomenological'). And second, by the relative absence of textual support. The second of these features is connected with the first and

with the fact that we are trying to clarify (or give meaning to) concepts in a way which does not from the start embroil us in philosophical controversy. During this first or 'phenomenological' part of our interpretation, we are not so much interpreting our starting passage in a conventional sense as trying to establish (with reference to the passage) the concepts, or the basis for the concepts, in terms of which the later, philosophical discussion will take place. This lack of textual support will continue to feature throughout our phenomenological interpretation, with which we now continue.

In our starting passage from the *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein distinguishes the two conceptions of intentionality through two questions. The second question asks about the subject's knowledge (that this is what he *meant*) at the semantic encounter, and we have begun to think about this by way of the concept of prior and by contrast with the naturalistic conception. We approached this question through the concept of prior because the concept of *at* the semantic encounter is phenomenologically problematic, as can be seen if we reflect upon the use of the past tense *meant*. But the first question relates directly to the concept of prior. It asks how the subject knows (prior to the semantic encounter) that he *can* recognise an example of red. We now continue our interpretation of our starting passage by beginning to think about this, again by making use of a contrast with the naturalistic conception.

On the first (naturalistic) interpretation, Wittgenstein's question 'How do I know I can pick out an example of red' invites an inductive response. Thus we may imagine the subject saying: 'Well I have been trained in the use of signs, and my actions in the *past* in response to this training have always met with approbation; and so I can be pretty sure that my action when faced with the paint-box will be judged by any competent person as satisfying the description 'pointing to an example of red'.' Now we may note that this reply is not obviously wrong. The problem with it rather is that it tends to point us in a certain direction away from the first person conception of intentionality. We can see this more clearly if

we follow up the idea of an inductive justification by making a comparison with our knowledge of a genuine mechanism, such as a kettle. In the case of a kettle we might indeed reply to the question, 'How do you know the kettle will boil water if switched on', by saying: 'Well it has always done so in the *past*'. Now in either case it may be argued there is at least a theoretical possibility that the later event will fail to occur. (As we shall remark upon below, in the case of recognising red this may seem to have something dubious about it. And of course we have to swallow our later Wittgensteinean qualms here as elsewhere in this first part of our interpretation.) The point that Wittgenstein draws attention to in the passage by speaking of a paradigm is that if the later event of recognising red did fail to occur, it would make sense to us if the subject said that at the time when he claimed he could recognise red, he *could* have done so:

> [...] neither would my proposition be falsified if such an event should fail to occur. Instead, it's as if the proposition is saying that I possess a paradigm that I could at any time compare the colour with.

The difference between the two cases is contained in the fact that if someone asserts that the kettle will boil water if switched on, and then it doesn't, then it would seem strange to us if the person without more ado insisted that the kettle *was* able to boil water at the time he made the assertion. In this case one would want further explanation. But in the intentional case there is a sense in which this does not apply. The subject's knowledge of his own intentional state may relate to the future, but it is not validated by the future (and to that extent not based upon the past) in the way that his knowledge of the kettle may be said to be. In other words, the subject's relation to his own (prior) intentional state is not at all like that of his relation to a mechanism.

[Might the 'further explanation' be that he earlier examined the kettle (checked the fuse, the connections, etc.) and applied

his knowledge of scientific theory? And might an 'introspective examination' of the paradigm be some kind of equivalent of this and account for the earlier certainty? But the conclusion about the kettle requires that the subject know what it is for a kettle to be in working order (a broken kettle may after all still function as a jug). But in the intentional case the notion of being in working order is not independently defined; the paradigm *itself* defines this notion. (Pace the later Wittgenstein. (But then, to say that the paradigm defines the notion need not imply that *I* define it.) Compare too Z #320.)]

[With regard to Wittgenstein's statement, that if the future event (of recognising red) did not occur it would not falsify the proposition, compare the Wittgensteinean disjunction between *certain* knowledge – which lacks content – and *substantial* knowledge – which lacks (absolute) certainty. It is worth noting that in the passage the former – which Wittgenstein ordinarily connects with what is shown by language/what is laid down by linguistic convention – becomes an (admittedly qualified) statement about the subject. (We shall return to this.) It should be acknowledged too that it may seem as though our presentation is equivocating between the two sides of this disjunction. What we want to say in defence is that our interpretation has not yet got as *far* as questions such as these.]

We suggested above that one might question the legitimacy of Wittgenstein's hypothesis in our starting passage of a later failure of recognition (of red). What we meant by that is connected in an obvious way with our earlier, parenthetical statement, that the semantic knowledge we are speaking of should be seen not as genuine knowledge (of the facts), but as the limiting case of that knowledge. The idea that the knowledge in question has a problematic status is, of course, fundamental: in part because it helps to define the knowledge, but in part too because it puts into question the way in which it may be expressed. At a later point we shall bring in explicitly the idea that the problematic or limiting status of the knowledge

is defining of it; what is more relevant to us here is the way its status affects our present attempt to bring the phenomenon of intentionality into view. In this regard it is worth reconsidering our present interpretation of Wittgenstein's first question in the light of our earlier example of verifying the proposition 'My copy of the Tractatus is on the table'. If we had used that example, then the corresponding question would have been: How does the subject know that he *can* verify the proposition – i.e. how does he know that he *will* be able to recognise the state of affairs that makes true the assertion 'My copy of the Tractatus is on the table'? This example makes it clear that there is something misleading about the comparison we made above. For it may be objected that if a comparison is to be made at all, then it should be between the subject's knowledge of what the kettle can do (a knowledge of the facts) and the 'semantic knowledge' that *this* knowledge presupposes, whose prior existence is *later* attested to when the subject responds to the question 'did the kettle boil?'. (And is attested to just as much by his saying 'no', if the kettle fails to boil and his (empirical) knowledge is proved wanting, as by his saying 'yes', if it boils.) The difficulty that our account faces is that the concept of *later* behaviour does not of itself make any contact with the concept of prior. Later behaviour contrasts with earlier behaviour. (With the line connecting them being – to use our earlier term – a 'smooth' one.) [As for a so-called prior '*capacity*' for later behaviour (even if it is accompanied by such and such appropriate feelings) that is so far simply the slave's semantically opaque mechanism dressed up in first person terms. (Compare PhR #82.)] That is why we have followed Wittgenstein's usage in our starting passage and spoken of (a prior semantic) *knowledge*. The interpretation we have given of Wittgenstein's first question has tried to remedy the misunderstanding that this usage inclines us towards by pointing out the *contrast* with genuine knowledge. The objection that there is something dubious about the hypothesis of a later failure of recognition can be seen as a way of making the point that this contrast too has something misleading about it.

[Compare this remark from the *Notebooks 1914-1916* (21.11.14):

What do I really know when I understand the sense of 'fa' but do not know whether it is true or false? In that case I surely know no more than fa $\vee\neg$ fa; and that means I *know* nothing.]

['I *know* it' (I know I can pick out the colour red, can recognise what makes true 'my copy of the Tractatus is on the table', etc.). Do I know this because my body has been trained and I am *identical* with my body? A naturalist philosopher is perhaps inclined to argue in some such way as this. The thought would be that *my* access to *my* body and brain is different from my access to the kettle inasmuch as I am identical with the former and not with the latter. I have, so to speak, an inside knowledge in the former case. This privileged access to myself gives me an 'inner' – or, if one dislikes the implications of that word, a sui generis – *certainty* that I can do such and such; a certainty which *I* do not base upon anything ('I just *know* I can do it').

It should be said that we are not trying to deny (nor are we agreeing with) what the naturalist says here. Rather, our concern with it (to the extent that we are concerned with it) is in terms of clarifying its meaning – in particular, clarifying whether it does not misunderstand or hide from our view important ('category') distinctions. It is worth noting too that Wittgenstein's response to any such ideas of 'inner certainty' is resolutely (or wilfully, as it may seem) to maintain a first person standpoint and ask about the 'feeling of inner certainty' as *datum*:

How do we know it is a feeling of *certainty* – are we quite *certain* about our interpretation of it as such?

'A feeling of certainty' – as, so to speak, the supervenient or first person manifestation of all that training (of all the causal connections the training has put in place). So my understanding of the proposition 'p' is hearing the words and being aware of the feeling. But then would it not be possible to hear a foreign sentence and have the *same* feeling? – Would I then be under the illusion that I understood it (and only realise I did not when I actually had to carry out the verification or order?

(One might live in a foreign city and hear such words often – so they need not be unfamiliar.) ((Here it is easy to get caught up with questioning the use of the word '*possible*' – the mistake being to suppose that an *argument* is being put forward.))

[Consider a complex order 'do x' which analyses into a series of tasks. Here we might say that the notions of prior to and at the semantic encounter run together with regard to the overall aim. The subject is engaged on a sub-task; – so we may ask Wittgenstein's second question: how does he *know* what he *is* doing constitutes carrying out the order? Through an 'inner feeling of certainty'? But then what about the first question (applied to the sub-task coming up next)? – does the 'inner certainty' simply *extend* to this as he considers what he is to do next? Is he quite sure this certainty is not a left over from answering the previous question?!

[A naturalistic philosopher may of course say that inner certainties are neither here nor there: the point is that the 'causal connections' which determine that the subject 'acts correctly' (now or later) equally determine the right response – 'yes I am certain' etc. From this perspective the problem of intentionality vanishes completely. (Compare Z #456)]

[How do you know you are carrying out the order correctly? The subject might indeed reply: I cannot be sure about this – perhaps I am not after all doing what the boss intended. But of course that is not what is at issue. If one is unsure what the boss intended, then one is unsure whether by 'do x' he meant do z or do y; but Wittgenstein's question is: how do you know that what you are doing now *constitutes* doing (say) y? Is your certainty *here* dependent upon the fact that in the past your actions have always been deemed correct?

[Suppose someone said: well I have been well trained in language use and so on that basis I can be quite sure that this (what I am doing now) is 'doing sub-task x1'; as for 'doing sub-task x2', I will discover soon enough what that means (just let me get to it, then I will show you; – until then I only

have the *signs* –).

['Next I bring about sub-task x2' – Wittgenstein's first question is: how do you know that you can do it? This does not mean: how do you know you are skillful enough, or that – as the extreme case of the later event not occurring – you will not suffer a brainstorm and forget the meaning of 'do x2'. Rather the question is intended to put before us a picture of the subject (who lacks first person intentionality) striding off into the unknown (the next sub-task) armed only with the *bare propositional* **sign** ('next I do x2') and his 'feeling of certainty'.

['But I surely know what I am to do next!! – why, I am on my way to do it now – I can even point out where I must stop to begin it!'. – But compare PI #185, final paragraph. – The point is, all these signs, these gestures, occur in the *here* and *now*; their meaning – inasmuch as this makes its appearance *later* – has yet to materialise. The question is, what *constitutes* our taking these signs and gestures as having the meaning they do have? (Or, as having *meaning* – when that meaning is defined in terms of what is *not* here and now – as against taking them to be just what they *are* (here and now) – namely, *signs and gestures*?)

[One is inclined to respond to the above by saying something along the lines of: 'So, within consciousness there must be a structure which incorporates future and past.' (the concept of the specious present). The problem with this response is that we are already inclined to try to make sense of the phrase 'within consciousness' in a certain way. (Compare the problem of solipsism. One wants to say in protest: but wouldn't *any* such structure *itself* also be 'here and now'?)]

The above, parenthetical comments bring to an end the first stage of our initial, 'phenomenological' interpretation of our starting passage. In this first stage we have made use of two ideas: the contrast with the naturalistic conception, and the distinction between prior to and at the semantic encounter. (Both of which had their origin in our starting passage.) In a moment we shall move onto the second of the two stages that

constitute the phenomenological part of the essay. Before we do that, though, it is worth raising a question which is connected with what we described earlier as our 'courtesy' use of the term 'phenomenology'. The question concerns whether or in what sense phenomenology and the distinction of prior to and at the semantic encounter fit together. For one might ask here: *who* is supposed to be making this distinction? Is it the subject through whose eyes we are supposed to be looking? Or the philosopher who attempts to get clearer about the 'structure' of what is going on? This is an issue that we shall come back to at later points in this essay.

The route we have followed during our interpretation so far has been the indirect one suggested by Wittgenstein's distinction of two conceptions of intentionality. We began by making the contrast with the slave, which introduced the idea that a first person conception of the proposition is misconceived if the notion of at the semantic encounter is not related back to the notion of prior to the semantic encounter. We then contrasted the subject's knowledge of what *he* can do (if shown the paint-box) and his knowledge of what the kettle can do (if switched on), which brings out the idea that there is a kind of direct or autonomous knowledge here. In our starting passage Wittgenstein signifies this notion of a prior, direct knowledge through the idea that the subject has access to something which he calls a paradigm.

Our indirect approach means that we are supposing the term 'paradigm' so far to have a meaning by way of the contrast with the concept of a mechanism. In the second stage of our phenomenological interpretation we alter our approach upon our starting passage, and attempt to interpret the Wittgensteinean conception of intentionality directly. We do this by interpreting the concept of a paradigm in terms of a (mental) image or picture.

In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein begins to make the moves that will take him away from his earlier, picture theory of meaning, and towards his later conception. In the main, though, he uses the concept of a picture in a positive way, to

argue against a (misapplied) naturalistic conception and for a certain first person conception. As our discussion progresses we shall criticise or evaluate the concept of a picture along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. But – aside from one note of warning – what we want to do at this point is to keep to the general tenor of the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion and use the concept of a picture to try to give expression to (first person) intentionality. (Note: henceforth we shall often let context supply the qualification 'first person' where appropriate.)

The concept of a picture is useful because it helps to give expression to what marks out and makes peculiar the concept of a paradigm. It does this through the idea that a real picture as we ordinarily conceive it allows us to 'see' what is not actually present: namely, what is depicted. This fits the idea – which we have expressed by way of the concept of *prior* – that the proposition (or intentional state) allows us to 'see' in advance what we only see in actuality *at* the semantic encounter (assuming positive verification). The connection here with Wittgenstein's hypothesis of a later failure of recognition is obvious. What the idea of a later failure is supposed to bring out is the fact that the subject does not have to wait and see which colour he *will* pick out in order that he may be sure that his prior intentional state is not the equivalent of a *broken* kettle. Or: he does not have to wait upon what the paradigm *will* do in order that it demonstrate its having a semantic value (as opposed to a truth value) *now*.

If one looks at the last two sentences of the above paragraph, then it can be seen that they can be taken in a way which fails to capture the real difference between the two conceptions of intentionality. It is in relation to this that the concept of a picture is important in expressing the first person conception. For it is too quick simply to say that unlike a mechanism the paradigm (intentional state) is 'semantically transparent', as though what we have here is no more than the difference between an opaque and a transparent box of tricks. The point of the concept of depiction is precisely the idea that the paradigm

– mental image, or whatever – reveals in advance something *else* (namely, what it images).

We said that the concept of a picture is useful because it helps to express what is peculiar about the concept of a paradigm. At the same time, though – or rather, in consequence of this – it contains a potential for misunderstanding. The danger here is quite different from the one we associated with the naturalistic conception, which was to do with the passing over of the first person concept of intentionality. In the case of the picture, the danger is that by seeming to assimilate intentionality to something familiar, it can appear as though we have a substantial grasp of the phenomenon. We can be lead to think this through the ambiguities of the statement, that the picture allows us to 'see' what is not actually present (something *else*). It is in some such way as this that we should like to characterise the mental image (paradigm), and in order to makes sense of such a characterisation we bring in the comparison with a real picture. But what can we really mean by this? In the case of a real picture we cannot mean literally that we see in it something *else*. – What we see is the picture, and that after all is just what it is – a piece of canvas with daubs of coloured paint in various arrangements upon it. So is our use of the comparison with a real picture based upon the idea that we can 'see in' the real picture a *likeness* to something else (which is not present)? But if we do mean this then we would seem to be approaching the other horn of the dilemma. For the statement that we can 'see a likeness' in the picture to someone or something else surely presupposes we can '*call to mind*' the absent person or thing. (The concept of similarity is after all a two place relation.) Thus the way in which we should like to use the real picture to make comprehensible (prior) intentionality on the face of it either does not work, or presupposes intentionality.

['I expect my friend N to arrive any moment – I have a picture of him in my head (in my mind) as I sit here waiting'. In appealing to the concept of a picture it is as though we say: 'well I know I'm expecting *N*, so I already take my mental picture to

be *of* someone (of something outside the picture) – and what is more, of someone I know well; so the picture is merely filling out detail or giving colour to the intentional state. (I interpret the picture as being of N because I already know *who* I am expecting – namely N.) It is as though we constantly presuppose intentionality in order to make comprehensible intentionality.]

One way of describing what our aim is in interpreting our starting passage is to say that we are trying to work out the *structure* of (Wittgenstein's conception of) intentionality. In the first part of our phenomenological interpretation we made use of the structure of prior to as opposed to at the semantic encounter (although we questioned how well this fits the idea of phenomenology). In this second part what comes out as important with regard to structure is this: that the concept of depiction essentially involves the idea of depicting or representing something *else* (something outside the picture, something in the world).

The idea that a picture represents something *else* makes a direct connection (and one which is independent of phenomenology) between the concept of depiction and the concept of a proposition as we ordinarily understand it. We shall recognise this connection in this essay by an assimilation to a general concept which we shall variously express through phrases such as: 'what is meant', 'what satisfies the proposition', 'what the signs say', 'what is depicted', 'what is intended', (etc.). We discuss the philosophical meaning or justification of this concept throughout the rest of the essay; but its justification in terms of our interpretation of our starting passage we can give straightaway. For the concept allows us to express what (from a first person perspective and in accordance with what we have said so far) is the connection between the two questions that Wittgenstein asks in that passage. We suppose this to be as follows.

Wittgenstein's first question asks how the subject knows that he *can* recognise a reference (or verify a proposition); to which the answer is: the subject knows *that* he can do this because

prior to the semantic encounter he knows *what* it is that the signs he is using mean. (He knows *what* will make the proposition true.) The paradigm – somehow – informs him of this. The second question asks about the subject's knowledge at the semantic encounter. Here we may say that it is because the subject knows prior to the semantic encounter *what* it is that the signs he is using mean, that he can say at the encounter, that *this* is what he meant (that *this* is what makes true his proposition).

In the above paragraph we have used the concept of what is meant to express the connection between Wittgenstein's two questions. At the same time we have given formal expression to an idea that has so far only been implicit in our discussion: that of an 'internal connection' between prior to and at the semantic encounter. What more exactly this notion of an internal connection signifies we set out shortly. Here all that we need say is that the notion of an internal connection characterises the concept of intentionality, and that our formal introduction of it in the above paragraph marks the end of the initial, phenomenological part of our interpretation of our starting passage. In the second part of the essay our aim will be to get clearer about Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality in philosophical terms and by reference to this notion of an internal connection. (Although what has come out of this phenomenological first part will play a main role in the discussion to come.)

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Part Two

The fact that we wanted to give our discussion an initial, phenomenological grounding means that we began our interpretation of our starting passage with very little philosophical

stage setting. The lack of philosophical context that this has entailed is something that we shall make up for to some extent as we proceed with the discussion. However, at this point where we begin the philosophical part of our discussion, it is worth taking the time to make a philosophical comment upon our main concept. The comment we make here is really no more than an aside whose purpose is to provide some belated philosophical orientation and to allow us to introduce a more usual and convenient terminology. We treat it as an aside because, so far as we are concerned, the concept of intentionality (and its associated concepts) are defined or justified primarily in terms of the 'facts' of phenomenology and the problem of an internal connection that is thereby introduced. (The question of the status of these 'facts' is one that we comment upon in due course.)

The comment we now make is upon the philosophical meaning of the concept of intentionality as one might find it characterised in an encyclopaedia. The concept of intentionality is generally taken to be defined through two concepts: the *intended object* (or intended state of affairs) and *aboutness* (or *intention*). The intended object is essentially what we have designated through the various phrases 'what is meant', 'what the proposition says' (etc.). The concept of aboutness (intention) we shall introduce in the next stage of this second part of the essay, although we shall tend to designate this concept by the term 'nonsatisfaction'. The meaning of these two defining concepts is determined philosophically through an idea that is connected with phenomenology, which is that we should begin with the structure of intentionality rather than the structure of the thought. If we were to begin with the structure of the thought (the articulation of the proposition), then it would be natural to distinguish the categories of content and 'aboutness' (or the domains they determine) in the following way. We should say in the case of our example that the proposition is *about* the copy of the Tractatus and the table in the other room, but that its *content* involves more than this; for its content is defined through what makes it true, which is the state of affairs of the book actually lying on the table. However, from a

phenomenological standpoint what is striking is the subject's capacity to anticipate (to 'intend') the state of affairs; and it is therefore the structure defined through this intentional capacity that is the primary object of interest. The focus is thus not on the distinction of category that can be made within the proposition, but rather on the nature of the content that is defined by the proposition as an intentional whole. The category of aboutness then gets expressed through the idea that the proposition is about (a state of affairs in) the world. Wittgenstein's example of the red paint in the paint-box then falls naturally into place. For we may say that although the subject has no particular paint-box in mind when he asserts that he can pick out the colour red, his thought nonetheless relates to the world (to paint-boxes in general, say) and thus has the property of aboutness in exactly the same sense as if he had a particular paint-box in mind. Of course, this means that in effect the categories of intended object (intended state of affairs) and aboutness (intention) define the same domain.

[The idea that the structure of intentionality takes precedence over the structure of the thought is the justification for assimilating Wittgenstein's and our example to a single case. We are focussing upon the paradigm in its role of making possible intention rather than in terms of the distinction propositional constituent – proposition.]

[There is also the following, non-phenomenological justification for beginning with the structure of intentionality: the thought that it is only through the *proposition* that language *works* – that is, operates upon the *world*. (Compare PI #49) This thought has, of course, to be set against the idea that because propositions are constructed, the propositional part must be given priority.]

[So far as interpretation goes, consider the insistence of both early and later Wittgenstein that philosophy is not concerned with specific forms of proposition.]

At the end of Part One we described the connection between

Wittgenstein's two questions of our starting passage, when we used the concept of the intended object (of what is meant) to express the internal connection between prior to and at the semantic encounter. In doing this, we also brought into view the philosophical problem, which is that this internal connection would seem to contain the paradox of an impossible ambiguity in the concept of the intended object. For, on the one hand we want the subject to be able to say at the semantic encounter that the fact (or state of affairs) before him is what he intended (is the intended object); so that on this interpretation the intended object is the existing fact. And yet on the other hand the possibility of falsity implies the subject's intentional state cannot be explained by reference to this fact, because he intends *something* even in the case where what he intends does not exist. Given that the intended object is introduced to be an explanatory or constitutive element in the structure of intentionality, we therefore conclude that it cannot be anything actual; and thus we have the interpretation of it as something ideal or subjective.

[Wittgenstein often uses the concept of a fact to signal the resolution of this paradox. Our use of the term 'fact' is obviously much looser. For us it is simply one way of referring to whatever it is that makes the proposition true. So far as our discussion is concerned terms such as 'situation' or 'state of affairs' in this kind of context mean exactly the same as 'fact'.]

This paradox is central to the question of how to understand the concept of intentionality, and much of the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion is concerned with how to understand or account for the internal connection that it expresses. Our phenomenological interpretation of our starting passage has emphasised the concept of prior precisely because the ambiguities inherent in the notion of an internal connection become more apparent, or become apparent in a particular way, from this perspective. In similar vein Wittgenstein often calls attention to the paradox by focussing on expectation. The following passage from the *Philosophical Investigations* (which we dis-

cuss later) is a good example:

> I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a report". The shot is fired. – Well, that was what you expected; so did that report somehow already exist in your expectation? Or is it just that there is some other kind of agreement between your expectation and what occurred; that that noise was not contained in your expectation, and merely accidentally supervened when the expectation was being fulfilled? – But no, if the noise had not occurred, my expectation would not have been fulfilled; the noise fulfilled it; it was not an accompaniment of the fulfillment like a second guest accompanying the one I expected. – Was the thing about the event that was not in the expectation too an accident, an extra provided by fate? – But then what was *not* an extra? Did something of the shot already occur in my expectation? – Then what *was* extra? For wasn't I expecting the whole shot?
>
> "The report was not so loud as I had expected" – "Then was there a louder bang in your expectation"?
>
> [PI #442]

The paradox finds expression in this passage in the question of how the fulfillment of the expectation can be (defined as) the event *itself*, rather than be defined through a notion of agreement with the expectation. Or: how the intended object of the subject's expectation can be the expected event when prior to the fulfillment of the expectation that event does not (yet) exist (and, if the expectation is not fulfilled, will not exist)?

[It is of course the case that most of our expectations are not expressed linguistically but through our behaviour. That does not, of course, mean they do not have a phenomenological manifestation, or that focussing upon the linguistically expressed case has no relevance to them. On the other hand

we are not asserting that our kind of case is to be thought of as paradigmatic for these other cases. We are distinguishing our kind of case – the simple and pragmatic, linguistically expressed, somewhat artificially isolated to help us to characterise it phenomenologically – in order to bring out the nature of the distinctions that apply to *this* case. The question of the wider significance of such distinctions is a secondary one within our discussion.]

Our aim of obtaining a clearer understanding of Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality means that we are committed to trying to think about the paradox of an internal connection. We have seen that the concept of intended object is essential both in expressing the internal connection and in bringing out its paradoxical nature, which implies it must play a central role in our discussion. However, we have also suggested that the internal connection, or our apprehension of its nature, differs in accordance with whether our focus is primarily upon prior to or at the semantic encounter. Something of this difference can be seen in the above passage, but it becomes very clear if we compare our earlier expression of the paradox with Wittgenstein's expression in the following passage from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> [...] When we say, and *mean*, that such–and–such is the case, we – and our meaning – do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: *this-is-so*. But this paradox (which has the form of a truism) can also be expressed in this way: Thought can be of what is *not* the case.
>
> [PI #95]

[PI #96, which comments upon the complete passage, should be compared with PI #110. The almost conflicting qualifications can perhaps be made clearer if we relate them to Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism. (I am thinking of the earlier, ambiguous assessment of uniqueness and the later transmutation of solipsism into 'solipsism of the we', defined through

a common language.]

We shall not comment explicitly upon the above expression of the internal connection or upon its relation to our earlier expression. What is relevant to us here is the fact that we are taking the concept of the intended object to be defined or justified in terms of our phenomenological interpretation, in which our approach was from the perspective of prior. In accordance with this emphasis upon the concept of prior, in the discussion of the intended object that constitutes Part Two of our discussion we shall take our bearings from the above passage (PI #95). We take our aim to be, roughly, to get a clearer understanding of how or in what role the intended object enters into the structure of *prior* intentionality (so as to make possible an internal connection).

In the passage PI #95 Wittgenstein gives two expressions of the 'truistic' version of the paradox. In line with this, in the following, first stage of Part Two we shall give two interpretations of the prior intended object, which we base upon these two expressions. At the same time, and as a way of making clearer what (for Wittgenstein) these interpretations amount to, we shall criticise these interpretation in accordance with the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion of intentionality and with what came out of our phenomenological interpretation.

In the first expression of the truistic version of the paradox it is stated that our meaning 'does not stop anywhere short of the fact'. A natural way to interpret this is as saying that if we construe the prior intended object as *something* (other than the fact that makes the proposition true), then we misrepresent the structure of intentionality. For we make it seem as though when the subject thinks, he stands in relation to some kind of psychological intermediary – the (sense of the) thought – whereas what we want to say is that he stands in relation to the *world* (to the facts), by means of the thought.

In interpreting this first expression, Wittgenstein's phrase from the *Philosophical Investigations* discussion of the concept of

pain comes to mind: 'It is not a *something* but not a *nothing* either!' The above paragraph suggests we should think of the proposition on the model of a relational term, which fits this 'not a something but not a nothing', but is complicated by the question of the relatum on the subject's side (one thinks of the Tractatus treatment of the subject). Thus it is perhaps equally valid to make a comparison with the concept of the predicate. In either case the (Fregean) concept of unsaturatedness can be used to point towards the idea that the proper way to conceive of the proposition is in terms of the concept of *nonsatisfaction*. In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein comments upon this as follows:

> A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a thought, what makes it true – even when that thing is not there at all! Whence this *determining* of what is not yet there? This despotic demand? ("The hardness of the logical must.")
>
> [PI #437]

> "A plan as such is something unsatisfied." (Like a wish, an expectation, a suspicion, and so on.)
>
> By this I mean: expectation is unsatisfied, because it is the expectation of something; belief, opinion, is unsatisfied, because it is the opinion that something is the case, something real, something outside the process of believing.
>
> [PI #438]

> In what sense can one call wishes, expectations, beliefs, etc. "unsatisfied"? What is our prototype of nonsatisfaction? Is it a hollow space? And would one call that unsatisfied? Wouldn't this be a metaphor too? – Isn't what we call nonsatisfaction a feeling – say hunger?
>
> In a particular system of expressions we can describe an object by means of the words "satisfied" and "unsatisfied". For example, if we lay it down that we call a hollow cylinder an "unsatisfied cylinder" and the solid

cylinder that satisfies it "its satisfaction".

[PI #439]

In the first paragraph of PI #439 Wittgenstein asks what is our prototype of nonsatisfaction; in other words, when we say our wishes etc. are unsatisfied, what are we comparing them with? The follow up to this question – Is it a hollow space? And would one call that unsatisfied? Wouldn't this be a metaphor too? – invites us to reflect that nothing we find in the world would be unsatisfied in the required sense. That, of course, is the thought that lead us to introduce the notion of nonsatisfaction in the first place ('not a something but not a nothing'). He then suggests that what we call 'nonsatisfaction' is more like a feeling – say hunger. Here it is as though the move is being made back to the subject in order to get away from any hypostatisation. The second paragraph then returns us to the lack of a prototype by making the comparison with the case where *we* lay down in advance what counts as being satisfied. So for example we may lay down that that a solid cylinder satisfies a hollow cylinder. The point to note here of course is that any such stipulation makes the notion of (non)satisfaction parasitic upon an already given intentionality.

'Nothing we find in the world would be unsatisfied in the required sense': this raises the question of what the required sense is. In our phenomenological interpretation we pointed out that it is essential to the concept of (first person) intentionality that the subject know *in advance* what is intended. Or, as we also put it, intentionality contains the idea that the subject does not have to wait upon the interaction at the semantic encounter in order to 'find out' what he means. We have not yet subjected this phenomenological conclusion to a philosophical examination, but on the face of it what it implies is that the unsatisfied state should *itself* reveal or make manifest what will satisfy it. Or perhaps: that the state itself should make clear that it will be satisfied by just *that* (and not

anything else) which the subject intends. Such statements of what is required are, it hardly needs saying, problematic with regard to their philosophical meaning; but they help to make sense of the criticism that Wittgenstein directs against the notion of nonsatisfaction in the *Philosophical Remarks* and the *Philosophical Grammar*. In the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein points out that if nonsatisfaction is thought of on the model of a feeling, then recognition – or knowing that this fact *is* what was intended – must in its turn be thought of as a feeling (of no longer being dissatisfied), which he dismissively refers to as a feeling of happiness. He then comments upon Russell's theory, which he interprets as equivalent to this conception, as follows:

> I believe Russell's theory amounts to the following: if I give someone an order and I am happy with what he then does, then he has carried out my order.
>
> (If I wanted to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the stomach, taking away my appetite, then it was this punch I originally wanted.)
>
> [...]
>
> [PhR #22]

The parenthesised sentence makes it very clear that this criticism of the concept of nonsatisfaction as analogous to a feeling of hunger works by arguing that the subject is in effect reduced to our earlier, semantically blind slave (the feeling of happiness as the equivalent of the earlier, flashing light). In other words, without the (prior) concept of *what* is meant, intentionality (or *meaning*) has so far not even made an appearance.

The *Philosophical Remarks* criticism may be compared with the following, *Philosophical Grammar* criticism. It makes essentially the same point but does so in a way that brings out

more clearly the different aspects:

> [...]
>
> Expectation is not related to its satisfaction in the same way as hunger is related to its satisfaction. I can describe the hunger, and describe what takes it away, and say that it takes it away. And it isn't like this either: I have a wish for an apple, and so I will call 'an apple' whatever takes away the wish.
>
> [PhG #87]

In this remark there are two criticisms of the concept of non-satisfaction, which can be thought of as the same criticism but viewed from different perspectives. In the first it as though we are attempting to think about things from outside – as an observer describing the facts (whether about myself or about a third person). The implied point of this criticism is contained in the fact that the description of the state of hunger ('a gnawing sensation in the pit of the stomach that comes and goes and gets worse with time') and the description of what the subject says will satisfy it (a green fruit with a sharp flavour – that is, an apple) are different. The connection between the two is thus external (causal) rather than internal (or logical): it is an hypothesis that eating the apple will take away the feeling; we cannot infer from the first description alone that satisfaction will come about through what the second describes. In this way it may be said that possession of the state does not – as the phenomenological notion of an internal connection would seem to demand – *by itself* point to what satisfies the state; and so satisfaction is a matter of what happens to take away the feeling.

The second criticism invites us to contrast intentionality with the statement, 'I have a wish for an apple, and so I will call 'an apple' whatever takes away the wish'. This criticism may be thought of as essentially the first criticism but viewed as it

were from inside. The implication of the first criticism is that because the present state of nonsatisfaction does not '(logically) contain' or allow us to infer what is intended, semantic responsibility is passed onto the later event of taking away the (feeling of) nonsatisfaction. Thus, and in line with the second criticism, we seem forced to conclude that what I intend by my words is something I discover later – 'so I will call 'an apple' whatever takes away the wish'.

We pointed out a few paragraphs back that the philosophical meaning of the requirement that phenomenology seems to lay down is problematic. In addition, the criticism of nonsatisfaction contained in the passages we have quoted would seem to be as much interpretation of nonsatisfaction as criticism of it, and so raises questions about why Wittgenstein interprets nonsatisfaction in this way. For these reasons the comments we now make upon the Wittgensteinean criticism of our first interpretation of the prior intended object is concerned mainly with bringing into view the conceptual issues that are involved. We shall return to most of what we say here later in the essay.

First we want to make a comment upon the way we set out the distinctions that entered into our presentation of the *Philosophical Grammar* criticism. We said that the first of the two criticisms involves an 'outside' perspective, or perspective defined in terms of our (being in a position to) describe what is going on. We pointed out that this description has the effect of misrepresenting what (phenomenologically) is an internal connection as an external connection. In making this point, though, we parenthetically contrasted external as causal with internal as *logical*. The contrast of causal with our phenomenologically defined notion of internal is clear enough; but our use of the term 'logical' is not, and needs remarking upon. What we wanted to indicate by the use of this term is the possibility of a different way of thinking about things from the one suggested by phenomenology. In our phenomenological interpretation of our starting passage we said that the naturalistic conception (with its outside perspective) can prevent us from

seeing clearly the nature of the first person phenomenon. Now it might be said that in the second criticism of passage PhG #87, this is what is going on; so that what the passage as a whole is trying to do is point us back to a first person conception defined phenomenologically rather than by way of an 'outside' perspective (as is expressed in the first criticism of passage PhG #87). However, although we have justified our use of the term 'internal connection' through phenomenology, (the early) Wittgenstein uses the term as much to imply a logical relation. (The two uses not, of course, being incompatible.) Thus, even though we are approaching Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality by way of his philosophy of mind, in interpreting what Wittgenstein says we need to have in view this other, logical way of approach. Later in this essay we shall make a comparison with Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning, which will allow us to bring these differences of approach into a clearer interrelationship.

Next we want to comment upon an alternative way in which we might have presented the *Philosophical Grammar* criticism. What we might have tried to argue is that the notion of nonsatisfaction cannot make comprehensible intentionality because, insofar as we must make use of language in order to express the connection between unsatisfied state and intended object, the notion presupposes intentionality (and hence nonsatisfaction). This notion of *presupposition* is significant for two reasons, which we now set out and comment upon.

First, it allows us to make a connection with our analysis of PI #439. We pointed out there that Wittgenstein distinguishes the two alternatives of stipulating what counts as satisfaction – which presupposes intentionality – and assimilating nonsatisfaction to hunger – which the *Philosophical Remarks* criticism makes clear reduces the subject to semantic blindness. This is comparable with the *Philosophical Grammar* version of the criticism through the fact that even though we may think of its two criticisms as equivalent, the first does not obviously imply semantic blindness because it takes us back to the (presupposed) intentionality of the outside observer. It is only

when we imagine the subject attempting to explain his *own* intentionality by way of nonsatisfaction, as in the second criticism, that the nonsensicality of the conception is made clear.

The connection we have just made back to passage PI #439 is significant because it helps to bring to our attention a feature of Wittgenstein's criticism of nonsatisfaction which might raise a doubt in our minds. This concerns the implication in the various critical passages we have quoted, that the alternatives, of reduction to semantic blindness (by interpreting the external connection 'from inside') and of presupposing intentionality (by stipulating or describing ('from outside')) in a way that manifestly gets us no further forward) are in some sense exhaustive. Now at first sight it is not at all clear that or why this should be so. One might suppose this disjunction might allow for a middle position, according to which satisfaction of the intentional state would be defined in a general way 'from outside', but with our description (or theory) of the prior (unsatisfied) state being such that it makes comprehensible how that state should yield up a phenomenologically adequate notion of intended object. In our discussion of Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning we shall try to get clearer about what such a middle way might involve.

The second reason why the notion of *presupposition* of intentionality is significant is that it makes a connection with the idea of *regress*. This idea is implicit as vicious regress in the second of the two criticisms of the *Philosophical Grammar* passage, as is seen in the fact that in the expression of it intentionality is both assumed – through the subject's understanding of the explanation – and (by implication) taken away – by the content. We have suggested that the first and second criticisms can be thought of as the same, but we should say at this point that although this is a helpful way of thinking about the *Philosophical Grammar* passage, things are complicated here by issues connected with the idea of a theory of meaning and the difference between an indefinite and vicious regress. Setting these complications to one side for the

moment, though, we may affirm the connection we are making with the concept of regress through the following passages from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> Saying "I should like an apple" does not mean: I believe an apple will quell my feeling of nonsatisfaction. This proposition is not an expression of a wish but of nonsatisfaction.
>
> [PI #440]

> Could the justification of an action as fulfillment of an order run like this: "You said 'Bring me a yellow flower', upon which this one gave me a feeling of satisfaction; that is why I have brought it"? Wouldn't one have to reply: "But I didn't set you to bring me the flower which should give you that sort of feeling after what I said!"?
>
> [PI #460]

In the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion, the idea of a circularity or regress in an explanation of intentionality (in terms of nonsatisfaction) is expressed in the following passage, which is worth setting out in full:

> I should like to say, if there were only an external connection no connection could be described at all, since we only describe the external connection by means of the internal one. If this is lacking, we lose the footing we need for describing anything at all – just as we can't shift anything with our hands unless our feet are planted firmly.
>
> Causality rests on an observed uniformity. Now that doesn't mean that a uniformity we have observed until now will go on for ever, but it must be an established fact that events have been uniform until now; that cannot in turn be the insecure result of a series of observa-

> tions which again is itself not a datum, but depends on another equally insecure series, etc. *ad inf.*
>
> If I wish that p were the case, then of course p is not the case and there must be a surrogate for p in the state of wishing, just as, of course, in the expression of the wish.
>
> There's nothing left for me, in answer to the question, 'What does p instruct you to do?', but to say it, i.e. to give another sign.
>
> But can't you give someone an instruction by showing him how to do something? Certainly: and then you have to tell him 'Now copy that'. Perhaps you have already had examples of this before but now you have to say to him that what happened then should happen now. That still means: sooner or later there is a leap from the sign to what is signified.
>
> [PhR #26]

The above passage makes a simple point, but one that is nonetheless important. Essentially it points out that our signs cannot be applied to the world by way of an explanation (or description), because that would give us a regress of explanation – and, very clearly, a vicious regress, given that our signs *do* get applied. In order that the regress be nullified, there must be an 'internal connection' between proposition and world, which the passage in effect defines negatively (and circularly) as a connection that is not or cannot be mediated by further propositions.

The distinction between a connection that *cannot* be described, and a connection that in practice is not described (or mediated by an explanation), but might have been by way of a further one that is not described, is of course fundamental. If we interpret the negative definition of an internal connection by way of the latter, then it may be said that the circularity of it does not get in the way of our making sense of what is going on. For, although we must say the subject at the time

must make an 'immediate' connection (a 'leap'), that would leave it open for another subject (or the same subject at a later point in time) to describe or explain 'what takes place'. In other words, it would involve us in a harmless indefinite regress rather than a vicious circle.

[It may seem as though something like a transition from 'cannot be described' to 'is not described' takes place in the *Philosophical Grammar*, and marks the move to the later philosophy. However, it seems to me that the second is easily misrepresented if it is not understood in terms of the (kind of) distinctions that are yielded by the first. It is for this reason that we are tending as far as possible to interpret the idea of a conceptual difficulty (leading to a regress) in terms of Tractatus ideas.]

[It is worth interjecting at this point to say something about the difference within the Wittgensteinean context between the concepts of description and explanation. The basic point we want to make is that it is easy to misinterpret this difference and as a consequence to underestimate the continuity of early and later Wittgenstein. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein assimilates the concept of description to the concept of what is said, and so to the concept of thesis (asserting that such and such is the case), and in this way connects it with the concept of (scientific) explanation. The contrast is with what can only be shown (although this contrast is complicated by the fact that although scientific theory deals with the facts, it is said to determine forms of description). So from the Tractatus we get the idea that description belongs to the side of *contingent* truth. In the later philosophy Wittgenstein *opposes* description (of the linguistic facts) to explanation and the putting forward of theses. This seems to be at odds with the earlier way of making distinctions, but what we need to take account of is that in these later contexts Wittgenstein means by description not assertion, but the pointing out of what (uncontroversially) takes place in our use of language. From these, apparently trivial descriptions we are supposed to 'see' the internal connections that determine meaning, which means this

later notion of description is really closer to the earlier notion of showing than of saying. (Of course, the later relativism and the move to 'depth grammar' being found on the surface are also factors here.) The particular relevance of this for us is that we shall tend to assimilate the notions of description – in line with the earlier – and explanation – in line with the later – to a single idea (of a conceptual difficulty with giving an account of the working of language).]

There is obviously something of a parallel between what we have just said about describing an internal connection 'from outside' and the Russellian solution to the difficulties of description which we mentioned in our Introduction. For this reason, when speaking of this idea of an 'outside' description or explanation, with the notion of outside implying description of the (intentional) subject, we shall generally use the phrase taking a 'meta view' (of what is going on).

At this point we ought to say something to make more precise this notion of a meta view. The difficulty we have, though, is that this concept, or its significance for intentionality, is something we are trying to get clearer about through this essay. Thus we shall just make the following two remarks regarding the way this concept enters into our discussion and its aims. The first remark is simply to remind us that both early and later Wittgenstein argue against the idea of meta, whether in the sense of a meta logic (or meta mathematics), or as a theoretical account of the proposition (and hence of intentionality). The second remark relates to the fact that the concept of a meta language is (in the formal sense) a perfectly clear one, and so not something one can argue against as such. The fact that Wittgenstein does argue against this concept therefore suggests that the point of his opposition is that when we make the move to a meta level, we necessarily cover over or miss what is essential to the subject language. It is to try to get clearer about what is thereby missed out that we are making use of the informal notion of a meta view of the intentional subject.

We have now come to an end of what we wanted to say by way

of introduction of our first interpretation of the prior intended object as nonsatisfaction. In our brief discussion of this interpretation we have mainly been concerned with pointing out the conceptual issues that are tied up with it. What we saw to begin with is that the basic *Philosophical Remarks* criticism of nonsatisfaction (as reducing the subject to semantic blindness) is in agreement with what came out of our phenomenological interpretation, although we also pointed out that the philosophical meaning of this is problematic. We then made a connection with (and raised a doubt about) the apparent assumption in Wittgenstein's criticisms of a disjunction (a tertium non datur) of intentionality and semantic blindness. Finally we pointed out that Wittgenstein makes a connection between nonsatisfaction and the idea of a regress, and so made a connection with the Wittgensteinean thesis that there is no meta view from which one can give an explanation of how language works.

In a moment we shall move on to our second interpretation of the prior intended object. Before we do this, though, we want to comment upon an issue which is relevant to both interpretations, but in different ways. We pointed out at several points in our phenomenological interpretation that there is a question of meaningfulness, or a difficulty of expression, with what we were saying. We now want to say something further about this, insofar as it relates to the first stage of that phenomenological interpretation. In order to help us get clearer about what is involved, we begin by quoting this passage from the *Philosophical Remarks*:

> I believe Russell's theory amounts to the following: if I give someone an order and I am happy with what he then does, then he has carried out my order.
>
> (If I wanted to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the stomach, taking away my appetite, then it was this punch I originally wanted.)

> The difficulty here with giving an account of what's going on is that if someone makes false assumptions about the way language works and tries to give an account

> of comething with language conceived as functioning in this way, the result is not something false but nonsense.
>
> Thus in terms of Russell's theory I could not express things by saying that the order is carried out *if* I am made happy by what happens, because I have also to recognise my being made happy, and this requires that something *else* should happen which I cannot describe in advance.
>
> [PhR #22]

The first (which we quoted earlier) and third paragraphs of this passage summarise the aspect of Wittgenstein's criticism which we have called attention to: the idea that nonsatisfaction does not yet begin to be an account of intentionality. This aspect may be related to the second paragraph of the passage, where Wittgenstein makes the point (or the claim) that a mistaken account of language is nonsense rather than false. One implication of this idea is that a correct account does not contrast with a mistaken account, so that an attempt to understand the former by way of such a contrast is liable to lead to misunderstanding. This idea of a misleading contrast is what we now comment upon with regard to the first part of our earlier phenomenological interpretation.

We began our interpretation of our starting passage by making a contrast with a 'mechanical' version of the naturalistic conception of intentionality by analogy with the slave of our re-working of passage PI #8. Our aim in doing this was to present the first person conception by pointing out how the naturalistic conception fails to correspond to the phenomenon of intentionality. In order to make this point we supposed the subject (viewed by analogy with the slave) might react with surprise when he discovers that *this* fact rather than another is the one that makes the proposition true. In making this supposition, though, we were in effect contradicting ourselves, and so speaking nonsense. For, of course, discovery means dis-

covery *that*, and surprise means surprise *that* (such and such is the case) – so that in either case there is the presupposition that the subject *expects* that things will be one way rather than another. Thus, in attempting to say why the mechanistic account is mistaken (as an account of first person intentionality), we ascribe to the subject precisely what in the account we say he does not possess.

The other contrast we made in that first part of our phenomenological interpretation was between the subject's knowledge of what a mechanism (such as a kettle) can do, and his knowledge of what he can do (if shown a sample of red). We commented at the time on how this contrast is misleading, and so here we shall just direct our comments against the contrast Wittgenstein makes in our starting passage. What Wittgenstein says there in effect is that if we take the claim to first person semantic knowledge to relate to a future event (of recognising or not recognising red), then we misrepresent things inasmuch as that event might not come to pass, but the proposition would not thereby be falsified. He concludes that it is as though the semantic knowledge relates instead to the subject's present state (of possession of a paradigm). Clearly, though, by the above remark from the *Philosophical Remarks*, there must be something misleading about this move from future event to present state, inasmuch as it fails to bring out the nonsensicality of the opposing view.

[How then should we express things in accordance with PhR #22? Not by saying that doubts about the coming to pass of the future event do *not* count against the claim to semantic knowledge, but rather by saying something along these lines: that if the doubts *did* – per impossibile – count against the claim, then they would be like the doubts of someone who says, 'I am not sure what will come out of *this box*' – and then when asked what *might* come out, replies by producing more and more boxes. (Compare the second criticism of remark PhG #87)]

In our discussion of our first interpretation of the prior intended object we have seen that the basic Wittgensteinean

criticism is that the notion of nonsatisfaction leaves out any reference to the notion of *what* is intended (until the subject gets to the semantic encounter and confronts the fact in question). This basic criticism points us to the second way in which we can interpret the concept of the prior intended object in accordance with the version of the paradox of PI #95. In the second sentence of that truistic version, Wittgenstein points out that thought can be of what is *not* the case. The point we may take to be implied by that statement is that when we know that a proposition is false, we nonetheless know *what* it is that is not the case. Thus we get the interpretation of the prior intended object which draws on such concepts as mental picture and similarity, and stresses the idea that *something* is intended (irrespective of the state of affairs in the world). This second interpretation says that the prior intended object is something in or accessible to the subject's mind which is *like* the reality that later presents itself (or not) to the subject.

Our second interpretation of the (prior) intended object is thus the same as our interpretation of the paradigm in the second part of our phenomenological interpretation: it is to think of the intended object as a mental image or picture. In that earlier discussion we were interested in using the concept of a picture to give expression to intentionality, although we also warned against the idea that the concept of depiction can (in itself) make intentionality comprehensible. What we said there by way of warning is that if the notion of image is to have an independent meaning, then it must presumably get this meaning from the case of a real picture; but the real picture only works as a picture by way of intentionality. In discussing the mental picture as an interpretation of the prior intended object we shall return to the theme of this criticism (and in part simply repeat it), although here we shall tie what we are saying more closely to Wittgenstein's remarks.

We take the following passage from Zettel as the basis for our discussion:

> If I try to describe the process of intention, I feel first and foremost that it can do what it is supposed to only

> by containing an extremely faithful picture of what it intends. But further, that that too does not go far enough, because a picture, whatever it may be, can be variously interpreted; hence this picture too in its turn stands isolated. When one has the picture in view by itself it is suddenly dead, and it is as if something had been taken away from it, which had given it life before. It is not a thought, not an intention; whatever accompaniments we imagine for it, articulate or inarticulate processes, or any feeling whatsoever, it remains isolated, it does not point outside itself to a reality beyond.
>
> Now one says: 'Of course it is not the picture that intends, but we who use it to intend something.' But if this intending, this meaning, is in turn something that is done with the picture, then I cannot see why that has to involve a human being. The process of digestion can also be studied as a chemical process, independently of whether it takes place in a living being. We want to say 'Meaning is surely a mental process, a process of conscious life, not of dead matter.' But what will give such a thing the specific character of what goes on? [...]
>
> [Z #236]

This passage really contains two criticisms of the concept of mental picture as explanatory of intentionality, which (in rough terms) we may characterise as logical and ontological. We begin with the logical criticism, which in essence is contained in the following sentence:

> ...a picture, whatever it may be, can be variously interpreted...

The point being made here is that no matter how good a likeness a (real) picture may be, it can always be interpreted

in different ways; but the mental image is *not* open to interpretation. In the *Philosophical Investigations* this criticism is expressed by Wiittgenstein's interlocutor in the following passage:

> "The image must be more like its object than any picture. For, however like I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else as well. But it is essential to the image that it is the image of *this* and of nothing else." Thus one might come to regard the image as a super–likeness.
>
> [PI #389]

The interlocutor's conclusion, that the (mental) image must be *more* like its object than any picture, is clearly at odds with the criticism; for it asks for *more* of something which by its very nature is inadequate. But what should we conclude from this? One conclusion would be the wholly negative one that it is a mistake to think of the mental image by analogy with the concept of a picture (construed in terms of likeness). [Compare what Wittgenstein says about reducing latent to patent nonsense.] On the other hand, it might be argued that if *more* of the same thing is inadequate, then we must make up for the lack that we wanted to fill with this *more* by postulating the existence of something quite different. – Something we may call 'intention', something which, as Wittgenstein expresses it in another passage in Zettel, 'seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation; which is not a further sign or picture, but something else –the thing that cannot be further interpreted' (Z #231) We shall come back to the difference between these two conclusions after we have discussed the 'ontological' criticism.

Before we move onto the 'ontological' criticism, though, it is worth pointing out two similarities between how this 'logical' criticism works and the earlier criticism of the prior intended

object in terms of nonsatisfaction. In the first place (and one should compare here our earlier comment upon the first criticism contained in PhG #87) we can point out that if the image or picture is something we can *describe* – other than tautologically, in terms of what is depicted – then it will be open to the criticism Wittgenstein is making. For the description of the picture and the description of what it depicts will be different, which raises the question of how the subject of the intentional state is able (through the picture) to intend just *this* state of affairs. (If the description was not different then it would seem possible the subject might confuse the two. Compare too Z #54.) And second, of course, there is the threat of regress in the idea that the image construed as a likeness requires an interpretation to be made unambiguous; for if that interpretation is a picture then it too will require interpretation; and so on.

[Does it matter if the mental picture is ambiguous? Are not all our thoughts vague anyway? For example the statement, 'My copy of the Tractatus is somewhere in the other room.' But the point is that here the vagueness is as it were within intention: I understand the limits (even if I cannot always set them out exactly); I can make the statement more precise if I wish. Compare Wittgenstein's example in the *Philosophical Investigations* of a picture of a man walking up a hill leaning on a stick – which might equally be interpreted as a man sliding in that position down the hill. In such a case we can use word language to disambiguate the picture: but the concept of (mental) picture was introduced to make clear the meaning of the words.]

The second, or 'ontological' criticism of passage Z #236 is implied by the way the picture is characterised in the following section:

> [...] When one has the picture in view by itself it is suddenly dead, and it is as if something had been taken away from it, which had given it life before. It is not a thought, not an intention; whatever accompaniments we imagine for it, articulate or inarticulate processes, or

> any feeling whatsoever, it remains isolated, it does not point outside itself to a reality beyond.
>
> [...]
>
> [Z #236]

The point of this section of the passage can be made more clearly if we go back to the distinction of prior to and at the semantic encounter. What we emphasised early on is that the concept of at the encounter has no (first person) sense unless it is related back to the concept of prior. What defines this concept, though, is that through the paradigm – the image – one can anticipate something *else*: namely, what is at the encounter (if the proposition is true). But now one must ask: in what sense can a real picture – or anything modelled on a real picture – reveal something *else*? (And here the concepts of genre and portrait picture are equally applicable.) Must we not say that any picture, mental or otherwise, *by itself* can only reveal *itself*? That is to say, '..when one has the picture in view by itself it is suddenly dead...it remains isolated, it does not point outside itself to a reality beyond'. Or, as we might also say: a (mental) picture taken as *something* ('in view by itself') could only *get in the way* of an intentional relation to the world; for our attention would be directed *to* such a picture, whereas in thought our intent is toward something *other* (namely, the state of affairs that 'is depicted').

In the passage Wittgenstein continues: 'Now one says: 'Of course it is not the picture that intends, but we who use it to intend something.' The problem with the idea that a human being (or mind) is the essential thing, though – and aside from Wittgenstein's own comment – is that this is so far a wholly unclear idea. The most it can mean so far is that what is essential to the picture is that it be a mental as opposed to real picture. But then cannot one raise the objection: are you not transferring the weight of explanation from the concept of (real) *picture* onto the concept of *mental* (picture)? And

do we know what is meant here by 'mental' (picture) other than that it is defined so as not to raise the difficulty that we find when we assimilate it to a real picture? (Which might be alright if we had a *clear* view of the difficulty that is at issue here.) We might ask too – which relates to the question of the two conclusions to the logical criticism – how much weight of explanation is thus transferred from the concept of picture to the concept of mental. (And how is the division to be thought)?

This second criticism is very clear: it says that thinking of the mental image on the model of a picture is mistaken in the first place because it is conceived as *something* (to which the subject may take up a relation in the way that he does with a real picture). We find this same criticism contained essentially if not explicitly in many of the passages in which Wittgenstein comments upon the concept of image; for example, the following:

> The strange thing is expressed in the fact that if this is the event I expected, it isn't distinct from the one I expected.
>
> I say: 'that's just how I imagined it'; and someone says something like 'That's impossible, because the one was an image and the other isn't. Did you take your image for reality?'
>
> [...] [PhG #88]
>
> [...]
>
> Surely the strange thing about expectation is that we know it is an *expectation*. For we couldn't, e.g., imagine the following situation: I have some image or other before me and say: 'Now, I don't know whether it's an expectation or a memory, or an image without any relation to reality.'
>
> And *that's* what shows that expectation is immediately connected with reality.
>
> For of course you couldn't say the future the expec-

tation speaks of was also only a surrogate for the real future.

For I await in just as real a sense as I *wait*.

[PhR #35]

[...]

If you were to ask: 'Do I expect the future itself, or only something similar to the future?', that would be nonsense. Or, if you said, 'We can never be certain that *that* was what we really expected.' [...]

[PhR #27]

[...]

If there were no connection between the act of expectation and reality, you could expect a nonsense.

[PhR #33]

The first and third of these passages require no further comment. In the second passage Wittgenstein argues in part by reference to the distinction between past and future, and in part by implicit reference to the distinction between sense and nonsense ('...an image without any relation to reality.'), which in the last passage is explicit. The point of the first distinction is that knowing an image is an expectation as against a memory is not a matter of recognising a *type* of image, but about being in no doubt about its *content* – about *what* is said. And so too the second distinction: we know an image (or proposition) makes sense not because we have followed certain rules in its construction (whose correctness would in the end be a matter of hypothesis) but because the concept of sense and the concept of saying *something* (and *thereby* knowing that one has said something meaningful) are equivalent. (Compare the Wittgensteinean thesis that sense is bounded from inside:

when we seem to move 'outside' we do not get a proposition which says something meaningless, we get a set of *signs* (which cease to say something).)

The statements in the above paragraph, that we are in no doubt about the content of the image, or about what the proposition says, look like statements belonging to psychology, and so statements that avoid the real issue. For what we are interested in in philosophy is *what it is* for a proposition to say something (meaningful). One thing that takes the statements beyond psychology, though, is that the implied criticism of the concept of image as *something* points us toward the concept of nonsatisfaction. For 'nonsatisfaction' means not (yet) satisfied by *reality*. Thus Wittgenstein argues in the passage that these observations show us that expectation and reality are *immediately* connected.

[Compare the negative definition of an internal connection which came out of our earlier discussion of a regress by reference to PhR #26. We said then that an internal connection is one that is not mediated by further propostions; that is, an 'immediate' connection. The question that is raised by the above remarks on expectation (and by our phenomenological interpretation) is: what meaning has the concept of 'immediate' (connection) from the position of *prior*?]

We said that one way in which the above passages go beyond psychology is through their pointing us to the notion of nonsatisfaction (by reality). Another way, which is perhaps less clear in its meaning, is to do with the question of the order of distinctions (of what is defined relative to what). So in the case of the second passage, the question of whether the distinction between past or future is internal or external to the content of the image (to what it says). This question of which distinctions are first relates to the significance of the two conclusions we distinguished in the case of the logical criticism, and is what we comment upon next.

The one conclusion we said might be drawn from the 'logical' argument is that, because any picture (construed as a like-

ness) is always open to interpretation (always ambiguous), we must postulate the existence of something 'quite different' to make the mental picture work; something which gives 'the final interpretation' and which we may call 'intention'. On this way of conceiving things the (real) picture is able *almost* to do what the mental image does. So that all we need to do is add something further – namely, intention – in order to make the two equivalent.

The other, more radically negative conclusion is to say that assimilating the prior intended object to a (real) picture does not even *begin* to introduce intentionality. In this case we would argue that it does not make sense to say the (mental or real) picture requires intention in order that it be interpreted in some particular way, for intentionality is already presupposed if we are to *speak* of different interpretations. (That is, intention does not choose between but makes possible the very notion of alternatives to choose between.) We might also say: it does not make sense to speak of an 'almost representation' – or something that almost represents (almost reaches across to the world beyond where the subject is now); when we make an assertion, we either say something, or we do not – there is no half way house.

The second of these two conclusions is the one that fits better with the way Wittgenstein expresses the 'ontological' criticism: '..when one has the picture in view by itself it is suddenly dead...it remains isolated, it does not point outside itself to a reality beyond'. (We may say: if the picture does not point outside itself, then it so far does not *begin* to be a semantic entity.) It is also reasonably clear that the early Wittgenstein's conception of the proposition is more in line with the second of these two conclusions. (We shall say more about this.) We may also compare here what we said in our discussion of the first interpretation of the prior intended object about a disjunction of semantic blindness against intentionality.

That, though, is by way of interpretation; the question we should like answered is whether the 'Wittgensteinean conclusion' (as we may call it) is correct. We said in the preceding

but one passage that 'it does not make sense to say the (mental or real) picture requires intention in order that it be interpreted in some particular way, for intentionality is already presupposed if we are to *speak* of different interpretations'. The second half of this is, of course, true, but as an argument it is very much on Wittgenstein's own terms (which do not countenance the notion of meta). It might equally be argued that any such speaking itself involves a combination of (disambiguating) intention and (ambiguous) depiction, but as it were 'under the surface' and not analysable to a further speaking. (Or perhaps analysable but in a way that leads to an indefinite regress.) It might also be said that the way we have presented the alternatives in terms of intention providing the final interpretation is already predisposing us to a Wittgensteinean way of thinking about the matter.

It might be thought that the 'ontological' criticism provides us with an argument for the Wittgensteinean conclusion. However, that criticism is itself open to the different conclusions we have distinguished, if we treat it straightforwardly as a (philosophical) argument. For in actuality, of course, the 'bare picture' shorn of interpretation (of seeing as) is an abstraction, so that one might well argue that it does not have the conceptual distinction that the Wittgensteinean conclusion implies.

We are less interested in this essay in arguing for the Wittgensteinean conception of intentionality than in getting clearer about what it involves. In the next stage of the essay we shall try to get clearer about what the two conclusions we have distinguished signify by making a comparison with a conception of intentionality which fits with pragmatism (on the Quinean model). In our present discussion of the prior intended object as (mental) picture our aim has been no more than to bring out the conceptual issues involved in this interpretation, which we now briefly summarise.

We have seen that the basic Wittgensteinean criticism of the concept of depiction is that if we assimilate the image to the picture construed as *something* – or as something we can de-

scribe – then it fails to do what the mental image (or prior intended object) does. Our Wittgensteinean interpretation of this conclusion involved the idea that the failure is radical: the picture does not even begin to introduce intentionality. Finally we may point out that just as the criticism of the first interpretation in terms of nonsatisfaction pointed us towards this interpretation in terms of depiction, because it failed to make room for the phenomenological idea that *something* is intended, so this second interpretation points us back towards the concept of nonsatisfaction, by the way it conceives the picture on the model of *something* (we can describe).

At the end of our first interpretation of the prior intended object we commented upon an issue which we said relates to both our interpretations: the issue of meaningfulness. Our comments there were directed towards the first stage of our phenomenological interpretation, in which we made use of the notion of contrast. In the second stage of that interpretation we made use of the concept of depiction to try to express (the phenomenon of) intentionality, at the end of which we warned that this expression easily leads to a misunderstanding. What was intended by that warning we shall now try to make clearer by reference to the question of meaningfulness. The question here is whether in that attempt to express intentionality (and so, by extension, in the phenomenological interpretation as a whole) we were *saying* something (substantial).

The question of whether we were saying something with content in our phenomenological interpretation has importance in relation to the way in which one is inclined to argue against the notion of a prior semantic knowledge. Such argument against will focus upon the fact that the statement, the subject 'knows what he means', in our phenomenological sense, not only cannot be independently verified, but is of uncertain meaning. Thus one may ask of this 'knowledge': *how well* does the subject 'know what he means? – and: *what* is it that he knows? – and: how does he *know* that he knows it? (might he not be misled by a purely subjective 'mental show' of imagery, with the later action at the semantic encounter being

objectively determined in a way that fits with the concept of satisfaction on the model of the slave?)

These three questions are worth responding to separately, because they encapsulate the doubts that one is bound to have about the Wittgensteinean conception. The first question asks, how *well* does the subject 'know what he means'? – the implication being that there is no sensible (or verifiable) answer to such a question. The answer to this, though, is that the question itself is mistaken: it is working either with a model based upon *empirical* knowledge, or with the notion of intentional state as *likeness* (which then seems to make it possible to ask about the *degree* of likeness). (Of course, that leaves unclear what model *is* applicable.) The second question asks, *what* is it that he knows? This question takes us back to our earlier concession that, although we have used the model of knowledge, it is a model that is apt to mislead us. We commented upon this in our phenomenological interpretation when we expresed doubts about Wittgenstein's idea that the later event of recognising red might not occur. (Compare in particular our quotation of *Notebooks 1914-1916* (21.11.14): What do I really know when I understand the sense of 'fa' but do not know whether it is true or false? In that case I surely know no more than fa $\vee\neg$ fa; and that means I *know* nothing.) We shall say something further about the status of the so called 'semantic knowledge' when we make the comparison with the Quinean conception of semantics, although it will remain something of a vexed issue. The last question is: how does the subject *know* that he knows? This is in a way the most important question (or the one that gets us closest to what is at issue). Here it is worth quoting the following remark from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> [...] I cannot accept his testimony because it is not *tes-*

timony. It only tells me what he is *inclined* to say.

[PI #386]

The objection in this passage is connected with the idea that objective knowledge – or testimony – presupposes the concept of independent verification. (The idea that 'private knowledge' cannot distinguish 'is' from 'seems'.) This objection, though, is one that we want to meet head on. We want to say that in our phenomenological interpretation we were not trying to *say* something – and hence not trying to say something objective – but rather to *point out* something. Thus there is a sense in which what we were *saying* in that interpretation is without content, and so (in the Tractatus sense) senseless.

This point can be made (even if not elucidated) if we consider the form that according to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus characterises propositional attitudes: the form, 'p' says that p. Later in this essay we shall question the relevance or significance of this form as a representation of intentionality; but in our present context it allows us to express formally what we are saying. We may say that when the subject 'knows what he means', then *what* he knows is that *'p' says that p*. Thus, so far as *linguistic expression* of the knowledge is concerned, it manifestly lacks content.

[That form can of course be *assimilated to* the different form: 'p' says that q. ('Il pleut' says it is raining.) This relates to the question of whether the knowledge in question can be captured theoretically – something we discuss by way of Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning.]

[Can the subject express his semantic knowledge by analysing his proposition? (By 'copy of the Tractatus' I mean a philosophy book, author's name 'Ludwig Wittgenstein'...; by 'book' I mean a number of pages of printed script bound together; by 'pages' I mean...etc., etc.) Two things may be said here by way of comment. First, that the analysing propositions beg

something of the same question as the original proposition (although, of course, it may be argued they take us closer to the notion of depiction as isomorphism). Secondly, it is unclear how the (possibility of the) analysis relates to the phenomenon of intentionality and *its* distinctions. It is this *phenomenological* basis that determines the meaning of – and so the kind of our answers to – our interpretation of Wittgenstein's questions.]

[How does the subject *know* that he knows? How does the subject know anything? If knowledge is justified true belief, then what about the justifications – must not they be knowledge too if they are to justify? Thus one may argue that at some point the subject must be able simply to say: I know – the question of how or with what justification does not apply. (I accept that my eyes may be deceiving me, but I nonetheless know that it *appears* to be raining.)]

We have now come to the end of our separate introduction and discussion of the two interpretations of the prior intended object based upon the truistic version of the paradox. Perhaps the most striking aspect of what we have seen with these interpretations is that, under the Wittgensteinean criticism, each interpretation points towards the other. This is clearly something of importance, and so the last thing we do in this stage of our discussion is comment upon the two interpretations taken together, and with regard to their relationship.

The first and most obvious thing we may say here is that the fact that the two interpretations failed, and the way in which this failure manifested itself, implies there is a mistake in viewing these two interpretations as though they are two alternative (and competing) accounts of the prior intended object. Rather, it is as though they express the two 'aspects' of this object – of the proposition – and, moreover, aspects that cannot be made sense of independently of each other. One is therefore inclined to say that the correct conception of the prior intended object must be such that it shows how these two aspects fit together. A main aim of the next stage

of the essay will therefore be to get clearer about this fitting together of these two aspects of the prior intended object, or proposition.

[For us (at this stage in our discussion, anyway,) the terms 'prior intended object' and 'proposition' are more or less equivalent (with our prior, phenomenological attitude to the latter taken as read). (Compare TLP #4 which equates *thought* and proposition.) We may recall too our earlier comment about not being too concerned about precise use of terminology.]

The idea that our two interpretations really represent two aspects of the prior intended object becomes very clear if we correlate them with the meanings combined in the term 'intended object'. The first interpretation in terms of nonsatisfaction naturally corresponds to the aspect of *intended* (to the pre of prefigure – or aboutness); while the second in terms of depiction can be taken to correspond to the aspect of *object* (to the figure of prefigure). The first interpretation introduced the notion of object in a secondary fashion – an object that is the actual state of affairs in the world, but in effect was introduced as whatever (happens to) take away the 'nonsatisfaction' of the intentional state. The second introduced the notion of intention (nonsatisfaction) in a secondary fashion, by way of the notion of likeness to a (previously introduced) picture. It seems clear from this that what is required is that the two aspects should be introduced in an 'equi-primordial' way – a way that shows their 'internal' dependence upon each other.

The next thing we do in order to comment upon the two interpretations taken together (in their interrelationship) is say something about the idea of regress. When one speaks of regress in this context the idea that is at work is that an explanation of language by means of language is in some sense circular – the definiens always presupposes the definiendum. What more exactly this means is not wholly clear, but the existence of the semantic paradoxes is generally taken (and was taken by Wittgenstein) to show that there is a conceptual difficulty with the very idea of a semantic explanation. These

paradoxes can, of course, be overcome by the expedient of distinguishing between subject language and meta language; but there one has the feeling this is merely expedient, and does not get to the heart of the matter. One wants to say that when we make this move, what was problematic and in need of explanation is simply transferred from the subject language to the presupposed meta language. It is as though what is really required is an immanent explanation of language. (The difficulty being that 'immanently' language is essentially about the world.)

Insofar as we situate ourselves 'immanently', or within language, the idea of regress manifests itself in this idea: that we can only explain the meaning (or application to the world) of words by way of further words, so that 'words only refer to words' and we seem to be trapped within a circle of words. This was, of course, what was expressed by passage PhR #26, which we quoted in our discussion of the first interpretation of the prior intended object. Aside from what we said there, though, this 'immanent' expression of the idea of regress suggests two ways in which we might break out of the 'circle of words'. The first is through ostensive definitions. This way may be connected with the concept of nonsatisfaction insofar as it is natural to conceptualise what remains *over* from such definitions (when the definiens is no longer in sight) in terms of nonsatisfaction. One problem with this way, which we highlighted in our discussion, is that it is not clear what (other than a feeling of lack) is left over. But there are other problems too. What is brought out by the later Wittgenstein's discussions of this and related topics is that we need to distinguish within the notion of ostensive definition the separate ideas of explanation and training, and that the first of these presupposes meaning (grammar) in a way that implies we do not get an explanation of meaning in the way that we wanted. (The concept of training raises deeper questions, but one thing we may say by way of a kind of objection is that it is not obvious we have a clear *concept* of training – if it is to be more than explanation to 'the body' as opposed to the mind.) There is, of course, also the difficulty that the notion

of ostensive definition make it wholly unclear how the subject makes the move from the definitions to the construction of (new) *propositions*.

The second way through which it may be suggested we break out of the circle of words explained by means of further words involves this idea: that we need a semantic baseline which makes possible all explanation but does not itself require explanation. A picture seems to fit this characterisation because it is natural to say that in contrast with the mere signs (the words), a picture 'explains itself'. The difficulty that we have seen with this idea is that any picture we can describe (any real picture) does not explain or interpret itself, but presupposes (the possibility of) an explanation of how it is intended; and so cannot play the role of preventing such a regress.

The connection we have made in the above two paragraphs between the idea of regress and our two interpretations of the prior intended object on the face of it return us to the idea of competing accounts or explanations. That is not the aspect of it that we want to stress, though, but rather the idea that the aspects of nonsatisfaction and depiction point us so to speak in different '*directions*' (the one 'forward', towards the world, and the other 'backward', towards the subject).

[[It is worth taking this opportunity to make an extended comment upon the concept of training, because it relates to many of the themes of this essay. The concept is most easily introduced against that of explanation (teaching), itself defined in terms of a move within a (pre-given) logical space. By contrast training may be compared with the child's learning of its mother tongue, where one wants to say the learning is strictly circular. (One wants to say that it is *through* training that such a circle is made virtuous.) This comparison can be extended if we impose upon the virtuous circle of learning the first language a notion of levels of syntactic complexity. We may then say that 'from outside' – where we speak of the signs – we can represent the child's current level of syntactic complexity within a larger framework, which allows us to compare or to foresee levels. However, 'from inside' – where it is the

proposition rather than the expression of the proposition that is at issue – such a notion of 'within a larger framework' has no sense. The difference here corresponds to the Wittgensteinean distinction between the representation of a boundary and a boundary to representation. One is inclined to say here too that there is something (philosophically) misleading in speaking of the subject making a transition across the levels; we want rather to say that in training the 'learner' is *subjected to* a transition.

[[One wants to say: in learning (by explanation) as against training (learning a first language) one can *foresee* what one will learn (it is a move *within* a space). The first side of this contrast may sound odd. But one should bring into relation with this characterisation two ideas. First, that it is sense (the elucidation of concepts) rather than truth (the question of whether the concept corresponds to the actual application of the word) that is important in the first instance. So it may be that we are distinguishing limiting cases which are more means of thinking about concepts than actual concepts (with direct application). This at any rate seems to me to be a helpful attitude when we meet up with Wittgensteinean ideas that at first sight appear counter intuitive or contrary to the facts. Second, we need to realise that the foresight involved here is strictly not psychological but *logical* foresight. One should compare in this respect what we say in our later analysis of a Quinean as against a Wittgensteinean conception of semantics.

[[In learning a (first) language one cannot look forward: but can one look back? That is to say, can one recall the level at which one was formerly (and which one has now got past)? This is – or relates to – a fundamental issue within our overall discussion. Here we shall comment in line with Wittgensteinean ideas and say the following. When the subject was at the earlier level, then the syntactical limits to his language manifested themselves indirectly as the limits of his world. On the other hand, when the subject 'looks back', he represents this earlier syntactical stage as being *within* a space; that is to

say, what once had the character of world now has the character of within the world. For Wittgenstein this is a distinction of great importance. It is connected with the idea that 'being a world' is of significance in and of itself, and that this significance disappears from view when we represent it (a representation which by its very nature turns it into within the world.) Later, in our discussion of solipsism, we shall suggest that it is only by bringing to bear this idea of (language) being a world that we can get get an 'immanent' – that is to say, a genuine – 'explanation' of intentionality.

[[It is worth comparing here the often criticised Tractatus idea that value does not come from within the world but from outside the world. Clearly this notion of outside cannot mean outside in the usual sense: it makes no sense to speak of outside the world (outside logical space). Rather it seems to me the concept is best understood in the first instance by reference to the idea of *not* within the world – where within the world implies we can set side by side and *compare*. (We enlarge on these themes in our discussion of solipsism.) We can then bring the Tractatus idea into relation to ideas that are more familiar. In particular there is the idea that one's parents, one's village (or community), or one's country are in a certain sense incomparable. Of course, there is also a sense in which they are comparable. But the philosophical point is contained in the idea that 'where one comes from' is the source of one's values, as it were they belong to the perspective or attitude one has to the world rather than being what one has an attitude to. Thus there is a kind of mistake in taking a 'view from nowhere' and placing within the world (as the oxymoronic a world) what is – or 'should' be *the* world (within which comparisons take place). (Compare the analogy of home as the origin of a co-ordinate system. If home is the point of reference then the world appears under the aspect of particular rather than general – different locations are not indifferently side by side. It would be as though the representation of oneself (one's origin) is in effect an attempt to make into 'one amongst many' (into *what* is represented) that which makes possible the representation only through its *not* being

one amongst many.) These idea can only be properly understood, of course, by way of the distinctions that come from out of the philosophy proper. (Thus one tends to assimilate them here to a subject-object distinction rather than understand them in terms of the (logical) notion of self reference.) There is, though, one further idea worth throwing into the pot: that when one does represent one's origin (one's world) as one amongst others, then this would seem to result in a tension in the concept of (my world as) the world. (For while I may represent my world as one amongst others, in a larger sense (a sense that is not available *to* me, because I make *use* of it to represent), it may be argued that it is not so. (Compare the ideas of existential dissatisfaction and deracination; and the idea that inequality is not a sufficient condition for dissatisfaction but requires too a 'no longer being rooted' which allows one (apparently) to compare – with the paradox being that the possibility of this comparison implies one is after all not comparing – what one compares is not one's world (as the world) – that has been lost by the very action of comparison.)]]

The last comment we want to make about the relationship between the different interpretations of the prior intended object concerns a different way in which they might have been introduced, and so conceived. It is worth setting this out and making some comments, first because it makes it clearer that the two interpretations were not arbitrarily chosen (or arbitrarily read into the truistic version of the paradox). And second, because it helps us to widen the conceptual context within which our discussion is taking place.

A basic question that one can ask about the proposition is this: is the proposition defined by what makes it true, or does the proposition itself define what makes it true? The two options that this question presents we now set out in relation to our two interpretations of the prior intended object, after which we make some further comments.

The first option says that the proposition is defined by what makes it true. This option may be compared with our first

interpretation in terms of nonsatisfaction through the idea that when we say one thing is defined in terms of another, we are bestowing upon the first a kind of 'dependent' existence. (Compare the earlier comparison with the concept of a predicate.) It is also natural to say this option gives priority to the notion of *at* the semantic encounter; for, if the definiens is to be found anywhere, it is there. The obvious objection to this option is of course that in the case of falsity the fact that makes the proposition true does not exist, when it becomes nonsensical to claim that the proposition is defined in terms of *it*. (A false proposition still has sense.) However, this objection may be taken further (and in a recognisably Wittgensteinean direction) by pointing out that even if the fact does exist, this option does not yield the notion of *saying* something (about something), because the notions of sense and truth have been locked together by it. It may therefore be said that the statement of definition, while it speaks of 'at the semantic encounter', can only be given a content if we take it back to the position of prior to the semantic encounter, and let it speak from there. But of course then the problem is that from there the definiens is only given through the definiendum, which implies this option is now trying to say more than it is properly able to say (and so has in effect become the second option).

The second option says that the proposition itself defines what makes it true. This option may be compared with the second interpretation, which had as its motivation the idea that the proposition must pre*figure* the fact that makes it true. The objection to this option would ordinarily be expressed by saying that it makes intentionality into something subjective, a phenomenon of interest only to psychology. But we may also express it in a way that links up better with Wittgensteinean themes, by pointing out that this second option makes it look as though the problem of intentionality does not really exist. For the problem in rough terms is how to understand from a first person perspective the 'fitting' of language and reality; but the second option would allow us to say that whatever *seems* to fit *will* fit; from which we conclude that any such

fitting takes care of itself. It is in order to counter this trivialisation that one finds oneself impelled to bring in the notion of at the semantic encounter – for the natural position of this option is of course that of prior. We can then try to express this option by saying that *this* – this intentional state (or proposition) – defines that *this* – this fact (and *not* these others) – *fits*. However, we now have the difficulty that it is not clear that the subject is ever in a position to make this assertion. (At the point at which he *can* make it it is already too late – the fact is 'what he *meant*'.) Thus it would seem that if the statement of definition is to have content, then it is for *us* to assert it (or something like it) on the subject's behalf. That of course then leads to the difficulty of whether we can speak from such a 'meta' position without losing contact with the (first person) concept of intention.

We do not want to discuss our characterisation of these two options. (The essay as a whole is in effect a commentary upon them.) One remark we want to make, though, is upon something that this different conception of the two interpretations of the prior intended object makes clearer, which is that the two interpretations are associated with the positions of at and prior to the semantic encounter, respectively. The fact of this association allows us to give an initial answer to the doubts we raised at the end of the first stage of our phenomenological interpretation, about how well the distinction of prior to and at the semantic encounter fits with phenomenology. The distinction we have now of the two aspects of the prior intended object allows us to relate our discussion to our previous distinction while maintaining a specifically prior phenomenological position. (On the other hand the question we asked then, about *who* is making the distinctions, is one that will continue to have importance for our discussion.)

The question we asked was about the direction of definition of the proposition, and it put before us two options: either the proposition is defined by what makes it true, or it itself defines what makes it true. However, it might be argued that there is a third option, one which attempts to combine both directions

of definition. This option is to argue that the proposition is defined 'objectively' by the meanings (references) of individual words, and 'subjectively' through the notion of combining these in order that the proposition itself defines what – within the limit set by the meanings – makes it true.

This third option brings with it two obvious, and obviously connected, difficulties. One is that it leaves it unclear how it is we make the distinction – or have the concept – of sense and nonsense. This is an issue to which the early Wittgenstein ascribes great philosophical significance but not one that we are attempting to bring within our overall 'argument' (although we shall at a later point note its significance in a historical context). The other difficulty is of course this: the third option leaves out any account of what it is to combine words and/or meanings so as to construct the semantic entity we call a proposition.

One way in which it is made obvious that we require an account of what it is to construct a proposition is through the existence of the problem of the 'unity' of the proposition. The problem, of course, is this: that if the subject is not to verify the proposition 'Fa' as true because the facts Fb and Ga exist, then the concept of the *unity* of the proposition (or of the relation between the constituents) is essential to its definition. But now the question is: what can we mean by 'unity' or ('propositional relation') if we are not to enter into a regress? The Fregean type answer that the elements combined in the proposition are unsaturated does not as such answer the difficulty, because all that means in effect is that the propositional constituents have the prototype of their argument written into them in advance; but then what about *new* complexes introduced through the propositions thus defined? (I.e., how are we to make sense of Fx in E(x) x = aRb & Fx? Did the unsaturatedness of F already predict the complex aRb? The answer to this would seem to be the Davidsonian one of analysis into a form to which a *recursive* theory of truth can be applied, a theory that from the start is prepared for *all* propositions we might construct and which goes back to a primitive set

of semantic definitions in order to determine the question of truth. (We can perhaps see a connection here with TLP ## 4.5, 5.555 etc..) How this is to be done in such a sweeping way is unclear. (The first difficulty that strikes one is that Fx (with x = aRb) will not always imply that Fa and Fb (or vice versa)) What is left unclear too is the interpretation of the *semantic* role of the theory *itself* (that is, to what extent *it* can be said to enter into the subject's meaning, as *substituting* for the 'propositional relation').

What, in conceptual terms, is implied by the problem of the unity of the proposition? It would seem at least this: that the semantics of the proposition (as a whole) is prior to the semantics of its constituents (in other words, the semantic value of the constituents is to be defined *relative* to the determination of truth or falsity of the proposition). It seems to me that this conclusion is inescapable, and that the Davidsonian project needs to be made sense of in relation to this. (Insofar as – and as Davidson has said – it may be viewed as an attempt to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition.) This conclusion also means, of course, that a straightforward reading of the third option is mistaken.

[The problem of the unity of the proposition is complicated by the fact that we do not have a clear idea of what are the constituents of the proposition, so that it can seem as though it arises from a hypostatisation of the notion of constituent. It is all too easy to suppose that all we really combine in a proposition are words, and that everything else is 'synapses'. But the fundamental point here is that *by* putting together words we assert *that* such and such is the case – and in that sense 'assert' an *external* relation; yet the content of the proposition as a *semantic entity* is determined by an *internal* relation.]

[It is a familiar Wittgensteinean point, but one worth repeating. The idea that our meaning – and so our communication – goes *via* (each of our) synapses. And yet we are able to work together on tasks of enormous complexity or delicacy!! (Such a long way round that it is a wonder the message comes through so clearly!) Wittgenstein, of course, tends to makes

this point in a psychological context.]

[The Fregean notion of unsaturatedness goes back to the idea that the subject-verb form is primary. So far as interpretation goes it is worth repeating what we have said before, that for Wittgenstein no specific form has primacy.]

The comments that we have made upon the two interpretations of the prior intended object taken together bring to an end this stage of our discussion. In the first of these comments we said that the obvious question raised by our discussion is of how the two aspects of the proposition represented by the two interpretations 'fit together', and we said that getting clearer about this would be a main aim of the next stage of our discussion. We also saw in our discussion of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the two interpretations that there are doubts or questions regarding the 'Wittgensteinean way' of interpreting things; and we said that in the next stage we shall try to get clearer about these issues by widening the conceptual context of our discussion.

*

In the next stage of the essay we attempt to get clearer about Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality by bringing into our discussion philosophical positions which differ from Wittgenstein's. In order to do this we return to the theme of the difference between the Wittgensteinean and Russellian conceptions of intentionality, but in a way that does not *oppose* the latter to a conception based upon depiction. We take as a point of reference and starting point the following passage from the *Philosophical Remarks*:

> What is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended.
>
> It may look as if, in introducing intention, we were introducing an uncheckable, a so-to-speak metaphysical element into our discussion. But the essential difference

between the picture conception and the conception of Russell, Ogden and Richards, is that it regards recognition as seeing an internal relation, whereas in their view this is an external relation.

That is to say, for me, there are only two things involved in the fact that a thought is true, i.e. the thought and the fact; whereas for Russell, there are three, i.e. thought, fact and a third event which, if it occurs, is just recognition. This third event, a sort of satisfaction of hunger (the other two being hunger and eating a particular kind of food), could, for example, be a feeling of pleasure. It's a matter of complete indifference here how we describe this third event; that is irrelevant to the essence of the theory.

The causal connection between speech and action is an external relation, whereas we need an internal one.

[PhR #21]

[In our discussion we take the concept of internal relation to express the same as the concept of internal connection which we have introduced formally through the paradox of an impossible ambiguity and informally through our phenomenological interpretation.]

In this passage Wittgenstein summarises his conception of the structure of intentionality in relation to the notion of at the semantic encounter. He does this by contrasting his conception of the structure, as involving just thought and fact, with what he interprets to be Russell's conception, in which the structure involves thought, fact, and a middle term, or 'third event'. Earlier, when we introduced the interpretation of the prior intended object in terms of nonsatisfaction, we followed the direction of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks* criticism and in effect interpreted the thought purely as nonsatisfaction: i.e. without any admixture of *depiction*; which made the reduction to semantic blindness trivial. But we also raised

the question why this conception should not allow for a phenomenologically adequate notion of image even while defining truth in terms of satisfaction. In the next stage of the essay we explore this idea by considering how we might combine a notion of (prior) image with that of a third event.

We begin our discussion of the idea of a third event in relation to the idea of image by reference to the following passage, which we quoted earlier to illustrate the paradox of an internal connection:

> I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a report". The shot is fired. – Well, that was what you expected; so did that report somehow already exist in your expectation? Or is it just that there is some other kind of agreement between your expectation and what occurred; that that noise was not contained in your expectation, and merely accidentally supervened when the expectation was being fulfilled? – But no, if the noise had not occurred, my expectation would not have been fulfilled; the noise fulfilled it; it was not an accompaniment of the fulfillment like a second guest accompanying the one I expected. – Was the thing about the event that was not in the expectation too an accident, an extra provided by fate? – But then what was *not* an extra? Did something of the shot already occur in my expectation? – Then what *was* extra? For wasn't I expecting the whole shot?
>
> "The report was not so loud as I had expected." – "Then was there a louder bang in your expectation?"
>
> [PI #442]

This passage suggests through its criticism two ways in which we might try to combine the notions of image and third event, and so the first part of our interpretation will be to set these out together with Wittgenstein's criticism of them. In doing this various conceptual issues will be raised, and in the second

part we go on to discuss these at greater length and in relation to alternative philosophical conceptions.

Before we begin, though, we need to bring passages PhR #21 and PI #442 into terminological agreement. We do this by assimilating Wittgenstein's terms 'expectation' and 'expected event' in PI #442 to the terms 'thought' and 'fact' in PhR #21; alongside the first of each pair taking the term 'image' as an equivalent. It might have been noted already, but in any case should be made explicit at this point, that we are tending to use the term 'image' as a stand in for the intentional state or prior intended object – but with the one aspect emphasised – as opposed to signifying the one competing or complementary aspect, for which we reserve the term 'picture'. Wittgenstein's use of the term 'agreement' in PI #442 can then be compared with the third event of PhR #21, and so with our earlier notion of satisfaction (or the taking away of the feeling of nonsatisfaction) at the semantic encounter. The emphasis Wittgenstein gives in PhR #21 to the structure of what is going on makes it clear that this is just a matter of terminology.

With these preliminaries in place we can now give one interpretation of the Russellian structure by reference to this first part of PI #442:

> I see someone pointing a gun and say "I expect a report". The shot is fired. – Well, that was what you expected; so did that report somehow already exist in your expectation? Or is it just that there is some other kind of agreement between your expectation and what occurred; that that noise was not contained in your expectation, and merely accidentally supervened when the expectation was being fulfilled? – But no, if the noise had not occurred, my expectation would not have been fulfilled; the noise fulfilled it; it was not an accompaniment of the fulfillment like a second guest accompanying

the one I expected. [...]

[PI #442]

This first part of PI #442 can be understood as an interpretation, which is at the same time reduced to absurdity, of the idea that the fulfillment of the expectation could be defined through something other than the expected event itself. It is thus a reduction to absurdity of an interpretation of the Russellian structure in which there is a third event (of agreement/satisfaction) through which truth value is assigned, and then in addition a notion of image (which lets the subject know 'what is expected'). The reductio works by in effect inviting us to ask the question, should we say that the expectation was fulfilled if the third event (the first guest) were to occur, but not the expected event (the second guest). This makes it clear that conceiving the third event as something that occurs in addition to the expectation (image) and the expected event, and as the decisive element in the structure, reduces the image to a semantic nullity. For it says that the subject would be happy to go along with the decision made by the third event, *whatever* the image supposedly portrays.

[We also see illustrated here the nonsensicality of trying to express an opposing view – in the use of 'expected' in '...it was not an accompaniment of the fulfillment like a second guest accompanying the one I expected.']

This reduction to absurdity of the idea that truth might be defined through something *other* than what is intended depends upon the idea that the third event takes on *all* the semantic responsibility, so reducing the subject (notwithstanding his supposed image) to semantic blindness. However, it may be argued that we need not interpret the structure Wittgenstein ascribes to Russell in such absolute terms. The alternative would be to suppose the third event of agreement takes on *some* of the semantic responsibility. Of course, we cannot suppose this third event itself is prefigured, and so this way

of interpreting the Russellian structure leads to the question of how the semantic responsibility is divided up between the expectation (or thought) and the agreement. The second part of PI #442 relates to this question:

> [...] – Was the thing about the event that was not in the expectation too an accident, an extra provided by fate? – But then what was *not* an extra? Did something of the shot already occur in my expectation? – Then what *was* extra? For wasn't I expecting the whole shot?
>
> "The report was not so loud as I had expected." –"Then was there a louder bang in your expectation?"
>
> [PI #442]

This second half of the passage may be thought of as a rhetorical reductio ad absurdum of the supposition that the third event might take responsibility for this or that part or aspect of the expected event. (If the report is not so loud as we expected, should we perhaps say that it is after all as loud as we expected, but that some of the volume is to be assigned to the third event?!) If we are to invoke such a third event, then it must make its effect manifest in or through the image as a whole, irrespective of content. But then one wants to argue: must it not disappear from view and so leave us with no reason for introducing it in addition to the image? (In addition to the expectation/thought?)

Our first interpretation of the Russellian structure absorbed intention into the third event, and so lead to semantic blindness. This second interpretation has remained with intentionality, but in so doing would seem to have lost any meaningful distinction of third event. The two interpretations thus accord with the idea of a disjunction between semantic blindness and intentionality which we earlier pointed out seems to be a feature of Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality. Of course, it is hardly surprising that the two interpretations should end

up according with this idea of a disjunction, seeing as they have taken place by way of a Wittgensteinean remark.

Our aim in this section is not to try to confirm this or that feature of Wittgenstein's conception, but rather to get clearer about the conception, by widening (the conceptual context of) our discussion. This suggests that what we need to do is interpret the Russellian structure much more on its own terms. In what follows it is this that we do, although not by looking for new interpretations of the Russellian structure, but rather by thinking in other terms about the two 'Wittgensteinean' interpretations of the structure that we have just given. For when these are looked at more closely, they can be seen to raise conceptual questions which lead us to what appears to be competing conceptions of intentionality.

We begin our closer look at the two 'Wittgensteinean' interpretations with the second one. (It will become clear that insofar as these yield competing conceptions, this is a natural order.) In this interpretation we made the supposition that there might be a *division* of semantic responsibility (between image and third event), and we interpreted the second half of passage PI #442 as a rhetorical reduction to absurdity of this idea. However, it may be argued that the example from which the reductio was inferred is phenomenal in an unrepresentative way. If we look to other examples, then it may be pointed out that we standardly pass on semantic responsibility to others who are in a position to 'know better'; either because of their more privileged epistemological access or because of their expert knowledge. The most obvious examples of this are the establishing of the reference of a particular term, and the determination of the extension of a natural kind term. These kinds of example suggest the very opposite of what we inferred from PI #442; namely, that a notion of shared semantic responsibility (and consequent distinction of narrow and wide propositional attitudes) should be taken as basic to language.

The conception of semantics that goes with the idea of a division of semantic responsibility as introduced in the above para-

graph may be labelled 'the pragmatist conception'. In broad outline this kind of model is well known. It is characterised in the first instance by its identifying objectivity with (scientific) truth, and so by its re-working the (Wittgensteinean) distinction of sense and truth into one of degrees of truth (or levels of theory). In accordance with this it is argued that signs connect with the world only by virtue of past truths and the scientific laws that connect these. The circularity that one can see in this idea leads to its second characteristic, which is that it accounts for the virtuous working of this circle (and so the transformation of the traditional a priori into graduating levels) by way of a conception of semantics in which society is prior to the individual. (And of course it is here that it seems to correspond with the later Wittgenstein.) Science (in the widest sense) is understood as essentially a communal project, within which any one of us is always already caught up. Thus semantic responsibility never belongs wholly to the individual subject, but is always to be displaced onto the wider society (or the experts approved by society); and even (science being progressive) onto future society. In this way the establishing of reference and truth is conceived as being always provisional, and semantic certainty, or finality of semantic determination, as being no more than an ideal of science.

This pragmatist conception is often associated with – and in the version sketched out above is largely derived from – the 'Quinean model of our body of knowledge'; and so it is by reference to this that we shall discuss it. According to the model we are to think of our conceptual scheme as consisting of a periphery of sensory input, a centre which acts as an ideal or real point of absolute holism, and an interior content of interlinking theory. Theories further toward the centre link theories further out and therefore stand to them in the relation of relation to relata. Theories closer to the centre may be thought of as a priori relative to theories further out, but not in a way that would justify the traditional notion of internal properties, or a Kantian a priori, because no theory is immune from revision. (The limiting case of such revision would occur if our most fundamental theories were overturned. This would

bring about the wholesale or 'revolutionary' change which is characterised by the idea that one cannot compare the before and after. There is a 'discontinuity', or 'paradigm shift'.)

[Our use of the Quinean model is in relation to the *model* (which has by now attained something of an independent existence) – rather than being directed through the model to Quine himself. It is important to stress this because we are using the model for the purpose of clarifying Wittgenstein, and so in a way which may not represent Quine's original (or later) conception.]

The natural place at which to begin our discussion of the pragmatist conception is the periphery of the Quinean model, or its outer limit of sensory data; for the initial criticism was that the example of passage PI #442 is phenomenal in an unrepresentative way. What is true about that criticism is that a discussion of intentionality works from the so called'phenomenal' (or as we have termed it, 'simple and pragmatic') case in the first instance. (Missing, most obviously, generalised propositions and ascriptions of propositional attitudes.) However, the term 'phenomenal' is apt to mislead us here, something which is not helped by Wittgenstein's other choice of example – the recognising of red of our starting passage. The way in which we can be misled by this kind of example can be made clearer if we consider the example we chose, of the copy of the Tractatus on the table in the other room. Now it might be said against our use of this example that in spite of its 'material object' content, the use we made of it reduced it to something equivalent to Wittgenstein's example. For it may be argued that the subject does not '*know*' (or is not certain) that this is *his* copy of the Tractatus (or even, at first glance, *a* copy); all he knows for certain within the given phenomenological situation is that the proposition, 'It *appears* that my copy of the Tractatus is on the table', is true. In this way it may be argued that the example is phenomenal after all. However, from our point of view the fundamental point here is contained in the fact that the certainty *at* the semantic encounter (that this *is* what I intended) needs to be taken back to the certainty

prior to the semantic encounter (that I *can* verify the proposition). The point is that the 'semantic knowledge' of the *prior* situation is not to be thought of as defined in relation to the *particular* phenomenological situation that *did* ensue – nor to any set of such situations except insofar as that set is defined by speaking in third person (material object) terms. That is to say, although the proposition is verified by (or, at any rate, by way of) the world as first person, it is not *about* this world. Here we may note Wittgenstein's reported remark: we live *in* the world as idea, but our propositions are *about* the world as fact.

The proposition is about the world as fact (the world as third person) – that is, the world within which we can agree – or dispute – what is the case; but might it nonetheless be argued that the so called 'prior semantic knowledge' is not *itself* about that world? We ourselves pointed out that this knowledge is to be thought of as a limiting case of knowledge which *is* about the (empirical) world. We also said that this knowledge has a status such that it manifests itself through what takes place at the semantic encounter (where, in some sense, the world as idea is primary). So does that imply that the prior semantic knowledge is after all to be thought of as being about the world as idea? Here it seems to me that while we have to admit the concepts or distinctions in this area are unclear, the answer to this question is *no*. To say that the prior semantic knowledge is not about the (empirical) world is really just a way of saying that it is misleading to speak of it on the model of knowledge. It does not imply that the knowledge in question does not relate (if that is the right word) directly to the world as fact. (Even though verification will always (ultimately) be by way of idea – in our simple and pragmatic case.)

There are really two points which we need to separate out in what we have just said insofar as a comparison with the pragmatist – or better, the Quinean – conception goes. The first is that, while accepting that the propositions in question (the phenomenal or 'simple and pragmatic' class) are located at the periphery of the Quinean model, they are nonetheless

about the world as third person. The second is to admit that the status of what we have termed 'prior semantic knowledge' is unclear and its philosophical interpretation remains open.

The first of these two points may be commented upon further, and in a way which turns the thrust of the original criticism back against the Quinean model. For what the first point says is that although the propositions of our language (at the periphery of the model) are about material objects (the world as fact), they are verified *by* (or through) sense data (the world as idea). This, though, seems to imply the existence of two different relations (in some sense of relation) to the world: the relation of being about, and the relation of being verified by (at the outer boundary). This is something we may comment upon by way of the folowing passages from the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms. We say, for example: 'Experience teaches us that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain sensations of wet and cold, or such and such visual impressions..' In defence of this one says that these sense experiences can deceive us. But here one fails to reflect that the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition.
>
> [PI #354]

> The point here is not that our sense impressions can lie, but that we understand their language. (And this language like any other is founded on a convention.)
>
> [PI #355]

> One is inclined to say: 'Either it is raining or it isn't – how I know, how the information has reached me is another matter.' But then let us put the question like this: What do I call 'information that it is raining'?

> (Or have I only information of this information too?) And what gives this 'information' the character of information about something? Doesn't the form of our expression mislead us here? For isn't it a misleading metaphor to say: 'My eyes give me the information that there is a chair over there'?
>
> [PI #356]

What we want to point out here is Wittgenstein's use of the terms 'definition' (in the first passage) and 'convention' (in the second), with the implication (made more explictly in the third passage) that at the limit of knowledge through theory we need to acknowledge a quite different relation to the world from that of being about. (That it is raining is a 'scientific result' (about the world) – which may be false; that *this* – what my senses tell me – permits the assertion 'It is raining' is a matter of definition.) This relation 'by definition' or 'by convention' signifies the idea that the 'semantic transition' which yields a truth decision (even if a provisional one) is not mediated (or justified) by other linguistic moves. (Compare what we said towards the end of our discussion of the first interpretation of the prior intended object in terms of nonsatisfaction, about a limit to an explanation of signs by means of signs.) At this stage we do not want to take up the question of what kind of transition occurs here at (speaking generally) the limit of the Quinean model. All we want to do for the moment is raise the question whether or how the model has made room for this notion of different relations to the world.

[It seems to me that the model itself is unhelpful both in allowing us to see clearly this question and in indicating how it might be answered. One way in which it obscures things is through an ambiguity in the way we are supposed to understand its outer limit. Does this signify nerve stimulation? – in which case we do not have an outer limit after all, for these are events on a par with all other events in the world as third person. Or does it indicate sense data (the world as idea)?

But then again the idea of an outer limit is misleading. (The visual field does not have limits.)]

The question of whether the model makes room for the notion of different relations to the world becomes a little clearer if we move on to the interior of the model. We may begin here by reflecting upon Wittgenstein's use of the term 'definition' in the first of the above quoted passages, where he says: 'the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition'. What one wants to say in reply to this is: How? For of course the constituent words of the proposition were not defined in terms of what is before the subject *now*. – Nor is it simply a matter of earlier and later, but of the fact that the (words and) meanings get so to speak rearranged in (the description of) the new situation. Whence the second question of our starting passage: how does the subject know that this *is* what he meant? This question of how truth (of our simple and pragmatic propositions) is possible is one that on the face of it is difficult for a proponent of the Quinean model to answer. This is because the model (to the extent that it repudiates empiricism in favour of coherence) ties together objectivity and truth in a way that seems only to allow the notion of *degrees* of truth (the degree determined by the extent to which verification coheres with the overall conceptual scheme. But it may be pointed out that even a *false* proposition is (in the ordinary sense) semantically satisfied to *some degree*; what is required for truth is a notion of complete semantic satisfaction. The point being that in our ordinary language use we do say that our propositions are true or that they are false. Of course, the Quinean may consign this ordinary use to the category of the psychological as opposed to what 'really' (under philosophical analysis) goes on. But then the question is: has this notion of the 'psychological' been brought *clearly* into view *before* we set about constructing a model of what is going on?

The above paragraph is really an expression of the standard criticism of the Quinean model, that in its conception of interior theory it prevaricates over the notion of internal and external relations (or sense and truth). We have expressed it

in the way that we have in order to make the connection back to the problem of the unity of the proposition. In terms of the standard criticism, though, the point is very clear, and is to do with the role of (interior) theory. The difficulty is that theory has the role of determining or entering into the *content* of theory further out – or propositions – in accordance with the denial of an atomistic conception of propositions (and so *against* a conception that *privileges* the proposition); and yet it is supposed also to be *verified* (or falsified) *by* that (level of) theory – in which case its role is after all that of external and not internal relation to outer theory as relata.

[(Of course, this should strictly be expressed as: interior theory has the role of determining or entering into *to some extent* the content of theory further out (or propositions)...and yet it is supposed also *to some extent* to be verified (or falsified) by that (level of) theory... . The point is, we need an account of this 'to some extent' which shows how the ambiguity of role is resolved.)]

We shall come back to the two criticisms or questions that we have put so far against the model, both to consider the Quinean response to them and to comment upon the comparison with Wittgenstein. Before that, though, we need to consider the inner limit of the model (thought of as an ideal). In respect of the inner limit, the comparison with Wittgenstein is straightforward and immediate. As we move towards the centre of the model we arrive at theories which more and more define what is theoretically possible – or what in terms of the model it makes sense to put into question. (Of course, theories closer to the centre may not define possibilities as such, but by way of the constraints they apply to theories further out.) Thus what we have here is something like a correlate of the Wittgensteinean notion of logical space; except that, through its dependence on the concept of truth, it should be termed *theoretical* space. Witttgenstein by contrast defines logical space in relation to grammar, a notion conceived in contradistinction to the concepts of theory and truth.

[It is clear in Wittgenstein's writings that the separation of

grammar from truth extends to the case where truth is thought on the model of coherence. Grammar is a presupposition for language (for a conceptual scheme) and not (like coherence) a feature of it.]

[In Kantian terms one can perhaps say that Quine moves from the categories of quality to the categories of relation without acknowledging the categories of quantity. In relation to the contrast we are making between Quine and Wittgenstein it is worth pointing out too that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (see A94, B127) Kant characterises the role of the categories in exactly the same way as Wittgenstein describes in a letter to Russell (Jan 1913, *Notebooks 1914-16*, p121) the role of a theory of logical types – which (through 'a proper theory of symbolism') becomes *grammar* (PhR #7).]

The reason why we initiated this discussion of the pragmatist conception is so that we could question more closely the denial implied by the second half of passage PI #442 of the notion of semantic sharing. The difference between Quine and Wittgenstein with regard to the inner limit of the model enables us to say something about this, because its most obvious effect is on the difference of conception of semantics. We comment upon this now by considering an example of the semantics of a natural kind term.

According to the pragmatist, if a subject with no knowledge of the modern theory of chemistry makes an assertion about salt, then the meaning of his proposition – or its connection with the world – is determined at least in part through that theory. That is to say, even though the subject does not know chemical theory and so in practice has to make do with a more 'phenomenal' meaning, his *intention* is for the word 'salt' to be pinned onto the world through that theory – at least in the final instance. In this way the meaning of 'salt' is shared between the ordinary subject and the experts who apply the theory – with the latter having the final say. Now, of course, a Wittgensteinean cannot deny what the pragmatist is saying here – insofar as what he is saying amounts merely to an observation on our actual language use and on what we say about

our intentions. However, what the Wittgensteinean wants to call attention to is this: that the subject who has only an untheoretical knowledge of the concept of salt can in principle be taught the relevant theory. He can be taught this through being given *words* – spoken or written signs. And after being given these words – and responding through further words in an appropriate way – he can demonstrate his understanding of the theory through his later (modified) application of the word 'salt'. What this illustrates is the way in which one may argue that the pragmatist notion of objectivity based on the notions of theory and truth presupposes a Wittgensteinean notion of objectivity in terms of *sense*. This notion of sense is thought of by Witttgenstein as delimited or defined through rules of grammar which are prior to and presupposed by the concept of (contingent) truth.

The difference between the two conceptions is clear enough, but there is one aspect of it which is worth stressing, because Wittgenstein's own writings can sometimes make it seem as though he is working with an outdated model of scientific discovery. Wittgenstein often writes (particularly when setting out the difference of science from mathematics) as though scientific discovery proceeds by way of the subject thinking up a hypothesis which he then tests by experiment. (The notion of discovery being *within* a space.) In fact, of course, scientific discovery works in both directions – or in a circular way – with the result of experiment (or perhaps simple *accident*) inspiring hypotheses which in turn lead to further experiment. Later experiments and/or hypotheses may be such that they *could not* have been foreseen when the subject embarked on the course of experimentation. From a Wittgensteinean perspective, though, this description of scientific discovery fails to distinguish the psychological from the logical. That such and such later hypotheses/experiments could not have been foreseen is a psychological matter; the 'could not' does not signify logical impossibility. The essential point is illustrated by the fact that a subject who has *not* been privy to the experimentation could have the whole series of events and conclusions described to him (described in *signs*), when he would be in

the *same* position as those who actually carried out the experiments.

[The above paragraph is in part to guard against an interpretation that would asociate Wittgenstein (particularly the earlier) with the side of nominal essences in the 'debate' over nominal versus real essences. What we want to argue is that if this debate has any relevance at all here, then it cannot be about the (scientific) nature of the things themselves, nor about our semantic practice, but rather as saying something about what distinctions come *first*. The later Wittgenstein works with a conception of logical space in which our decisions here and now contribute to the grammar of our signs, and so there is a sense in which there is an openness in the later conception which is not there in the earlier. (An openness which we are representing through the idea that the later Wittgenstein gives priority to nonsatisfaction over depiction.) In that sense we may say that in the later conception there is a capacity for nature to 'surprise' us which is not there in the earlier philosophy. (But such a notion of 'surprise' is surely to be thought of more in terms of a paradigm shift, so that strictly it is *not* surprise.) In this sense it seems to me one may say the early and later Wittgenstein come down on different sides of the nominal versus real essences distinction. However, it seems to me it would be a misunderstanding of what this means to infer (as is usually done) that Quine is closer to the later Wittgenstein than the earlier. In the way we are interpreting the Quinean conception (as pointing towards Rationalism), the conception more properly belongs on (so to speak) the *other* side of the Tractatus – that is, as giving priority to internal over external relations.]

The description we have given of the difference in conception of semantics between Wittgenstein and Quine serves to bring into view the essential difference between the two: the priority given by Wittgenstein to the concept of the proposition. On Wittgenstein's conception what is important is that we can sketch out (that is, give *sense* to) a description of the world which *contradicts* our overall conceptual scheme – where that

conceptual scheme is defined by reference to science in the traditional sense. Where we cannot give sense to it, there we have the concept of the *a priori* sciences – logic and mathematics. But the fact that we cannot make sense of a situation which contradicts these is an indication that they have to be conceived by reference *to* the proposition. Quine by contrast would want to understand the proposition by reference to a general concept of theory which does not essentially distinguish the a priori from the a posteriori.

[We do not want to suggest there are not difficulties with the Wittgensteinean conception. We are not trying to argue for the one over the other but to get clearer about the differences. Of course, the fact that our primary interest is in Wittgenstein's conception means that where our account takes the outward form of a critical encounter, it is inclined to argue for the one over the other.]

It should be clear that the criticisms or observations that we have made upon the outer boundary, interior, and centre of the Quinean model all add up essentially to the same thing. What they say is that the model does not properly acknowledge the difference between sense (a connection by definition, internal relations, grammar) and contingent truth (being about, external relations, theory). We connected this with the fact that the pragmatist (read through the Quinean model) does not give any account of what it is to construct a proposition – that is, of what it is to *put together* words to express a *new* sense (which may be as precise or as bizarre as we wish to make it) – which we can then verify as true or false. (Even though that truth determination may later be revised.)

[It is too easy to be misled by the fact that most (new) language use is simply variation on a theme – so that it can seem superficially as though a causal account would be sufficient to account for it. The point, though, is this: that we can understand (and verify) *any* new proposition – no matter how 'unusual' its content. (Or, if we are unsure about that content, then we can ask for clarification and make sense of it by way of the further, clarifying *signs*.) It is *this* – together with

the fact that there is a potential infinity of possible propositions – that shows that language and world must be *essentially* connected. (Such a focus upon the the *all* encompassing, *systematic* nature of language is of course the alternative to our way (through intention) of by-passing the causal theorist.)]

Does the supporter of the Quinean model have a response to the basic criticism that we have made of the model? The basic criticism is that the model prevaricates over the notion of internal and external relations so as to leave unclear the notion of application (of theory). The answer which is generally given (or is implicit in discussions of the matter) is this: that data which verifies (or falsifies) a theory is pre-interpreted by *other* theory relatively closer to the centre, even while allowing that the former theory may – together with other theory at the same level – falsify that inner theory. This relatively deeper 'pre-interpreting' theory would correspond to the Wittgensteinean notion of a transition by definition, except that it retains a connection with truth, and so is not a matter (as it is for (the later) Wittgenstein) of arbitrary convention. What should be noted, though, is that supposing the model to work in this way does not get us away from the ambiguity of role of theory, which means it is unclear exactly how this kind of answer is to be worked out. And it means too that the notion of theory as it occurs in or is made use of by the model is not as clear as one might originally have supposed. (Having said that, we have acknowledged that the Wittgensteinean notion of a prior semantic knowledge also is unclear.)

[This ambiguity in the role of theory is what seems to me to point towards the philosophical position of Rationalism. Of course, one might argue that the Tractatus itself looks something like an 'up to date' (as acknowledging the Frege-Russell logic) version of Rationalism. We may call attention in particular to the argument against a Kantian synthetic a priori (admittedly made less clear cut by the way the Tractatus characterises number); the anti-Kantian equation of ethics and aesthetics; the simplicity of the Tractatus characterisation of the general form of the proposition (which if it does not hark back

to the Leibnitzian version, nonetheless is in obvious contrast to the complication of the Kantian general form); and the arguments of the early, 'ontological' pages, which read almost like a homage to the *Monadology*. However, it seems to me (and of course this is not controversial) that in spite of these examples of difference, the deeper comparison is with the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The main reason for saying this is the Tractatus' avowed aim of drawing limits to (meaningful) language, with its implication that the distinction between sense and nonsense (as against truth and falsity) is to be thought of as a *first* distinction. (Compare the Kantian emphasis upon the notion of 'real possibility' as circumscribing thought.) We may note too that Wittgenstein later remarked that his early philosophy can be viewed as a clarification of Kant.]

It may not be clear exactly how we are to think of the working of the Quinean model, but there is enough that is clear in what we have said about it to allow us to comment upon the main point of difference from the Wittgensteinean conception. The essential point, as we have indicated, is that for Wittgenstein semantic content always takes us back to the proposition as the primary semantic concept, whereas for Quine the semantics of the proposition is defined by reference to the concept of levels of theory. Thus (the early) Wittgenstein argues that the notion of uncertainty (or vagueness) is always to be found *within* the picture (as internal to the variable) – not in the picture's relation to the world. (The proposition determines reality up to the point where we need only say 'yes' or 'no' – 'true' or 'false'). By contrast for Quine the relation of our signs to the world – the relation of being about – is not clearly separated from the content expressed by those signs (or what is said), which means that the relation to the world itself contains the notion of degree – our use of signs is objective *to the extent* that theory enters in and gives the signs meaning.

We introduced the pragmatist conception of semantics in order to discuss or question the reductio of semantic sharing of the second half of passage PI #442. It is now clearer that on Quinean terms this questioning is justified. Our interpretation

of the Quinean model has connected the notion of aboutness (intention) with that of transcendent theory, or theory which goes beyond the subject's knowledge. The conception of intentionality that this implies is one where there is a division of semantic responsibility, but not a division that is vulnerable to the earlier reductio. We may say: on the Quinean conception, the third event – which prior to the encounter yields intention – is thought of as *co-extensional* with the image – while yet dividing up semantic responsibility with it (or with the pictorial aspect of it). We may also characterise this in a way that fits the early Wittgenstein's mode of expression by saying that for Quine, intentionality is characterised by the notion of *absolute* vagueness. (As against vagueness *within* a (logical) space.)

The conception of intentionality implied by the Quinean model may be related back also to what we said about Wittgenstein's criticism of the second interpretation of the prior intended object in terms of depiction. In our discussion of that criticism we distinguished between a 'Wittgensteinean conclusion', which would argue that the concept of depiction does not yet *begin* to introduce intentionality, and a conclusion which would postulate 'intention' to give the 'final interpretation' to an ambiguous (but nonetheless semantically conceived) picture. This latter conclusion may be compared with the way we have characterised the Quinean conception of intentionality. On our interpretation, this involves the idea that intention (or aboutness) is itself to be thought of as having semantic content; except not as a 'final interpretation' of the subject's intentional state, but in terms of (the possibility of) *further* interpretation. (Later 'verification' feeds back to determine *further* the 'original' content.)

We have said that the concept of intentionality is characterised through two ideas: of *what* is intended, and of aboutness (or intention). Our discussion of the Quinean model has made clear that of these two ideas, the Quinean conception of intentionality gives priority to aboutness. For Quine it is theory that pins our signs onto the world, with (deeper) theory in-

evitably always going *beyond* the intentional state of any individual. We have also argued that it is not altogether clear how the concept of theory is to be understood within the Quinean model. There is, though, something we may say about the way in which we are inclined to understand that notion of theory – particularly in relation to the concept of aboutness. What we want to point out is that there are three characteristic conceptual moves involved in such understanding. These are: first, the taking up of the viewpoint of a subject with a restricted knowledge (an ancient Roman speaking about salt, say); then the representing of this subject's 'intentional state' *within* the space of modern theory (salt = NaCl), and so conceiving it as *limited* or *lacking*; and finally, applying the same move to ourselves (by way of analogy). What is characteristic here is the way we use analogy to conceive what lies beyond our (present) knowledge on the model of what lies within it. In other words, it is by way of a meta view that the concepts are determined.

[It is worth comparing the three conceptual moves we have distinguished with those that characterise the transition to scepticism. In the case of scepticism too we first look *with* the subject in question; then 'from outside' look either *beyond* what the subject can see (in the way of the pragmatist conception) or into a world that he has knowledge of only *indirectly* (as a naturalistic explanation would conceive it). We then postulate the existence of visual impressions by way of the latter, and in either case argue that the subject's world is limited in a way that cannot keep out scepticism. Finally, we apply this result to *all* subjects (including ourselves). But – as Wittgenstein points out in a number of passages – when we are doing the 'looking from outside' and arguing that the subject's world is limited, or that all he ever 'has' from which to construct 'his world' are light waves entering his eyes, etc., *we* are not aware of any difficulty: at *that* point we do not feel imprisoned within our senses, or that there is a phenomenal world *and* a physical world.]

This is as much as we want to say (for now) about the differ-

ence between the Quinean and the Wittgensteinean conceptions of intentionality. (We shall make a final comment when we discuss solipsism.) The comparison we have made has in a way been a superficial one, because neither the Quinean notion of theory nor the Wittgensteinean notion of a prior semantic knowledge are entirely clear. Having said that, though, it may be recalled that we are trying to interpret Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality in part by getting clearer about its physiognomy – that is, in terms of conceptual distinctions and the manner of their interconnection, rather than by way of the meaning of concepts. So too we are not trying to follow a line of argument through to a conclusion. In accordance with this we shall close our discussion of Quine not by attempting to summarise where we have got to by way of it, but by noting the two main features of the Quinean conception.

The first of these features is contained in the fact that the Quinean conception *downplays* the concept of image (denies the priority of the proposition). We connected this with the idea that the 'being about' (or intention) of the proposition is defined by reference to its 'theoretical analysis', which implies this 'being about' is a matter of degree. The second feature relates to what we said is a main aim of this stage of our discussion, which is to get clearer about the 'fitting together' of the two aspects of the prior intended object. What we have seen here is that this 'fitting together' of the two aspects is conceived by the Quinean conception of intentionality (in particular, with regard to status of aboutness, or intention) by reference to the concept of *meta*.

In our initial interpretation of the second part of passage PI #442, we took Wittgenstein to be arguing against a division of semantic responsibility between image and third event; and we have now commented upon this by way of the comparison with the Quinean model. In our initial interpretation of the first part of passage PI #442, we supposed that the third event might take on *all* semantic responsibility. We then argued that such an assignment of semantic (or truth determining) responsibility must take away from the supposed image

any genuine semantic content. What we do next is comment further upon this interpretation of the Russellian structure. We begin by considering the following remark from the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion of the Russellian conception of intentionality, in which Wittgenstein raises the possibility of a conflict between the two criteria (of picture and third event):

> Suppose you were now to say: pictures do occur, but they are not what is regular; but how strange then, if they happen to be there and a conflict were now to arise between the two criteria of truth and falsity. How should it be adjudicated?
>
> [...]
>
> [PhR #23]

This remark is (with the qualification below) really another way of expressing the reductio of the first part of PI #442; except that this expression suggests a way in which one might try to overcome it. If, as this passage implies, a conflict between the 'two criteria' does not make sense, then one might argue that this is because there are not really two criteria here, but instead two perspectives upon what is going on. Or, as we might also express it, two different levels: the level of the image, and the level of the third event. We shall now comment upon upon this notion of levels, thought by reference to the idea of different perspectives upon the *same* thing, by making a comparison with Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning.

The implied thought in the above passage is that it does not make sense for there to be a conflict between the 'two criteria'. This thought may be related to Davidson's argument for the idea of a theory of meaning based upon Tarski's definition of truth, in which Davidson lays great significance upon the subject's unlimited capacity to construct new propositions.

What that capacity may be taken to imply is that agreement of the 'two criteria' cannot be thought to be accidental; so that if a theory as Davidson conceives it were constructed, then we should be justified in saying that it dealt with *meaning*.

[Davidson does not express it in quite this way. Rather he argues (like the early Wittgenstein) that the subject's unlimited capacity to construct new propositions is an internal characterisation of the proposition, so that a theory which accounts for this capacity (even though it be a meta theory which does not make use of the concept of meaning) may be called a theory of meaning.]

[A useful way of characterising our discussion is by taking its underlying question to be something like this: Is there room between a scientific conception which remains with third person categories, and a phenomenological conception that fails to get beyond a description of psychological or subjective states, for an *objective, first person* account? It seems to me that Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning is important for a discussion of Wittgenstein because it gives us a paradigm of such an account as *theory*. Wittgenstein's position, as we have said, is that there is *no* room between these for a *theory*.]

[We said with regard to our use of the Quinean model that we were not attempting to represent Quine's views or aims. The same goes – but perhaps even more strongly – with our use of the Davidonian conception of a theory of meaning. In particular, we may point out that Davidson in his introduction of the idea of such a theory conceived it as *empirical*; whereas we are assimilating it to a *philosophical* account – of the kind whose paradigm is provided by the Tractatus.]

[Our approach upon Davidson is biassed towards a particular way of looking at the matter, which means it does not bring out fully the significance of Davidson's conception of theory for thinking about the (early) Wittgenstein. An instance of this that is worth mentioning is the way Davidson helps us to understand what is at first sight the most characteristic and

puzzling aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy: the denial that we can get enlightenment by looking at or into *the subject*. This is an aspect most obvious in the later philosophy, where it is tied to an emphasis upon the outer (with its interpretation in terms of the social or public realm), but it occurs just as much in the earlier writings and can be argued to have its origins there. A passage that illustrates this is the following one from *Notebooks 1914-1916*, where Wittgenstein says: 'The difficulty of my theory of logical portrayal was that of finding a connection between the signs on paper and a situation outside in the world'. When one first reads this one wants to protest: but doesn't the (nature of the) *subject* have anything to do with this? But it is of course just here that we need to bring in the idea of the subject's *infinite* capacity to construct and verify new propositions (upon a finite basis of meanings). – And with it (or following on from it) the Wittgensteinean idea that what philosophy seeks to understand is the *general form* of any possible account.]

[It might be argued that the concept of verification takes us back to the finite, strictly considered. But Davidson's use of this epithet may be related to the way in which a speck of light on a screen may be interpreted as signifying equally an atomic or interstellar event.]

The comparison we want to make with Davidson requires that we specify what we mean by two criteria – or two levels – in respect of Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning. The obvious way in which the notion of levels enters into the conception is through the requirement that a theory of truth must be at a meta level relative to the subject language, if it is not to run into contradiction with itself. However, this is not the notion of levels that we want to compare with the two criteria of image and third event. The comparison we want to make comes from the idea that when we move to the meta level in order to theorise about the subject's use of language, we can no longer deal with the proposition (or meaning) in the same way or in the same sense as the subject deals with it. This is expressed by the equation that Davidson – and the

early Wittgenstein – call attention to in their remarks upon the idea of a theory of meaning: the equation p ⇔ 'p' is true. The left hand side of this equation we may take to express the idea of meaning as we all ordinarily understand it (in our application of language to the world). According to the theorist, this idea of meaning is not suitable to be the direct object of a theory of meaning; it is argued to be irredemiably psychological, or intensional. The right hand side may be thought of as expressing the same meaning as understood or made sense of at the second level by a theory of truth. In his early writings Wittgenstein stresses the fact that the implication sign in this equation signifies an *internal* relation as against an accidental agreement; which we are taking to be the point of Davidson's emphasis upon the subject's unlimited capacity to construct – and then verify – propositions. We want to use this idea of an internal relation to try to give meaning to the notion of levels in terms of perspectives (upon the same thing). Thus we may say that a theory of meaning is *indirectly* about the (level of the) image (the left hand side of the equation), but directly, or in terms of the application of the truth theory, it has its own level of subject matter (indicated by the right hand side). This direct 'level' of subject matter gives us a *provisional* definition of what we are calling the level of the third event.

[It is worth clarifying our use of the equation in the above paragraph. For us the equation is working as a meta meta equation – that is, as part of our discussion of the connection between first level language use (the left hand side) and a theoretical (meta) account of that language use (the right hand side). It is not being used to illustrate the form of inference of a theory of meaning, when both sides are at the second level and the left hand side would be replaced by something more informative.]

[Why should it be supposed that it must be possible to construct such a thing as a theory of meaning? The line of thought is something as follows. First there is the fact that the subject constructs (scientific) theories about, and in this way imposes order upon, the world. (And, of course, is able to commu-

nicate through *signs* to other subjects these theories in all the complexity of their application.) It seems reasonable to suppose that this activity of imposing order upon the world must *itself* show or involve its own order. Second, there is the idea that a causal or behaviourist conception of the subject's understanding of propositions (and consequent capacity to theorise) cannot reach to what that understanding really amounts to. It is true that the way in which such naturalism must prove inadequate is difficult to pin down. If an argument is to be made, then this is generally articulated in one of two ways (which more or less add up to the same). One is by reference to the notions of the infinite or the mathematical ideal. Here it is pointed out that *what* is described by a naturalistic account is always finite, or in terms of its *approximating* to the mathematical concept. (The world in which the subject is simply one more (highly complex) item only ever contains *approximations* to a triangle: so how can a description of the world (and the subject) make explicable our possession of the *concept* of a triangle?) The other is by reference to the idea that meaningful use of language goes beyond behaviour through its implicit committment to concepts such as *must, ought, reason*, etc. (What is essential is not that the subject picks out the red from the other colours in the paintbox, nor that he continue to pick out red when shown further examples, but that he *must* do so if he is to be *in accordance* with the *meaning* of 'red'; that he acts in this way *because* (for the *reason* that) he is thereby following the *rule* bound up in the word 'red' *correctly*, etc. etc.) It is argued that a naturalistically conceived theory is suited only to describe or predict what does or will happen; it does not touch upon the concepts which characterise intentionality. Thus the argument for the existence of a theory of meaning is, roughly, that there is surely something to theorise about (evidenced by the subject's capacity to theorise), but such a theory must make contact with first person concepts, and so cannot be a naturalistically conceived theory.]

[The idea that a naturalistically conceived theory does not make contact with the categories that determine meaning is

a part of what Davidson means (it seems to me) when he argues against mind brain identity in favour of 'supervenience' of consciousness upon the brain.]

[The way we have described the objection to a 'naturalistically conceived' account makes it difficult to see how there ever could be an account of meaning. The important point to appreciate about Davidson's conception, though, is that it does not attempt to deal with meaning *directly*, but by way of a theory which deals with something *else* (the propositional signs and the facts attributed as truth conditions). That is to say, this indirect approach can be seen not as a *pis aller*, but as itself a way of *characterising* the concept (the ontological status) of the proposition. It is this thought that we want to interpret in a way that fits with Wittgenstein's conception.]

[Davidson's approach upon meaning through a theory of truth (which recognises formally the problem of self reference) is one way in which we are made aware of the idea that what is at issue here is conceptual. But it can also be seen informally in the way we have set out the justification for a theory of meaning. As we have described it, such a theory is (in effect) trying to make sense of the subject's capacity to theorise; that is, it wants to theorise *about* what it itself *is*; almost – one wants to say – the theory wants to find *itself* in its 'theoretical object' – and yet at the same time be able to stand back as separate from that object.]

[With reference to the above, it is worth pointing out that in a paragraph in the *Philosophical Remarks* that is pregnant with the distinction of Wittgenstein's early and later conceptions of mathematics, Wittgenstein speaks of its being as though 'the rule itself must understanding *itself*' – in distinction from a rule which is as though 'a *man* were needed' before it can be carried out. (Of course this is not with regard to a meta theory) See PhR #183.]

[C.S. Lewis states in his autobiography that a behaviourist conception of logic is (in his case) literally unbelievable (that is, nonsensical). This is surely the right reaction (in the sense

in which the right reaction to the later Wittgenstein on rule following is surely a feeling of *vertigo*). Elsewhere Lewis argues against naturalism as a complete account of the world in a way that fits with the justification we have set out for a theory of meaning. It seems to me that the argument in question is fundamentally the right one to make; except that it is not helped by being presented *as* an argument. When it is presented in this way, the concepts too easily end up being defined through a catch-as-catch-can rivalry, with the internalist and the externalist each trying to trump the other. (Compare the debate on whether causal chains determine the meaning of words.) But that misses what the 'internalist' is really trying to say. The point is that one has to *see* something here – be struck by something. (Compare the idea that human beings in their behaviour are just like animals – and here one describes the similarities – and the failure to be struck by the difference – by the fact that *we* are the ones describing *them*. (For no doubt this 'describing behaviour' too can be assimilated to one or other feature of animal behaviour.))]

[Compare the usual behaviourist (naturalist) statement of his position which runs something like: evolution has produced the 'right' conception of mathematical understanding in us because this is the understanding that *works*. It as though the behaviourist reduces philosophy to causality by seeing everything through the lens of epistemology, so missing out (while presupposing in the very statement of his position an) ontology. (An ontology whose clarification cannot *but* bring in the subject.)]

[The nonsensicality of the naturalist's position is of course covered over by his reducing of intentionality to the general category of 'consciousness' (thought in terms of psychology), whose existence he can then ascribe to magic – the 'emergence' of consciousness from out of physiological complexity.]

[Is there not something to be said on the side of the naturalist or externalist position? We have after all implied that both the externalist and internalist give us an insight into intentionality. With regard to this question it seems to me worth thinking

about a crude behaviourist explanation of the subject's possession of the concept of a triangle. The account might be in terms of ordering approximations *towards* the ideal (an ideal which is explicit in the *account*). What is surely correct about this behaviorist conception is that the ideal cannot enter into (our description of) the level of the subject *explictly*. (Compare what we said about Davidson's conception not being a pis aller in the second of this series of parenthesised comments.) The question would seem therefore to be of how 'the ideal' can be introduced indirectly (and in a wholly 'general' way) but not in a way that makes us feel it is presupposed (as in the present example). (In this context one cannot help but be struck by the way in which a geometrical limiting case actually takes us to the arithmetical ideal (the arithmetical infinite).)]

[In our Introduction and initial comments upon our starting passage we associated an 'externalist' conception with the later as against the early Wittgenstein. The fundamental difference, though, (setting aside the fact that the later conception is clearly not derived from naturalist ideas) is this: that for Wittgenstein, the 'external constraints' must be thought of as *internal* to the level of the subject (internal to our *concepts*). The further implication of this is that what the philosopher is able to see from an 'outside perspective' must be (in some sense) incorporated into our conceptual scheme (if only in terms of our no longer being dogmatic about *our* notion of the ideal). It is interesting to compare here Nietzsche's description of the philosophical 'experiment' in the Gay Science (110). Wittgenstein wrote that his early philosophy can be thought of as a clarification of Kant. It seems to me there is a sense in which the later Wittgenstein clarifies aspects of Nietzsche. (Compare too the idea that philosophy is an expression of *ressentiment*. Wittgenstein's later philosophy is surely the answer to this insofar as it does not want to *say* something.)]

We have provisionally defined the level of the third event as: what a Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning deals with directly – that is to say, its subject matter. The rea-

son why we have called it a provisional definition will appear shortly, but to help us to get to that point it will be useful to have a working definition of that subject matter. Thus at this initial stage we may say: a theory of meaning is about: *the subject speaking about the world* – with, of course, the 'speaking about' implying the concept of understanding. This definition implies there are three elements to be distinguished here. We comment upon these in turn, but leaving the problematic middle element to last.

On the right hand side of the definition we have the notion of world. This appears within the theory of meaning in the guise of the truth conditions inferred from (a description of) the propositional sign. The description of the truth conditions will be in terms of a primitive set of semantic definitions which are given once and for all; and so it may be supposed the description will be in terms *other* than those used by the subject. (Setting aside the distinction of language and meta language.) It also seems clear that the primitive referents will be of a quite different category from what the subject would ordinarily distinguish (if only because the theory is supposed to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition).

[One argument for saying that the primitive semantic definitions are given once for all is this: that any new complex given to one subject by acquaintance may be given to another (and might have been to the first) by description. It is this *intersubjective* component that the theory is supposed to make comprehensible. (It is true that this argument as it stands does not quite make the (Tractatus) case.)]

[It is worth noting Davidson's suggestion that the posits of the theory may be compared with the posits of physics, as against the posits of so called folk science, the implication being that they would be of a different order from the objects referred to by first level language. Compare too the question that used to be asked of the Tractatus objects, whether they are to be identified with the category of subject or verb. But these objects are surely to be thought of as *prior* to such distinction of category. ((On the other hand Wittgenstein is also clear that

the business of analysis is not *to inform* the subject what he really meant (in some way analogous to the previous, pragmatist conception), but to clarify that meaning as it stands.)]

[In the case of subject-verb one sometimes speaks (following Frege) of a difference of level rather than difference of category. This usage brings out what at first sight seems to be a peculiarity in the concept of unsaturatedness. For one would think that in order for two things to separate or come together they must be at the *same* level – be the *same* kind of thing. But of course what is really being expressed through the notion of difference of level is the 'diagonal' structure of assertion, or the saying *that* such and such is the case; it is not being supposed that in thought anything (other than the words) is *actually* being combined. Compare Russell's various discussions of the concept of logical form.]

[If the Fregean difference of level is to be thought of as no more than expression of the 'diagonal structure of assertion', what place has the notion of unsaturatedness? Here it seems to me useful to compare the analogy often used by the early Wittgenstein, between language and a co-ordinate system. (Compare too TLP 3.41: 'The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates – that is the logical place.') In the *Notebooks 1914-16* Wittgenstein sets the idea of co-ordinates alongside that of depiction as 'general concepts'. (12.5.15)]

On the left hand side of our working definition of the subject matter of a theory of meaning we have the notion of the subject, or, as we may also say, the intentional state. (We shall comment in due course upon this usage.) In terms of the theory the description of the state of the subject takes place through a description of the propositional sign used by the subject. And of course it is not simply the one propositional sign (the one whose meaning is in question) that is relevant here: the analysis of the subject's meaning will go by way of (or involve syntactical relations with) definitions and related propositional signs whose previous description we also need to think of as contributing to the description of the subject's

intentional state. It is worth adding that on this side too it seems likely the theory will not follow lines that the subject would recognise: both the early Wittgenstein and Davidson argue that the logical form revealed by analysis may not be the same as the form which the subject works with when asked to explain what he means.

The description we have given so far of the level of the third event fits with our original definition of it as what the theory of meaning deals with directly – its subject matter. The middle element of our working definition, the 'speaking about' is, though, more problematic, and it is why we spoke of the original definition as provisional. In order to make the transition to how we want to define this middle element, let us first point out that our definition of the third event has so far missed out the essential thing about Davidson's conception of the theory. The two sides of the definition, namely the signs (on the side of the subject) and the truth conditions (the side of the world), are really the inputs and outputs of a theory of meaning, and as such have missed out the theory as *connecting* (the two sides). The point of a theory of meaning is that it takes the description of *any* propositional sign and allows the theorist to infer on the basis of a finite set of axioms the truth conditions of that propositional sign. That is to say, the theory does something (and does something special, as indicated by the distinction of finite basis and (potentially) infinite application). This notion of theory as connecting (the two sides) and as *doing* something is one that we also need to interpret at the level of the third event.

Given the way we are trying to think about the level of the third event, we cannot say that the connecting theory is *understood* by the subject. However, if the theory of meaning (as empirical theory) is successful in predicting the subject's truth claim behaviour, then it may be said that the theory as operated by the theorist must give insight into what is going on 'in the subject'. Thus it may be said (or said as shorthand for this) that the subject *instantiates* the theory. (Compare Davidson – admittedly warning as much as acknowledging –:

'There must, of course, be *some sense* in which speaker and interpreter have internalised a theory'.) What exactly instantiation may mean is not clear (except that it will involve the things themselves – the signs and the facts – rather than representations of these). We shall nonetheless at this point make a connection with the following remarks from (or originating in) the *Philosophical Grammar* discussion of intentionality:

> It's beginning to look somehow as if intention could never be recognised as *intention* from outside; as if one must be doing the meaning of it oneself in order to recognise it as meaning. That would amount to considering it not as phenomenon or fact but as something intentional which has a direction to it. What this direction is we do not know; it is something that is absent from the phenomena as such.
>
> Here, of course, our earlier problem returns, because the point is that one has to read off from a thought that it is the thought that such and such is the case. If one can't read it off (as one can't read off the cause of a stomach ache) then it is of no logical interest.
>
> [...]
>
> [PhG #96]

> 'It looks as if intention could never be recognised as intention 'from outside', as if one must be doing the meaning of it oneself in order to understand it as meaning'
>
> Can one recognise stomach-ache as such 'from outside'? What are stomach-aches 'from outside'? here there is no outside or inside! Of course, insofar as meaning is a specific experience, one wouldn't call any other experience 'meaning'. Only it isn't any remarkable feature of the sensation which explains the directionality of meaning. And if we say 'from outside intention cannot be recognised as intention etc.' we don't want to say that meaning is a special experience, but that it isn't anything that happens, or happens to us, but something

> that we do, otherwise it would be just dead. (The subject – we want to say – does not here drop out of the experience but is so much involved in it that the experience cannot be described.)
>
> [...]
>
> [PhG #107]

> We want to say: 'When we mean something, its like going up to someone, it's not having a dead picture (of any kind).' We go up to the thing we mean.
>
> [PI #455, cf. PhG #107]

> 'When one means something, it is oneself meaning'; so one is oneself in motion. One is rushing ahead and so cannot also observe oneself rushing ahead. Indeed not.
>
> [PI #456, cf. PhG, #107]

In the first of these passages Wittgenstein connects the concept of intention (or direction) with the concept of inside, but then in this and the next passage qualifes the connection by pointing out that intention is not a (sensory) phenomenon or (in the ordinary sense) an experience. Through all four passages Wittgenstein makes clearer the way in which the concept of inside is applicable by relating intention to three interconnected ideas: that of doing (or acting), of its involving the subject (but so much so that it is not given *to* the subject), and (in consequence of the latter) of its being something that cannot be described.

We have made the connection between the concept of instantiation and the above four passages not so much to try to give meaning to the former, but as part of our general policy of trying to make connections (or seeing physiognomically). The meaning or point of introducing the concept of instantiation

– and with it the connections we are making – will become clearer when we make the comparison between Davidson and Wittgenstein. Before we do that, though, we want to make several comments upon what is expressed by the above passages in relation to what we have said so far.

First, we may make a connection between what Wittgenstein says in these passages and his later statement that it is a mistake to think of meaning as an (inner) process. That statement is, of course, to be read primarily in relation to the thesis that an inner process stands in need of outer criteria; but it (and with it that thesis) can be connected too with the above ideas. For when Wittgenstein tells us meaning is not a process, he clearly does not mean we should think of meaning – as the Tractatus might seem to imply – as something static, but rather that meaning contains the concept of movement or action in a way that the concept of process fails to capture. Thus in Zettel Wittgenstein remarks: 'It might almost be said: 'Meaning *moves*, whereas a process stands still.' ' (Z #237)).

[It is worth comparing the distinction of meaning and process with the distinction of fact and complex. From his earliest writings on Wittgenstein contrasts the concept of fact, which he connects with language and its relation to the world, with the concept of complex, or of objects in space and time. In the immediate post Tractatus writings Wittgenstein clarifies this by pointing out that a complex can be described both in terms of its relations to other complexes, and in terms of the relation between its individual parts. (Parts which can themselves be described separately prior to the assertion of the relation between them.) In contrast it does not make sense to speak of the movement of a fact or of the division of a fact into parts, and so neither of describing (as against asserting or depicting) a fact. (Compare the idea that facts are timeless; complexes on the other hand move within space and time.) The early Wittgenstein also tells us that a proposition is a fact, which fits with the idea that what is essential about language cannot be described by language. (Compare too PhG

#1: it does not make sense to speak of half a proposition.) The later Wittgenstein does not work with an ontology of facts in quite the way his earlier self did, but the thesis that meaning is not a process becomes a little clearer if we interpret it as a distinction of act of meaning against process, which we may then assimilate to the earlier distinction of fact against complex. One justification for this assimilation is that we may speak of the separate stages of a process just as we can of the individual parts of a complex. (Confusingly, in the above passage Wittgenstein *contrasts* a fact (as not having direction) with the proposition. It seems clear this goes against the spirit of the Tractatus distinctions. (Compare the early insistence that only a (propositional sign as) fact can express a *directed* (positive or negative) sense.))]

The second comment concerns the relation of the concept of action (or doing) to the concepts of inside and outside. What is problematic about these latter concepts is that they tend to lead us to the idea of the inside and outside as separate realms; which is also suggested by the use (or our use) of the term 'levels'. But the significance of Wittgenstein's connection of intention with action in the quoted passages is surely that this notion undercuts the conceptual distinction of inside and outside. (Insofar as *I* am acting, it would seem to be a first person concept; yet it is not phenomenon or experience. Compare PI #620)

The third comment we want to make is in relation to the idea expressed in the last line of the second passage and in the fourth passage, that the subject is so much involved in the act of meaning something, he is not is a position to observe – or describe – what goes on. This idea fits with the Wittgensteinean thesis that there is no meta view from which one can describe how language works. On the other hand it can also be supposed to fit with what a supporter of the Davidsonian conception may be supposed to argue, which is that what we have here is not a conceptual difficulty, but merely an expression of the idea that meaning enters in through the notion of instantiation. That is, the subject instantiates a theory of

meaning and thereby *means* (at the level of the image), but the theorist through his understanding of the theory is able to make sense of what instantiation amounts to.

Our interpretation of a theory of meaning on the Davidsonian model so far has been with a view to giving meaning to the idea that the theory deals with meaning at a different level from that of the image: what we are calling the level of the third event. The next thing we want to do is compare the Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning with the Wittgensteinean conception of intentionality. In making this comparison, though, we shall be referring to the Davidsonian theory as *meta* theory; that is to say, not (or not in the first instance) as conceived by reference to our notion of the level of the third event (instantiated theory).

The best way to make the comparison between the Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning and the Wittgensteinean conception of intentionality is to consider what, in line with our interpretation of Wittgenstein thus far, is the natural criticism of this conception of theory. As we have represented it, the form of the theory is such that it makes use of a general definition of truth, on the basis of which the theorist can make an inference from a description of the subject's intentional state to a description (in other terms) of the state of affairs that constitutes satisfaction of that state. The natural criticism of this is of course the one we have used before, which is to point out that, whatever we identify as the subject's intentional state, this will not be the same as what the subject himself speaks about (or intends), and so from our description of this state *alone* we cannot 'read off' (c.f. PhG #96, quoted above) what is intended. But then what about the subject who understands the proposition – what more does *he* have that allows *him* to 'read off' – that is, to 'know' – what is intended?

In Davidson's case, of course, the intentional state is described indirectly and in the first instance by way of a description of the signs. So the question is one of reading off or inferring from the signs themselves what is intended. The theorist will

do this by way of (his understanding of) the theory and its axioms. But then the question is: what about the subject – after all does not he have only the *signs* to go by? And yet he is in no doubt as to what he means. He will make the transition to the intended object at the semantic encounter without any difficulty and without (so far as one can see) making any use of a theory of meaning. But does not that mean that the theorist's attempt to provide a theory is misguided?

We shall come presently to the question of whether this Wittgensteinean criticism can properly be called an argument against the Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning (on our representation of it). What we want to do before that is to use the criticism to help us to bring out more clearly the conceptual distinctions that are at issue here. It will be noted that we have set out the criticism in the paragraph immediately above in a way that fits with Davidson and Wittgenstein, but in the paragraph preceeding it in a more general form. This latter paragraph is to meet the natural response to the one above, which is to say that at the semantic encounter the subject does not have 'only the signs' to go by, but also everything that constitutes his 'intentional state'. But what we want to say is that it does not matter how that state is characterised (even if as 'instantiation of the theory') – or how exact the description of the state may be – the question remains why the theorist should need something *further* (something made possible by his *understanding* of the theory) to make the transition to (a description of) the fact, whereas the subject is able to make do with the state alone?

[Is there perhaps a connection here with the early Wittgenstein's interest in the idea of a mechanical proof procedure?]

There is, of course, something of a mismatch between (intentional) *state* and instantiation with its implication of action; and we shall say something about this later in this discussion of Davidson. First, though, let us set out two connections which we may make from the Wittgensteinean criticism of the

Davidsonian conception.

The first connection is from the difference of perspective of the theorist and subject to the distinction of syntax against semantics. The idea here is that in studying the subject's use of language, the theorist is always dealing with syntactic (grammatical and inferential) connections, whereas when the subject uses language, he is concerned with semantics (with what is the case in the world). This distinction of syntax against semantics may be compared with the idea that it is syntax that is important so far as an *objective* determination of meaning goes; what is left over is 'mere intension', or merely psychological. So far as Davidson's conception of theory goes, there is support for such a dismissal of semantics in the idea that the posits of the theory are more like scientific posits: they are needed to make the theory work rather than signifying something to which anyone would have access in any usual sense. On the other hand, of course, the theory takes a semantic concept – truth (or satisfaction) – as its basic concept; and its hypotheses about the subject's intentional state take place by way of a representation of the fact that is supposed to satisfy it.

The idea that it is syntax rather than semantics that is important in giving an objective account of meaning may be compared with the later Wittgensteinean notion of philosophy as grammatical investigation. Also there are many passages in which Wittgenstein argues against what (loosely) may be called a semantic approach to meaning. An example is where he tells us: 'One can say that meaning drops out of language; because what a proposition means is told by yet another proposition.' (PhG #3) However, we want to argue that care is needed before Wittgenstein's views are assimilated to that of the paragraph above; in particular, because Wittgenstein does not take theory to be the criterion of objectivity where meaning is concerned. We comment further upon this shortly.

The second connection may be compared (and contrasted) with the first. It is with an idea that has appeared before

(but parenthetically) in our account, and is one that a critic of the notion of a theory of meaning may be supposed to invoke. Such a critic may begin by arguing that the subject's understanding of the proposition is in an important sense more fundamental than the theorist's understanding of that understanding of the proposition, because the subject understands 'off his own bat', rather than by way of a meta theory whose understanding by the theorist must be presupposed. In order to try to give substance to this criticism, the critic may make a connection to this idea: that *being* the intentional state in question as against theorising about it 'from outside' is the crucial (not to say magical) thing. Previously when we touched upon this idea (towards the end of the first stage of our phenomenological interpretation) we questioned whether such an appeal to identity does not stand in the way of our getting clearer about the conceptual distinctions involved. One thing we had in mind was that the notion of identity tends to lead us towards a conception of the subject as isolated (within his own world as representation and idea) – or towards solipsism. What we may say here is that our use of the notion of instantiation may be thought of as a way of giving expression to what lies at the back of the appeal to identity, while attempting to keep at a distance its apparent implications.

[One question that brings out the lack of clarity with this notion of identity is: are we to think of ourselves as identical with our brain state or our psychological state? A second question one may ask (in relation to the usual discussions of mind-body identity, etc.) is: if this notion of identity really is a *first* notion in the order of things (inasmuch as it *yields* understanding), then why should we automatically assume it can be discussed by reference to the rules that govern our ordinary (logical) notion of identity?]

[A third (and for us more relevant) question is this: what is it that leads us to take as a starting point the idea that ('in the order of things') the first person world is primarily dependent upon the brain, and only secondarily dependent upon – or defined by – *what* is experienced/*what* is represented? Do

we not have here a target of Wittgenstein's remark on the misleading use of anologies?]

From these two connections (but while keeping them in mind) we now return to the Wittgensteinean criticism. We gave two versions of the criticism, the first a general form and the second in a form more oriented to Davidson and Wittgenstein. In that second version we asked how the subject is able to make the transition to the fact when he has only the signs (and no theory of meaning) to go by. We suggested the natural response to this would be to point to an underlying intentional state (the instantiated theory, perhaps) through which the propositional sign gets its meaning; and we wanted to say by way of the general form that the criticism applies here, too. This appeal to an underlying state is an obvious move to make because it would seem clear that the signs by themselves are not enough to go by. However, anyone who has familiarity with Wittgenstein's later philosophy will know that Wittgenstein's position is pretty much just that: the signs *are* enough to go by. Or, to make the same point negatively, meaning (and so knowing what is meant at the semantic encounter) is *not* a product or function of the inner state of the subject.

Our 'two connections' can be seen as a way of dealing with or responding to the Wittgensteinean criticism in its more general form. In fact, one might have wanted to interpret the Wittgensteinean criticism as an argument *for* the primacy of a notion of *being* ('identical' with) the intentional state – or, as we may call it here, the 'inner state'. However, on this point Wittgenstein is very clear: if it is a mistake to look to the notion of a later event to determine meaning, then it is equally a mistake to look to the present (inner) state of the subject. The later thesis that an inner process stands in need of outer criteria is the most definite expression of this; but there are other remarks that point to the same idea. A well known example being the statement: 'If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.' (It is worth reflecting too upon Z ##608ff.)

[One might want to argue that the dismissal of a later event is much more in line with the early Wittgenstein, and the dismissal of an inner state in line with the later; so that an indifferent dismissal of both is potentially misleading. It is true (as we said in our Introduction) that we are running together the early and later Wittgenstein in a way that leaves us open to the charge of simplification. However, here as throughout we take such simplification to be justified if it helps us to bring out the distinction or distinctions that come *first* (which is what we would want to argue is the case here). (If the later Wittgenstein does seem to allow for something like a later event to play a role, then this is a later event conceptualised from a *first person* perspective (as internal and not external to the prior intentional state). Compare our comment at the end of the first stage of our phenomenological interpretation regarding the question of *who* makes the distinction of prior to and at the semantic encounter.)]

One thing the Wittgensteinean dismissal of an inner state tells us is that the Wittgensteinean criticism of the Davidsonian conception is not pushing in the direction suggested by our second connection. This is important inasmuch as we are trying to interpret Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality in a way that makes the Wittgensteinean criticism comprehensible. But the dismissal of an inner state as primary in determining meaning is important for our discussion in its own right. For it makes a connection with our interpretation of the prior intended object in terms of nonsatisfaction, through the idea that nonsatisfaction implies satisfaction by something *else* – something *outside* the intentional state. This requirement of a notion of outside is something we now discuss within the context of our comparison with Davidson. We begin by asking how or whether the notion of outside may be said to enter into the Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning in a way that yields nonsatisfaction.

The first answer we may give to this question relates to the requirement that meaning must show that and how it is ob-

jective, or intersubjective. The Davidsonian interprets this requirement by arguing that intentional states can be regarded as objective only through their connection with publically demonstrable truth claim behaviour; which at the level of the theory is made possible by the inference of the truth conditions by the theorist. (This is of course to be compared and contrasted with the Wittgensteinean view that objectivity enters in at the level of sense.) Thus we have as our first answer, that 'the outer' enters into the theory through the truth conditions which the theorist infers on the basis of the theory. The difficulty with this answer, though, is that it would seem to take 'the outer' *too far* outside the intentional state. For what makes the proposition true is *represented* in the meta theory, and so enters in (prior to the semantic encounter) only through the *theorist's* understanding (and at the level of the third event only when and if the subject meets up with the fact in question). But in order for the outer to yield nonsatisfaction at the level of the subject, it must be (in some sense) 'internal' to the unsatisfied state; that is to say, it must make contact with the notion of image.

Our second answer to the question of how the outer enters in begins by locating itself on the other side of our definition of the level of the third event: the idea that through the theory we describe – or better, characterise – the subject's intentional state. We may say: the theorist will analyse the subject's meaning, reveal its syntactical relations to other beliefs, and so forth, and thus reveal the structure of the subject's intentional state (and the way that structure bears upon the proposition in question). This structure is not (ordinarily) itself the object of the subject's intention: what he intends is a state of affairs in the world; but according to this answer, what he intends (as prior image) is the first person manifestation of what the theorist reveals 'from an outside perspective'.

This answer has a certain attraction in that it seems to allow us to make sense of a notion of outer which is immanent to the image, and yet is not available to the intending subject (or not in the way it is to the theorist). It also fits with the idea

that nonsatisfaction of the image is in part expressed through the fact that the subject *can* – but ordinarily does not – fill out the detail of what he means. And one may make a (less obvious but surely fundamental) connection with the idea that this filling out of detail is never complete – one can always say more by way of explanation. (Compare Quine: to understand a proposition is to understand a language.) The question, though, is whether this notion of outside really takes us beyond the notion of an underlying inner state which Wittgenstein wants to argue against. (A doubt which exists insofar as the theorist conceives the structure which he uncovers as pertaining to, or defining of, the intentional state of the *subject* (or, *this* subject).)

There is a further aspect to this second answer. It is natural to argue that as the theorist reveals more about the 'underlying structure' of the intentional state, so we are more justified in thinking about that structure in terms of what we have called the instantiated theory. All we have to do conceptually is to think of the state more as capacity (to *do* something) or as *connecting* (the two sides) than as structure (which reveals something). If we do think of it along these lines, though, the difficulty that we have pointed to with this notion becomes easier to see. We may now ask: how does the instantiated meta theory show that it is an instantiated *meta* theory? – for it is only as *meta* theory that its role of taking us *beyond* the subject is made evident. Or, to put this more simply: how is the instantiated theory to be conceived as having *prior* to the semantic encounter the status of bridge between the two sides (of sign and fact) if at that prior stage there is only the *one* side?

It should be clear that our comments about the concept of the outer in relation to the Davidsonian conception have very little to do with Davidson. Rather, we are making use of our representation of Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning in order to make a point, which is that the notion of outside expressed by the formula, 'an inner process stands in need of

outer criteria', is *problematic*.

We shall now make two further comments upon this problematic notion of the outer, whose aim is to bring what we have said into closer connection with Wittgenstein's own remarks.

Earlier we made a connection from the Wittgensteinean criticism of a theory of meaning to the idea that all the theorist can do from his 'outside' perspective is reveal the syntactical connections which characterise the intentional state. (The first of our 'two connections'.) We said that this idea accords in one way with the Davidsonian project (through the idea that the posits of the theory are there simply to make the theory work), but not in the way the theory is based upon a semantic concept. We also pointed out that Wittgenstein's characterisation of philosophy as a grammatical investigation would appear to suggest a certain agreement with this "first connection'. What we want to do now is to suggest how an assimilation of this Wittgensteinean conception of philosophy to this first connection is misleading, and in a way that relates to the concept of outside.

When we made the 'first connection' and pointed out an apparent similarity with Wittgenstein's conception, we quoted this remark from the *Philosophical Grammar*: 'One can say that meaning drops out of language; because what a proposition means is told by yet another proposition.' (PhG #3). Immediately preceding this, though, occurs the following remark, which helps to put the former one into a clearer context:

> [...]
>
> But if you say 'How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?' then I say: 'How is *he* to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?'
>
> What is spoken can only be explained in language, and so in this sense language itself cannot be explained.

Language must speak for itself.

[PhG #2]

The conceptual distinctions in the area touched upon by this remark are easily misunderstood (or miscommunicated), and this needs to be borne in mind here. But we may say that when set into the context of other remarks (on intentionality, in particular), the point is not so much that meaning (or sense) drops *out* as that it is immanent *within* language. That is to say, we make a mistake if we assimilate this passage to the conclusion that, because all we have for definite are syntactic connections, any notion of first person meaning that goes beyond these is to be ruled out. It is more in line with the Wittgensteinean position to say that such a notion of meaning is *already* ruled *in* – and that it only becomes problematic if we think of it as something that, if it is to be deemed real, must be explicable in *other* terms. (We might put this by saying that the response in the passage above, 'I say: 'How is *he* to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?" is to be interpreted not negatively but *positively*.)

In connection with what we are interpreting as a positive statement about meaning, there is a further and more obvious implication of the above passage. It is that so far as meaning goes, all subjects are on the *same* level. We might say: the concept of outer as a presupposition for meaning is *equally* outside for all subjects; no one subject can gain an advantage here with respect to others. (There is perhaps a qualification to be made here with regard to solipsism. And in relation to that qualification, compare the later idea of a 'solipsism of the we'.) The idea that all subjects are on the same level is, of course, simply an expression of the Wittgensteinean thesis that there is no meta view, and so does not say anything new within our discussion. It is nonetheless worth setting out for comparison at this point two further quotations. The first is

noteworthy less because of its first paragraph (whose point we are familiar with) than through the juxtaposition of this with the last paragraph:

> Here my thought is: if someone could see [my expectation] – he would have to see *what* is being expected (but in such a way that it doesn't further require a method of projection, a method of comparison, in order to pass from what he sees to the fact that is expected.)
>
> But that is how it is: if you see the expression of the expectation you see 'what is expected'.
>
> [Zettel #56]

Which in the *Philosophical Investigations* version (#452) has appended to it:

> And in what other way, and in what other sense would it be possible to see it?

[Note: the square bracketed interpolation is ours: in Zettel Wittgenstein writes, '...could see the expectation itself – ...'. Our variant is justified by PI #453 and helps to make more clearly the point we are trying to express: that we *want* to take a meta view (*of* the subject) but that the most we can do is look *with* the subject.]

The second quotation comes from Theodore Redpath's memoir. He reports a conversation with Wittgenstein (#find quote#):

> W asks whether such and such (?)musical recording is any good.
>
> R: well it depends upon what you mean by 'good'
>
> W (with a force and emphasis that impresses R): '*I* mean

what *you* mean.'

Our first comment upon the concept of outside and its problematic status has emphasised the idea that with regard to meaning all subjects are on the same level. The second comment we make returns us to the concept of different levels, but in a way that makes problematic our earlier characterisation of these in terms of different perspectives upon the same thing. In order to help us to discuss this we first go back to the concepts (or levels) of image and third event in order to clarify their meaning within our present context.

We begin with the concept of third event, which has by now taken on a rather complicated meaning within our account. The concept came out of the Russellian structure of intentionality, where it denoted the idea of an event of satisfaction (at the semantic encounter). The basic Wittgensteinean criticism of that structure we saw earlier on in the esssy, when we discussed our first interpretation of the prior intended object. It amounted to saying that intention (nonsatisfaction) in the absence of a (prior) notion of *what* is intended reduces the subject to semantic blindness. However, we pointed out that the way Wittgenstein presents his criticism seems to imply or presuppose a disjunction of presupposing intentionality (in a nonexplanatory way) against reducing the subject to semantic blindness, and we asked why there should not be a middle way between these two. Our initial interpretation of the first part of passage PI #442 may be thought of as an attempt to find such a middle way, in that it tries to make sense of a structure within which (prior) image and later event are combined. Our interpretation of Wittgenstein's criticism of this was in effect that if we suppose the two criteria to be externally related, then assigning all semantic responsibility to the one takes away semantic responsibility – and with it, genuine semantic content – from the other. This criticism lead us to the idea that the two criteria should be thought of as internally related, which we interpreted in terms of levels, with this being thought by reference to the idea of different perspectives

upon the same thing; which lead us to the present attempt at finding a middle way by way of Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning.

Our discussion of Davidson proceeded by defining the level of the third event so that it corresponded to the 'subject matter' of a theory of meaning. The problematic part of this definition was the idea that the meta theory is instantiated 'in' the subject, and as such – or rather, as characterised from an outside perpective by the theorist – corresponds to a different perspective upon the same thing; that is to say, a different perspective upon what for the subject manifests itself as *image*. Given the lack of clarity in the notion of instantiation, one is inclined to put this simply by saying the image is an inside view (the view *for* the subject) of what the theorist through his meta theory would reveal from outside.

What is noticeable in this definition of the level of the third event is that it has moved away from the original concept of *event* (at the semantic encounter). This is of course a consequence of the emphasis upon the concept of *level* (of third event), with the term 'level' interpreted through the idea of a different perspective from that given (or constituted) by the level of the *image* (with its emphasis upon the position of prior).

Let us turn now to the concept (or level) of the image. One might want to say that in this case too there has been a shift of meaning – or at least of emphasis – within our discussion, through the fact that when we said the term 'image' was serving as shorthand for the intentional state (or prior intended object), we qualified this by adding that it emphasises the one aspect of depiction. In this case, though, there is a justification for the shift of emphasis which goes back to the way in which the prior intended object originated from within our phenomenological interpretation. For what came out phenomenologically is that the subject knows (in advance) *what* is intended: which points to the notion of depiction in the first instance, and to the notion of nonsatisfaction only secondarily. Although we did not present it in this way, the notion of

nonsatisfaction can be seen to enter in only through the failure of the ordinary notion of depiction to explain, and not on its own account. In this way it may be said that that as a phenomenological concept, the image (or prior intended object) has its *primary* meaning in terms of the aspect of depiction (or *what* is intended).

The clarifications we have just given of the concepts of image and third event in our present context may now be used to suggest how the notion of levels may be thought to enter in to Wittgenstein's conception in a more natural way. (Even while being undercut by the denial of a meta view.) We have taken as basic to our interpretation the idea that within the concept of prior intended object we may make the distinction between the notion of intention, or nonsatisfaction (the *pre* of prefigure), and the notion of *what* is intended, or of depiction (the *figure* of prefigure). However, we have pointed out above that the prior intended object is in origin a phenomenological concept, and that whereas the notion of depiction enters in phenomenologically in a primary way, the notion of nonsatisfaction does not. *Phenomenologically* we do not come across nonsatisfaction. This difference between the two aspects of the prior intended object is one that it is natural to connect with the idea of levels (thought by reference to perspectives) in the following way. We may say: the concept of depiction (or of what is intended) corresponds to the subject's perspective, and the concept of intention, or nonsatisfaction, to the perspective of the theorist. And in accordance with this we may also make the distinction (which, although it is terminologically natural, we deliberately did not make before) between *what* is intended (or said) and the intentional *state* (or proposition) *through* which or by means of which the intending (or saying) is made possible, and to which alone the epithet 'unsatisfied' would be applicable.

It is worth setting alongside the idea expressed in the above paragraph the following two remarks, which we quoted earlier in connection with the idea of instantiation of a theory of

meaning:

> We want to say: 'When we mean something, its like going up to someone, it's not having a dead picture (of any kind).' We go up to the thing we mean.
>
> [PI #455]

> 'When one means something, it is oneself meaning'; so one is oneself in motion. One is rushing ahead and so cannot also observe oneself rushing ahead. Indeed not.
>
> [PI #456]

In our present context it is natural to see in these remarks an expression of the idea that nonsatisfaction is made possible only *by way of* the fact that the subject 'goes up to the thing he means' (intends *something* by way of depiction). It would be as though the first person in the sense of 'for the subject', through its very nature of being a directedness towards something (outside the subject) thereby yields the first person in the sense of something lacking, and so the first person 'for the theorist'. (The phrase used in German Idealism comes to mind here: the philosopher sees what goes on 'behind the subject's back'.)

[Wittgenstein sometimes directs us to the natural expression of intention (in the sense of purpose) in an animal – a predator stalking its prey. An aspect of the matter that this comparison brings to our attention is the following. There is a distinction to be made between the space of the first person, defined relative to *my body* ('to my right, some way ahead of me') and the space of the third person, or relational space. One is inclined to say that when we are intent *upon* something (as in the case of stalking), it is the former space that defines the level of 'for self', but that 'behind my back' there must be an 'objective synthesis' (to continue with German Idealist terminology) within which my position in the world is *included* . (The 'view

from nowhere', to use a more modern phrase.) Compare too the idea that one speaks *about* the world as third person but lives *in* (and so verifies within) the world as first person (the world of fact against the world as idea, as Wittgenstein put it when expressing this idea in conversation). Of course, the comparison is misleading insofar as here the intended object is thought of as given through the senses as opposed to being represented. (It is worth recalling too that Kant argues in the Transcendental Deduction that there is only one synthesis – i.e. the first and third person are given together.)]

The connection that we are suggesting between our basic distinction and the concept of levels as perspectives makes a connection back to the second answer we gave to the question of how the notion of *outer* enters into the intentional state. At the same time it points towards a simplification of the embarrassment of expression in our definition of the level of the third event. We defined that level through the unwieldy idea of the third event as the subject matter of a Davidsonian theory of meaning, thought by reference to the idea that the theory gives a *different* perspective upon what, from the subject's perspective, manifests itself as image (with its double aspect of depiction and intention). What was especially problematic in that definition was the idea of the third event as instantiated theory, particularly in regard to the question of how this retains a connection with the concept of meta (or outer). One is inclined now, though, to want to cut through this whole complicated expression of definition by distinguishing just two ideas: the perspective of the subject (depiction/what is said) and the perspective of the theorist (nonsatisfaction/meta). In other words, we are to think of the perspective of the theorist not as a different perspective upon the (same thing that is given to the first person as) image – with its double aspect of depiction and nonsatisfaction – but as being itself *internal* to the image (as *yielding* nonsatisfaction). Of course, in one sense this does not take our discussion forward – for the simplification comes at the price of leaving it wholly unclear how the perspective of the theorist is to be thought of as entering in at the *first* person level. So one might say that all we are

really doing here is placing emphasis upon the notion of *meta* in the phrase 'instantiated meta theory'. However, when we attempt to express things in this alternative and simplified way, we bring more radically into the foreground two ideas. The first idea relates to the question of whether we may legitimately make a distinction between the intentional state – as something unsatisfied – and *what* is intended (through depiction) by way of that state. The second idea relates to the way the basic Wittgensteinean thesis that there is no meta view (and so no perspective 'for the theorist') is to be understood. It seems obvious even independently of what we are saying here that this thesis is to be thought of not as *closing off* a way of understanding the proposition, but as being itself an *internal* characterisation of the proposition. That is to say, it is *through* this negative thesis that we must try to make sense of Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality.

The two comments that we have made upon the problematic notion of outside (the intentional state) are as much as we want to say about this notion within the context of our comparison with Davidson. Thus what we do next is return to the Wittgensteinean criticism of the Davidsonian conception of theory. We said when we set out the criticism that we would come back to the question of the status (or validity) of the criticism, and it is this that we do now.

The Wittgensteinean criticism of the Davidsonian conception goes back to the phenomenological concept of prior semantic knowledge, which contains the idea that the subject knows (in advance) what will make the proposition true. The criticism points out that any description of the subject's intentional state (as input for the theory) must fall short of what essentially characterises that state (the intended object), and that this 'falling short' is made up for by the theorist's *own* intentionality, so revealing the inadequacy of this (or any) conception of theory. This criticism was, of course, already implicit in our criticisms of our two interpretations of the prior intended object. What we admitted in our discussion of the first interpretation in terms of nonsatisfaction, though, is that the

kind of statement upon which the criticism depends is philosophically problematic. An example which occurred there and which makes the point very clearly is this statement: that what is essential to the intentional state is that prior to the semantic encounter it (i.e. the *state*) should show that it requires satisfaction by just *that* that is intended (i.e. the *fact*). We may compare too Wittgenstein's own statement in passage PhG #96 (quoted immediately after our introduction of instantiation): '...the point is that one has to read off from a thought that it is the thought that such and such is the case. If one can't read it off (as one can't read off the cause of a stomach ache) then it is of no logical interest.' The obvious question raised by statements such as these is: exactly what condition is being laid upon the intentional state – if it is not to be an impossible one? (And if it is an impossible one, how can the Davidsonian conception be criticised for failing to meet it?)

The answer to this question is, of course, a twofold one. On the one side the answer is to direct us to phenomenology. On the other side, though, it is this: it is to point out that in speaking about an apparently impossible condition being placed upon the intentional state, we are speaking *of* the intentional state, and it is by doing this, according to Wittgenstein, that we go wrong. The difficulty here is not to fall into a case of what David Pears has named 'deceptive pointing', in which we suppose there *is* such a thing as the intentional state, except that we cannot quite reach out to it by means of our signs. On the other hand neither do we want quite to place ourselves on the other side of this 'Ramsay dilemma' (as we might term it). What is clear is that in trying to follow Wittgenstein's conception, which says (most clearly in the Tractatus) that the signs *only* reach out to the one and only empirical *world* (and everything else falls into place when we realise this), we find ourselves treading something of a tightrope, or boundary.

[The natural objection to the second part of this answer would begin by recalling our earlier (parenthetical) argument for a

theory of meaning, and finish by saying something like: '...and there surely must be *something* – and something systematic or objective, which the theorist therefore can capture – going on 'inside' each and every one of us when we use language. To this kind of objection, though, there are two things we may point out by way of a (partial) response. The first is that Wittgenstein does not deny that an account may be given of what is going on, but directs us (in the case of the later Wittgenstein, at least) to the use of language as it can be observed in the *public* sphere. The second thing to say is of course this: that so far as nonsatisfaction is concerned, we do not want to find *something* (but rather a *lack* of something).]

[Of course, we can speak of the intentional state inasmuch as we say that someone (who might be oneself) believes (hopes, etc.) that p. The question is whether we can make sense of this state of belief *except* through its being defined by reference to (the fact asserted by) the proposition 'p'.]

The second part of the Wittgensteinean answer is (on our presentation) no more than a straightforward denial of the possibility of a meta view. By contrast the first part of the answer, directing us to phenomenology, appears to require a response from a supporter of the Davidsonian conception. We shall set out in a moment what kind of response might be expected here. First, though, let us make a comment which relates to both parts of Wittgenstein's answer.

The Wittgensteinean criticism, as we have stressed, is general: it says that anything we identify – or describe – on the side of the subject will be different from what the subject himself intends (insofar as that is a state of affairs in the world), and so raises the problem of the connection from the one to the other. We suggested in the Davidsonian case that the natural move to make in response to the criticism is to an underlying intentional state which would mediate the connection from sign to fact. In a non Davidsonian context, though, there is a more usual move: that from sign to *mental* state. (Compare the second of the two connections we made in regard to the Wittgensteinean criticism of Davidson.) What is worth not-

ing about this move is that it contains an appeal to ontology in order to avoid facing square on the logical nature of the criticism. It will be said by a supporter of such a mentalist conception that mental images just *are* 'queer things' – somehow 'slippery' and difficult to get within our grasp ('it all goes by so fast' – cf PI # 453) – and *in consequence of* this peculiar nature they are difficult to describe. (Compare the idea that the intentional *just is* irreducible to description). From a Wittgensteinean perspective, though, this is surely to get things back to front. That is to say, the slippery – or better, the *dependent* – nature of mental phenomena is to be made sense of by way of the *logical* argument, and not vice versa. Thus in the Tractatus Wittgenstein does *not* say that we cannot describe mental states, but that we cannot describe (the essential properties of) *language*.

What then is the Davidsonian response to the first part of Wittgenstein's answer – the directing of us to phenomenology? The response we may ascribe to Davidson is, of course, the same one that characterised the Quinean conception of intentionality: it is to distrust or dismiss phenomenology. When we introduced the Davidsonian conception we supposed we might be able to use it to make sense of the idea of the *image* and the third event (as the matter of theory) as different perspectives upon the same thing. That characterisation suggests that each perspective may be thought of as, in a certain sense, equivalent (the image *as* the third event 'seen from inside'). One might even have wanted to make a connection here with Wittgenstein's dictum: Nothing is hidden. What is implied by the Wittgensteinean criticism, though, is that the Davidsonian conception of theory necessarily takes the important thing away from the image, and places it in the hands of the theorist.

The downplaying of the image which goes with the Davidsonian conception may be related to something we said when we first set out the Wittgensteinean criticism of the conception. We said then that there is something of a mismatch between (intentional) *state* and instantiation of (meta) *theory* with its

implication of action. In this mismatch one is inclined to see a further expression of the secondary status of the image (/intentional state), by way of the idea that the (meta) theory is designed to make the *transition* from the side of the subject (however characterised) to the side of the world (the truth conditions). We may also recall in this context our statement that the theorist will characterise the state of affairs that constitutes satisfaction of the intentional state *differently* from the subject. (Setting aside the formal distinction of level.) For the theorist will analyse the subject's proposition in a way that reveals the underlying structure of that proposition – and with it the 'logical structure' of the fact – and by this means arrive at a different characterisation of what constitutes satisfaction. The idea that this structure goes deeper than what is available to the subject (through the image) is implied by the idea that this structure ultimately is not a matter for empirical discovery, but is presuppposed by the very existence of semantics at the first level; that is to say, it is a structure implied by the demand for an internal connection (connection of logical inference) within the meta theory between the subject's signs and the fact.

In our discussion of the idea of a perspective 'for the theorist' (as making possible nonsatisfaction) we pointed out that our way of introducing the level of the third event had brought with it an unwieldy complication of expression. It will have been noticed – or can be seen by way of the last line of the above paragraph – that there has been a similar complication – or confusion – of expression in our use of the notion of 'internal connection'. Complication such as this is attributed by Wittgenstein not to what we are trying to understand – which the early Wittgenstein tells us must be 'utterly simple' – but rather to our 'tangled understanding'. (As though we always go round the outside of what must be grasped 'at the centre'.) It is thus important – even aside from our particular interest in the present case – to clarify such a complication where we are able to. Thus as our last comment upon the Davidsonian conception before saying something by way of summary of it, we comment upon this confusion of meanings of internal con-

nection. We begin by reviewing the various meanings that have entered into our account.

The first concept of internal connection that entered in was given meaning (or justification) through our phenomenological interpretation of our starting passage, and had formal expression in paradoxical terms. This initial conception relates to what we are calling the level of the image; it is defined and expressed in terms of how things are (or seem) to the subject in relation to Wittgenstein's two questions of our starting passage. This initial conception leads, of course, to the question of how such an internal connection is possible. Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning based upon Tarski's definition of truth may be thought of as an attempt to give an answer to this question, in that it contains the idea that the theorist should be able to infer the truth conditions of the subject's statement from a description of that statement. This notion of *logical inference* from sign to fact (via their meta level representations) gives a second meaning to the notion of internal connection. [It may be compared with the (early) Wittgensteinean notion of an internal relation (or connection) between picture and fact. This Wittgensteineanean notion points us on the one hand towards the phenomenological notion of image – the notion that has guided our interpretation – but on the other hand towards the idea of *logical inference* (as understood by the Tractatus). This second meaning is made very clear in TLP #5.1362, where Wittgenstein says explictly that 'the connection between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.' Thus in the Tractatus we have at an *immanent* level what in the Davidsonian conception would take place at the *meta* level.] The third meaning that has been given to the notion of internal connection in our account is in relation to these first two meanings. We conceived Davidson's theory as being about the subject's understanding of the proposition, but in such a way that it deals with that understanding 'at a different level' – the level of the third event. The supposition was that the level of the image and the level of the third event are really 'the same thing', only viewed from different perspectives, and that through this conception of levels

it might be possible to give meaning to the idea that the two 'criteria' of image and third event are internally connected.

We can now see, at least in outline, how this complicated picture simplifies from within the perspective of Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality. According to Wittgenstein, the last meaning of internal connection does not apply; or not as we have presented it, in terms of its involving different perspectives. This is because there is no room within Wittgenstein's conception for the perspective the theorist would like to take in order to get clearer about 'what takes place at the semantic encounter'. That does not quite say an account is not possible; only it cannot be a meta account as in the second meaning of internal connection of the above paragraph. It cannot be an account that discovers how things work at a deeper level – 'the third event' – because there is no deeper level. ['Nothing is hidden' (PI #435) – Or, if things 'are hidden [it is] because of their simplicity and familiarity.' – 'one is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes' (PI #129). Or, if we do bring what is hidden into view and into our considerations, then we do so wrongly – we seek to go *beyond* it and so mistake as a preliminary to a solution something that is *itself* the solution. (cf. Z #314)] In other words, the second meaning that we gave to 'internal connection' is at best *problematic*. Thus the only clear meaning of internal connection that Wittgenstein allows out of the three that have been operating in this discussion of Davidson is our first, phenomenological meaning – which is not explanatory. We might sum this up by saying that for Wittgenstein, the *meta* notion of 'getting clearer about what takes place at the semantic encounter' disappears to leave us with our ordinary, first level notion, in which we *do* get clearer about what takes place – but only in the usual sense of these words (and only because we understand from the position of prior 'what is said').

[The sense in which Wittgenstein does allow for a 'meta' account is expressed by his statement that the philosopher can only adduce *exterior* facts about language. ('From *inside*'

(when we *use* language) there are only the facts that we assert about the world.)]

We have now come to the end of our discussion of Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality by way of a comparison with Davidson's conception of a theory of meaning. (Although in the discussion that follows we shall make one further comment.) Our aim in this discussion, as in the earlier comparison with Quine, has been much more to make connections than to argue one way or another, and so we close by briefly summarising the most obvious of these connections.

In our comparison with Quine we pointed out two main features, which are the downplaying of the concept of image, and the connection between the notion of aboutness (nonsatisfaction) and the concept of meta. We have seen these too in our comparison with Davidson, and in the case of the latter in a way that makes more obviously problematic the question of how the two aspects of the prior intended object 'fit together'. What is problematic here came out very clearly in the question of how to give sense to the concept of instantiated meta theory so as to retain the notion of *meta* within the first person notion of *instantiated*. (We may compare here the difficulty with the notion of interior theory that we pointed to in the Quinean conception.) Our discussion of this difficulty brought up the question of whether we can make a distinction between (intentional) *state* – characterisable as unsatisfied – and *what* is intended (given *to* the phenomenological subject). The question of a distinction between these also entered into our discussion of the Wittgensteinean criticism of the Davidsonian conception, where we pointed out that we find ourselves treading something of a tightrope, or boundary. We argued that the Wittgensteinean position is that the distinction between intentional state and what is intended is illegitimate, as is made manifest by phenomenology (knowing *what* is intended) on the one hand, and expressed by the denial of a meta view on the other hand. We also suggested in our discussion that the denial of a meta view should be seen as an *internal* characterisation of the proposition, or of intentionality. In

other words, it is by way of this negative thesis that we must try to understand Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality.

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In our discussion of Davidson we suggested two ways in which the concept of outer might be thought to enter in so as to yield the (first person) concept of nonsatisfaction. The first of these was through the representation in the meta theory of the truth conditions (which way we argued takes the outer too far outside the intentional state). In our follow up comment upon this, we claimed – in accordance with the Wittgensteinean denial of a meta view – that with regard to meaning all subjects are on the *same* level. This claim, though, is not so simple within the Wittgensteinean context as it might appear. The problem of solipsism – or Wittgenstein's treatment of this problem – would seem to suggest that there is one subject who has a special status – namely, myself. It is thus the topic of solipsism that we turn to next in this discussion. Our aim here is to get clearer about the basic distinctions which have entered into our discussion (particularly through the comparison with Davidson) by way of a topic that is central (in different ways) to both early and later Wittgenstein. We should say, though, that our discussion of it is very much oriented towards Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, where the characteristic feature of Wittgenstein's treatment (the analysis in terms of the limits of language) is least pronounced. (But it seems to me the remarks here are more accessible.)

The concept of solipsism as it occurs in Wittgenstein's writings is determined by two questions or ideas: first, of whether there are two 'worlds' – *my* world and *the* world – or one world; and second, of a *limit* to what can be expressed – an idea which has attached to it (perhaps more strongly in the early philosophy) the thought that solipsism contains an essential truth ('For what the solipsist *means* is quite correct; only it cannot be

said, but makes itself manifest.' (See TLP 5.62)).

We can get a preliminary sense of how these ideas belong together by relating them to this Wittgensteinean thought: that in order to *draw* a limit we must be able to cross over to the other side of the limit; that is, we must presuppose both sides of the limit (c.f. TLP 5.61). The implication of this thought is that when the solipsist tries to assert that his world is *the* (one and only) world he can do so only by (implicitly) distinguishing this world *from* what does not belong to him (and to which he must have therefore a certain access); and so, in trying to express what he wants to say, he contradicts himself. Wittgenstein put this same point succinctly – and in a way that makes clearer the way in which solipsism may be supposed to contain a truth – in a comment about what is correct in Kant's philosophy. The insight he ascribed to Transcendental Idealism is: that I can only make the distinction between *my* world and *the* world *within* my world. Of course, the question that remains here is about the meaning of that second 'my'. (If it is not distinguished from anything then am I justified in using the word 'my'? – Wittgenstein is perhaps more equivocal about this than Kant.)

In order to try to get clearer about the two basic ideas we have distinguished let us begin with Wittgenstein's statement of solipsism at TLP #5.63: 'I am my world. (The microcosm.)'. The parenthesised addition points to the contrast with 'The macrocosm', and thus raises the question of what Wittgenstein means when at TLP #5.641 he speaks of the 'fact' that 'the world is my world'. The obvious first question to ask of this statement is what is meant by 'is'. If we think of this as the *is* of identity, then, depending on which side we emphasise, we come up against one of two difficulties. Either the world is absorbed into something subjective (which is, as it were, the superficial interpretation of solipsism – the retreat into subjective idealism) – or 'my world' is absorbed into the common, everyday world (the world as fact); which is the interpretation which fails to see the problem (the realist or common sense reaction, according to Wittgenstein in *The*

Blue Book). The difficulty with the second is of course that it only acknowledges me as a body (on a par with all other bodies), and so leaves out myself as a subject who *experiences* (leaves out 'my world as idea').

One response to the two difficulties of the above paragraph is simply to deny the statement of identity and take up a dualist position: to assert that there is *my* world (and by extension, when the solipsist decides to make the 'transition' to other minds, *your* world and *their* worlds) *and* the common world. This response is unsatisfactory for all sorts of reasons, and we shall not discuss it. (Not least of these reasons being that it contradicts our (philosophical) sense of what is satisfactory. It is not simply that it offends our 'aesthetic' (or 'scholastic') sense – it just *looks* too much like an evasion.)

The other response to the statement 'My world is the world' is to question whether the meaning of 'is' should be thought of in some other way than on the model of identity. It seems clear this is the way we should try to make sense of the statement, but rather than attempt to do this directly we consider some examples of solipsism (or of statements connected with solipsism).

[The question of identity comes in too in the way that Wittgenstein relates solipsism to the problem of other minds in *The Blue Book*. Characteristically Wittgenstein discusses this problem in terms of sense rather than truth. That is to say, the question is not so much how do I know other people have minds (what are the grounds that justify me in asserting this), but how do I give *sense* to the assertion. For if it is said that I transfer to his body what goes on in mine when I behave as he is now behaving (pain behaviour, for example), it is unclear how this can take place when (or if) what goes on in my body is *logically* tied to my ego. (If it does not make sense to say that someone else feels my pain, because my pain *includes* my feeling it (includes my ego), then how can I 'transfer' the pain without transferring *myself* – i.e. supposing not that he feels 'something similar' but that *I* feel pain in *his* body.) The question would seem to be one of giving meaning to 'logically

tied' without simple recourse to notions such as identity or inclusion.]

We begin with the 'solipsistic' assertion, 'I am here'. Wittgenstein points out in *The Blue Book* that this statement only makes sense if 'here' refers to a point in 'common space' (the space of the third person) – which position might be made clearer by the sound of my voice or by adding something like '..in the garden next to the pond'. The statement ceases to have sense and becomes solipsistic (in Wittgenstein's extended sense of the term) when the 'here' tries to refer to a 'position in visual space' – when 'roughly speaking it is the geometrical eye', as Wittgenstein puts it in *The Blue Book*. It is this second case that is meaningless in the sense that it is uninformative; in this case the reference of 'I' is logically tied to the reference of 'here', so that one ends up saying no more than 'here is here'.

[A variation upon the solipsistic statement 'I am here' is the statement: 'I am at the centre of the world'. It is worth reflecting upon this variation because it brings out more clearly the idea that the solipsist is *trying* to say something (but cannot). For how is the solipsist to make clearer what he means? Presumably by adding something along the lines of: 'Don't you see, no matter how much I move around within the world, *I* remain at the *centre*!' Thus in trying to express what he wants to say, the solipsist contradicts his intended meaning.]

A second statement of solipsism is: 'Only the *present* experience is real'. Wittgenstein discusses this in the *Philosophical Remarks* in the following passage:

> [...]
>
> We are tempted to say: only the experience of the present moment has reality. And then the first reply must be: As opposed to what?
>
> Does it imply I didn't get up this morning? (For if so it would be dubious.) But that is not what we mean. Does it mean that an event that I'm not remembering

at this instant didn't occur? Not that either.

The proposition that only the present experience has reality appears to contain the last consequence of solipsism. And in a sense that is so; only what it is able to say amounts to just as little as can be said by solipsism. –For what belongs to the essence of the world simply *cannot* be said. And philosophy, if it were to say anything, would have to describe the essence of the world.

But the essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world; and philosophy as custodian of grammar can in fact grasp the essence of the world, only not in the propositions of language, but in rules for this language which exclude meaningless combinations of signs.

If someone says, only the *present experience* has reality, then the word 'present' must be redundant here, as the word 'I' is in other contexts. For it cannot mean *present* as opposed to past and future. –Something else must be meant by the word, something that isn't *in* a space, but is itself a space. That is to say, not something bordering on something else (from which it therefore could be limited off). And so, something language cannot legitimately set in relief.

The present we are talking about here is not the frame in the film reel that is in front of the projector's lens at precisely this moment, as opposed to the frames before and after it, which have already been there or are yet to come; but the picture on the screen which would illegitimately be called present, since 'present' would not be used here to distinguish it from past and future. And so it is a meaningless epithet.

[PhR #54]

Wittgenstein's analogy of the projection of a film strip onto a screen brings out in a very clear way the common features

between this and the previous example of solipsism. In this case too there is a distinction between the 'space' or world of the third person and the 'space' or world of (or as) the first person. This extended use of the word space goes back, of course, to the Tractatus notion of logical space, and is intended to make the distinction between a move *within* a space – Fa as against either Fb or Ga, and the (logical) space itself which is given through the logical form of the symbols a, b, G, F (i.e. rules of grammar). In solipsism of the present moment the space of the third person is the time of the calendar – the temporal relations in terms of which we describe the film strip – and the first person space is *the* present – the screen onto which the film is projected. And again the problem is that the solipsist's attempted expression makes it look as though he is separating out one special position from amongst others – one frame of the film rather than another – rather than referring to what (as Wittgenstein puts it elsewhere) separates *itself* out.

[The analogy that Wittgenstein uses here is only *a* comparison, as Wittgenstein implies when he introduces it into his discussion; and (as the last paragraph of chapter VII of *Philosophical Remarks* can be interpreted as concluding) is in one way misleading. What is misleading about it is related to the question of the phenomenology of the present experience, and is worth setting out because the question of the possibility of phenomenology is relevant to our discussion. The easiest way to do this is in relation to the fact that the analogy has so far introduced only two of the notions of time which together yield our ordinary concept of time; namely, *the* present (experience) and the time of the calendar – or the ordering of events in terms of past and future. The third notion is of course that of *change*; and so it may be asked whether or how in terms of the analogy this concept enters in.

[One can, of course, say that the concept of change enters into the analogy as the movement of the film strip through the projector. However, this does not give us what we are looking for, because it does not make clear how the notion of

change enters in at the level of the first person – that is, how the notion makes contact with phenomenology. (The time of the film strip we are of course supposing to enter in at the level of the screen through the subject's representations.) And there is of course in any case the independent objection that introducing change in this way would be circular, for it means in effect that we are thinking of *the* present as moving through time. (So seeming to allow the question, how fast does it move?)

[If we turn from the level of the film strip to the level of the screen, then one is inclined to say that the concept of change enters in through the fact that the picture on the screen is ever changing. However, this too is unsatisfactory. For the picture on the screen is supposed to represent my experience (my visual field, most obviously); but in terms of the analogy, the previous (past) picture is no longer on the screen, and the next (future) picture is not yet on the screen; so that in spite of change of picture all there ever is on the screen is the present picture. And how can that yield for the subject the experience of change? In other words, all that the analogy with a screen gives to us is a *change of experience*, whereas what is required is the *experience of change*. (It seems to me this is a part of what is involved in Kant's argument in The First Analogy.)

[(One can of course say that on the borders of the screen (alongside the present picture) are memories and expectations; but then these too only exist 'in the present'. The point is, we *see* change (see movement) – in other words, change is internal and not external to the experience.)]

In the passage Wittgenstein claims that what the solipsist wants to say cannot be expressed by the propositions of our language, but is expressed by the 'rules for this language which exclude meaningless combinations of signs'. We may relate this claim to the fact that within Wittgenstein's conception, rules of grammar are not (meta) propositions, and so do not themselves draw a boundary (within a space). Rules of grammar distinguish meaningful from meaningless combinations of

signs, but the former are expressed *through* (the fact that there are) such and such propositions (which say *something*). The latter do not *contrast* with meaningless combinations of signs. ('Sense does not border on nonsense', as Wittgenstein expressed it.) In Zettel Wittgenstein points out that if we cover one eye and look with the other eye then we do not simultaneously see darkness with the eye that is covered. This analogy (which of course is not merely analogy) helps to illustrate the distinction which is at issue. In this case it is the distinction between an absence *of* seeing (as it were, an absence of the subject), and an absence given *to* sight (given to the subject). Saying that rules of grammar are not meta propositions is equivalent to asserting the first as a model for thinking about what is going on as against the second.

The analogy in Zettel with *not* seeing (as against seeing nothing) would seem to suggest that on the positive side what the solipsist is really trying to bring into view is (the fact of) his *seeing*, or experience. (It is the presence as against the absence of the subject that is at issue.) The first version of solipsism can also be interpreted as implying this, inasmuch as the subject's statement 'I am here' is trying to bring to our attention the world as it is from the point of view of the subject (who experiences). The difficulty that the solipsist has is that the concept of world which he is trying to point out to us is one that, as Wittgenstein puts it in the *Philosophical Remarks*, 'never can strike us because it is *the* way we perceive':

> That it doesn't strike us at all when we look around us, move about in space, feel our own bodies, etc., etc., shows how natural these things are to us. We do not notice that we see space perspectivally or that our visual field is in some sense blurred towards the edges. It doesn't strike us and never can strike us because it is *the* way we perceive. We never give it a thought and it's impossible we should, since there is nothing that contrasts with the form of our world.
>
> What I wanted to say is it's strange that those who ascribe reality only to things and not to our idea move

about so unquestioningly in the world as idea and never long to escape from it.

In other words, how much of a matter of course the given is. It would be the very devil if this were a tiny picture taken from an oblique distorting angle.

[...]

[PhR #47]

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein makes the same kind of point, although here he stresses the danger of making a category mistake (as we may call it) in our understanding of what the solipsist is trying to say:

'But when I imagine something, or even actually *see* objects, I have *got* something which my neighbour has not.' –I understand this. You want to look about you and say: 'At any rate only I have got THIS.' –What are these words for? They serve no purpose.– Can one not add: 'There is no question of a 'seeing' – and therefore none of a 'having' – nor of a subject, nor therefore of 'I' either? Might I not ask: In what sense have you *got* what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even *see* it.

[...]

[PI #398]

The category mistake that this passage warns against occurs if we speak as though the seeing (of the objects about us) can itself be seen. That is to say, there is not *what* is seen in the ordinary third person sense – the sense with which we are all familiar – and then 'what is seen' in the special, solipsistic sense. Of course, that does not mean we cannot speak of the

visual image (it is after all the image that gets larger as we move closer to an object, and not the object itself) but it does mean that it is problematic to speak of it as though it is something that is given alongside or in addition to what is seen in the ordinary sense. The picture that comes to mind here is of the two worlds as the two sides of one coin: each of us has access only to the one side, but the other side is nonetheless (conceptually or internally) 'implied' by it. (Something of this kind is suggested too by the passages we quoted from the *Philosophical Investigations* in our discussion of Quine.)

Which side do we have direct access to and which is 'implied'? One might say (which perhaps fits better the passage) that we have direct access to *what* is seen, and the notion of seeing or of the world as idea is secondary – it is brought to our attention at a *second* remove. (Compare the emphasis in Wittgenstein's Zettel discussion of philosophical '–isms' upon the fact that we learn material object language in the first instance.) Or we might say (as would be more in keeping with philosophical tradition) that we have direct access to the image, but the world as third person is thereby conceptually implied; this being shown by the fact that it is this world we speak about. (We *live* in the world as idea (and it is idea that verifies our propositions) but speak *about* the world as fact, as Wittgenstein put it.) Presumably in either case we would mean different things by the various terms involved. The fact that we could interpret things either way is, it seems to me, an indication of the fact that conceptually things are not at all clear here. Perhaps the only thing that is clear is that there is something here that is difficult to bring into view.

[There is a suggestion in PI #398 (made more strongly at PI #399) that the subject does not 'have' his world as idea because he is in a certain sense '*identical*' with it. This makes a connection with the Tractatus assertion: 'I *am* my world (the microcosm)' (my emphasis). And from here it is tempting to make a connection to the idea of a distinction between the world as idea and the world as representation. But it is not at all clear that as they stand these concepts or distinctions are

helpful.]

[There is in the present context an inclination to speak not of the image and what is seen but of visual *space* and what is seen. It then seems possible to say that visual space is defined *by* what is seen, so expressing the idea that visual space is properly to be thought of as unsatisfied, or dependent. This would seem to make sense of the idea (implied by PI #398) that the world as idea is not given to us – for if it is not *something*, then it is not something that can be given. In addition it might be suggested that the notion of nonsatisfaction can make clearer the idea of a relation between the two worlds – a relation which does not reduce the two worlds to one in the way of the logical notion of identity, but which does not fall back into an unacceptable dualism.

[Having said so much, though, it seems to me that it is easy to oversimplify things here and to think that by redefining our basic terms we have made things clearer when we have not. This is something worth making an extended comment upon because of the way it touches upon the themes of our discussion. We have interpreted Wittgenstein in the passage PI #398 as saying that we make a mistake if we suppose the subject can separate out experience from *what* is experienced. This is something that is easy to agree with; yet we are nonetheless inclined *within language* to distinguish between the experience *of* the subject (the experience which we think of as 'identical' with the subject, and so (for that reason) not given *to* him but (by the same reason) indisputably *his*) and *what* the subject experiences (the object in the world as third person). This distinction now seems to be forcing us towards the dualism that we want to avoid, because the notion of experience is still 'there' (as identical with the subject) in addition to *what* he experiences. It is at this point that we bring in the notion of the world as first person as *unsatisfied*, and try to use it to force closed the gap that leads to dualism. But how is it supposed to do this? That is to say, in what sense is the visual field – or visual space – defined by what is seen? Does this mean there is a hole or gap at the limit

of visual space into which the real thing (the thing that *we* see but to which *his* brain – the brain from which the image is 'conjured up' – is merely in *causal* connection) exactly fits? And would this 'fitting' be altered (from *his* perspective) if there were *no* such real thing (in the way of scepticism)? – If not, then what is it that allows us to say that the seeing (his seeing) is defined by what is seen and at the same time to assert the *identity* of this latter with the 'real things' in the world as third person?

If the questions or confusions that remain here (in spite of redefinition) are to be unravelled, then the first step must surely be to go back to the position from which they arise. This position involves something like the following. A subject (not ourselves) looks at something in the world of the third person – the side of a mountain, say. We do not treat this subject as being in *our* position (that is, in *direct* perceptual contact with the *real* thing) but observe that in his case there are two things involved – the side of the mountain, and the retinal image (leading further back to all those synaptic connections). But this by itself seems not to be enough. So we switch (briefly) to *our* case and on that basis postulate something further – the seeing, or visual field, which (mysteriously) arises out of the situation he is in and which to try to save our embarrassment we describe as 'unsatisfied'. The reason why we are embarrassed is that we do not want to *interpose* the visual field between retinal image and mountainside – as it were placing it in the same (third person) space – and yet neither do we want to abandon the subject to a *separate*, phenomenal world. As a final move we then apply his situation back to ourselves (at which point the philosophical position of scepticism arises to make us realise something has gone wrong).

If the situation just described is what leads to the difficulties, then it also – so it seems to me – points us towards the way out (even if we do not understand quite how to follow it). We said that the visual field (the seeing) arises – as something unsatisfied – out of the situation the subject is in. We expressed

it in this way because it seems clear that in this statement we have the germ of what we know to be the right kind of answer, but are unable quite to see how to arrive at. What we want to say (and are surely right to say) is that the *seeing* must not be something over and above the situation we are observing – the situation of the subject and the mountainside. Rather, as something with a *dependent* nature, it must enter in and be defined through *that* situation. Only it must arise perspicuously and 'logically' from it, rather than as a mysterious fact of nature arising from a *quite different* situation (those complicated synaptic connections). Why then does it seem not to do so? The answer must be to do with the asymmetries of my (or our) situation and his situation. And the crucial point here is surely that when we observe and describe the subject, we situate him *within* the world as third person (as being on the same level as everything or everyone else). What solipsism attempts to point out to us is that this is not how '*my*' (or *each* of ours) situation is. The subject (as *first* person) is not 'in the world' in the way that our propositions necessarily portray him as being. And it seems obvious that the '*dependence*' or nonsatisfaction of the *seeing* which we are looking for (and displace onto the brain when we cannot find it) is only apparent when we take into account the *whole* situation from the *subject's* point of view (i.e. from a first person standpoint). The difficulty that solipsism places before us is that from the subject's (that is, each of ours) perspective the 'whole situation' is precisely what we do not get – all we get is '*what* is seen'.

[I can say of a subject A that light waves come from the object and strike his retina, etc; but can I say this of *myself?* Here we want to say on the one hand yes and on the other hand no. (Compare Wittgenstein: 'The visual table is not composed of electrons.' (PhR #36))]

[The last few sentences of the paragraph preceding the one above might seem to suggest that what is required is phenomenology in Husserl's sense. But it is clearly a conceptual reversal, or new concepts, that are required, not new 'facts'

to stand alongside scientific ones. And in this context we may observe that Wittgenstein's dictum that science cannot *advance* philosophy must also mean that it cannot ever come into *conflict* with it.]

[Compare the idea that just as we do not want to propose anything beyond the facts of the matter (mountainside, retina), in order to make comprehensible 'the world as first person', so too we do not want to introduce more than the signs and the facts in order to arrive at intentionality. That is to say, we do not want something *further*, something *new*, but rather a new way of looking at what we already have. Compare the Wittgensteinean conception of the structure of intentionality (in contrast with the Russellian) as involving just thought and fact. In the spirit of this comment (and in line with the later Wittgenstein) we might re-phrase this as: just propositional *sign* and fact.]

[The difficulty of getting a view *of* the first person world (as opposed to the world as it is experienced *by* the first person) may be connected with our problem through the idea that the proposition does not reveal to the first person what it *is*, but only what it *says*. (And of course from an outside standpoint, all we see is (a subject and) the *propositional sign*.) We might also say that in terms of *what* the proposition says – that is, in terms of the facts of the matter – everything is represented as being on the *same* level. Things or events (or people) are indifferently side by side in space and time. Compare Wittgenstein's discussions (in relation to toothache) of the impossibility of representing *my* privileged position (PhR VI). But compare too (in relation to our earlier comments upon the concept of training) the emphasis the later Wittgenstein gives to the *particular* circumstances of the subject's use of a sign.]

There is one more statement of solipsism that we want to comment upon. It is the standard version, usually expressed as 'Only *I* exist', but in the Tractatus as 'The world is *my* world'. What this statement brings to our attention is the problematic position of *my* ego in relation to other egos. (Or:

myself in relation to others.) The basic point here is that I do not meet up with myself in the way that I meet up with other egos. I meet up with other subjects *within* my (or the) world: these subjects are so to speak given *to* me. (They occur *within* the book 'The world as I found it' – TLP #5.631.) How or in what sense, then, does *the* subject – that is, myself – enter in? The answer would seem to be that *I* am 'given' not as one amongst other subjects within my (the) world, but through the fact that 'there is a world'. (The I is given as – or is – the stage upon which the play is played out. It is equivalent to the *book* 'The world as I found it', not to any one thing found within the book.) Or, to put it in a more philosophical fashion, once *others* are introduced, the *I* is *already* thereby introduced. This is, of course, simply to repeat the position that we have observed with our other two statements of solipsism: the (or my) world (*the* I) is not one amongst other things, and so cannot be separated out from them (in language); it separates *itself* out. However, in the case of this version one is more inclined to make the protest that there is something wrong (as well as something right) about it. For inasmuch as the distinction between others and myself corresponds to the distinction between the world as third person and the world as first person, one wants to say that I too belong to (or within) the world as third person. That is to say, I conceive of myself as one subject *amongst* other subjects. (I have a body; I manifest pain behaviour; I remember what I did (how I behaved) yesterday (and before yesterday) – where I went, who I met, etc. – ; and I have plans about what I will do tomorrow (and into the future).) Of course, it is *I* who conceive of myself; – or: it is *within* my (the) world (the world given to *me*) that I represent these things concerning myself as taking place; and so one does not escape from what the solipsist is trying to say. However, this protest against the solipsist is not (quite) claiming that we can escape from what he is saying. Rather, it is suggesting that there is a mistake (as well as something correct) in thinking of the I of solipsism as eternally out of reach. (Out of reach because it is the stage *within* which 'in reach' and 'out of reach' have meaning). What the protest wants to argue is this: that

it is *by way of* this I of solipsism (as *not* one amongst other subjects) that we give *content* to the I which does exist – or is represented as existing – *as* one amongst other subjects. Of course, it may be said that in making this protest we find the solipsist is always one step ahead of us. On the other hand it might also be said that he is only one step ahead because we are unable to live with the ambiguity that enters in as soon as we represent what is going on.

This third version of solipsism suggests that the conceptual distinctions which we presented in our first two versions are not so clear cut as they might have seemed. There is also a suggestion in this version that in trying to think about the distinctions, we come up against a difficulty analogous or equivalent to that expressed by the semantic (or set theoretic) paradoxes. Having said that, though, our first two versions were in the terms in which we presented them somewhat misleading. This is something that is easier to comment upon at this point now that we have all three versions before us.

The basic distinction that we found ourselves making in our first two versions is that between the world or level of the third person and the world or level of the first person. We have used the word 'world' in accordance with Wittgenstein's own usage, and the word 'level' to make the obvious comparison (and we may note Wittgenstein's use of 'first system' and 'second system' in the *Philosophical Remarks*). However, the use of the word 'world' is in one respect misleading. The implication of the word is at least this: that a world is not one thing amongst others. (Compare too the remark on contemplating the stove in the *Notebooks 1914-16*, p.83) The notion of two worlds thus implies a kind of contradiction – something which we attempted to get past by speaking of the two sides of one coin. On looking at the matter more closely, though, it becomes clear that this apparent contradiction is really introduced by our uncritical use of the word 'world' to characterise both levels. It is the world as *first* person (world as idea) that solipsism is trying to point out separates *itself* out – or, is *not* one amongst other things. This aspect was less clear in

our first version than in our second and third versions; but we may perhaps say that there the geometrical eye (the 'here') is not tied to any particular point of third person space, and so may be said to bring with it the whole of visual space. (Or one might argue directly that visual space as a given structure comes as a whole.) And, as Wittgenstein emphasises in a number of places, visual space does not have limits: visual space is finite, or at least not infinite in any usual sense, but neither is it *bounded* (by anything outside it). Thus here the term 'world' has a justification in the same way as when speaking of *the* present (experience). On the other hand, *what* is experienced is always one (or many) *amongst* other things – as an event related to past and future events, as a thing related to other things in space; and in either case as internal to our being on the same level *with* other subjects.

It thus looks as though the distinction that solipsism is trying to bring to our attention is better characterised as follows: it is between the level of the third person as *within* the (or my) world, and the level of the first person as this world as a *whole* (or as *not* being bounded). In our first two versions we emphasised the idea that what the solipsist is trying to call to our attention is not given *to* us. Wittgenstein's interpretation of solipsism is rather in terms of the idea that the solipsist cannot express what he wants to say. In this regard it is worth quoting Russell, who points out in his introduction to the Tractatus (what he had confirmed to him in conversation): '...one instance of Wittgenstein's fundamental thesis [is] that it is impossible to say anything about the world as a whole, and that whatever can be said has to be about bounded portions of the world.'

[Insofar as a connection with the paradoxes goes, it is worth noting the fact that the various paradoxes can be represented within a more general setting in terms of diagonalisation out of specified totality. (The point we want to put forward (even though our discussion is unable properly to bring out this aspect) is that what seem always to be ontological-psychological

distinctions must in the end be *logical* distinctions.)]

In our discussion of Davidson we raised the question of whether we can make the distinction of intentional state (as 'for the theorist') and *what* is intended ('for the subject'). What we have said so far about Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism suggests that insofar as we think about this by reference to solipsism, the former of the two is connected with the idea of the (or my) world as a *whole*, with the implication that here it does not make *sense* to speak of an outside. This idea, as we indicated earlier, is most readily conceived in the first instance by reference to the subject (compare the analogy with not seeing as against seeing nothing). Wittgenstein, though, expresses it in a way which makes it clear this is illustration rather than explanation or justification. (Or we might perhaps say, it is potentially misleading inasmuch as we fail to conceive the subject of the illustration as *the* subject.) The basic Wittgensteinean expression of the distinction is between a boundary expressed *by* language, as against a boundary *to* language. The first of these contains the idea of a move within logical space (saying things are one way as opposed to another), while the second contains the idea *of* that space (as separating *itself* out).

[The question raised by this way of making the distinction is, of course, of how the world as first person *as* such a (potentially infinite) space of possible propositions is given logically. (The question of how the variable has its values 'written into it', as Wittgenstein puts it in the Tractatus.) Wittgenstein uses the term 'rule of grammar' to express the idea that this space is given neither as extension nor as intension.]

[The term 'logical *space*' is a useful one inasmuch as it expresses the idea that it does not make sense to speak of an outside. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein denies we can represent 'logical form' (i.e. the early version of grammar) by asserting: 'In order to be able to represent logical form we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.' (TLP #4.12). This statement is most easily made sense of by interpreting

logic/world as the realm of sense – that is, logical *space*. We may then express the Wittgensteinean position by saying that when we go beyond the rules which determine sense we do not *go* somewhere, we merely end up with meaningless combinations of signs. (As it were, we return to '*within* the world', except that now we are dealing with language as *sign* as opposed to (expression of) *thought*. Compare the preface to the Tractatus.)

[It is of course a simplification to call logical form the early version of grammar (but in our context not a misleading one, it seems to me.) There are, though, two differences we should mention. The first is that the notion of logical form contains the idea that syntactical rules do not constitute a 'third realm' (cf WWK pp 80, 240). By contrast (although the exact nature of the contrast is unclear) it is natural to compare the later notion of grammar with that of the synthetic a priori (as Wittgenstein agreed in conversation with Drury). The second difference is to do with the way in which we are inclined to distinguish – as the early Wittgenstein does – between syntax (logical form) and logical inference (tautology). The concept of mathematics is then naturally assimilated to the latter rather than the former (something the Tractatus appears to concur with at TLP ##6.2ff). And in line with this one is inclined to say that space, time and colour (see TLP #2.0251) delimit 'what is possible' in *our* world, but that mathematics defines what is possible in *every* (conceivable) world; which agrees with the Tractatus introduction of the forms of elementary proposition and number, respectively. (Which is not to say that the exact status or conception of mathematics in the Tractatus is at all clear.) In the later philosophy, by contrast, Wittgenstein assimilates these two different notions to the *single* idea of grammar (as arbitrary convention). (Or perhaps: assimilates the notion of tautology to the notion of logical form.)]

Our aim in discussing solipsism is to try to get clearer about the concepts or distinctions which determine Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality. The concept that has come out

of our discussion is that of totality (as not given *to* the subject) – or of there not being an outside – with the distinction being with 'within the world', when we are – in a very natural sense – outside what is given to us (as one amongst other things). This distinction also has expression in the idea that solipsism is a limiting case, in the sense that it separates *itself* out, as opposed to being separated out by us (through language). We have already suggested a connection between this distinction and the distinction that came up (as something problematic) in our discussion of Davidson, between intentional state (as unsatisfied) and what is intended (by way of depiction). We now want to relate the basic solipsistic distinction more closely to our discussion by making three comments. The first will be by way of a comparison of solipsism with the Quinean and Davidsonian conceptions of intentionality. (The comparison being made possible, of course, because of the analogy between the notions of *what* is said and *what* is experienced.) The second will compare the solipsist with our phenomenological subject. The last will take place mainly by quotation of passages from the *Philosophical Grammar* relating to the distinction of inside and outside.

[It is worth first commenting parenthetically upon the way the distinction of first and third person as it is expressed within solipsism has moved away from our earlier expression of things. (Compare our original distinction of a naturalistic against first person conception – and the shifts of meaning that have taken place along the way. It is such shift of meaning that seems to me to necessitate a focus upon *physiognomy*.) The level of the first person as it is here being defined is precisely what is *not* given to the first person, but rather corresponds to what we earlier characterised as 'for the theorist' (even while pointing out that for Wittgenstein there is no such perspective). What we here call the level of the third person corresponds to the (phenomenological) notion of what is intended – or, in the case of solipsism, what is experienced. We have already commented (parenthetically) upon the difficulty presented by this notion

of what is experienced.]

We begin by making a comparison between solipsism and the conception of intentionality implied by the Quinean model. The structure of the Quinean model is sometimes said to express a solipsistic conception (of our body of knowledge), and one can see an aspect of this in the way the model is used to support the idea of scientific 'revolution' and incompatible paradigms. (It may be pointed out too that the metaphor of two sides of one coin has a certain interpretation in the way deeper levels of theory do not occur *alongside* theory closer to the outer boundary.) However, the supposed solipsistic nature of the Quinean model is undercut by the way we *characterise* it in terms of a division or sharing of semantic responsibility (between the first person and third person 'others' – or society). It is the way in which the model is interpreted by way of our characterisation of it from outside that we want to make two remarks upon.

The first remark relates to the way in which the model conceives of the concept of nonsatisfaction. We pointed out in our discussion of Quine that it is by way of three conceptual moves that we arrive at the concept of nonsatisfaction. In the first we take up the viewpoint of a subject with a restricted knowledge (an ancient Roman speaking about salt); we then represent his 'intentional state' as being *within* the space of modern theory (salt = NaCl), which allows us to conceive it as lacking (or unsatisfied); and finally, we apply the same move to ourselves (by way of analogy). What we want to emphasise in our present context is this: that in representing the Roman soldier's knowledge, we are so to speak drawing a line *within* logical (or theoretical) space: but that when we apply the idea to ourselves, this is something we cannot do. When it comes to our *own* situation we reach a limiting case, where we can only gesture (into the void, as it were) – and appeal to analogy. As we pointed out in our discussion of Quine, when we interpret the model we conceive this limiting case on the basis of the case to which we *can* – by way of a meta view which is only possible through this limiting case – give content. The

question raised by solipsism is whether in attempting to make sense of our own case by reference to the case to which we can give content, we do not miss what is essential to it as a limiting case.

[We suggested there are similarities between the Quinean model and the philosophical position of Rationalism. The difference, though, is surely to be found here: the Rationalist takes seriously the idea that objectivity has to be conceived 'from inside'; that is, he takes the limiting case as *primary*.]

The second remark has its point in relation to what we say below about Davidson. It is just to point out that within the Quinean model the notion of meta is equivalent to the notion of the third person – or to objectivity. (With the meta ultimately disappearing into the 'lack' represented by the centre of the model.)

We turn now to the Davidsonian conception of a theory of meaning. The theory can, of course, be interpreted solipsistically by way of Davidson's own conception of it as a theory of interpretation of an alien language. However, our portrayal of it took place by assimilating its aims much more to those of the Tractatus, when its most notable feature in relation to solipsism is the role of the notion of meta. The role of the theorist may be thought of as *linking* the first person (given through the subject's language behaviour) and the third person (the inferred truth conditions). Of course, the first person in this case (and consistent with the theorist's meta position) is given to the theorist only indirectly. But it is the first person or subject characterised in terms *other* than by reference to *what* the subject intends; whence the requirement of a theory to make the link to the world (to the world of the third person).

The above remark just makes the distinction of the Davidsonian conception of intentionality from the Quinean in relation to the concept of meta. The remark that we want to make about the Davidsonian conception in relation to solipsism is to do with the way the argument is made for that concept

of meta. In order to help us to comment upon this, we first bring in something of what Wittgenstein says in his discussion of Moore's Paradox. Wittgenstein sets out his version of the paradox by observing that the expression 'I believe this is the case' is equivalent to the assertion 'this is the case' (in the sense that an observer can infer neither more nor less from my assertion of the one than from the other); but the *hypothesis* that I believe this is the case is not similarly equivalent to the *hypothesis* that this is the case. 'So that it *looks* as if the assertion 'I believe' were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis 'I believe'!' (See PI, II, X) Wittgenstein also expresses the paradox in this alternative form: 'Similarly: the statement 'I believe it's going to rain' has a meaning like, that is to say, a use like, 'It's going to rain', but the meaning of 'I believed then that it was going to rain', is not like that of 'It did rain then'.'

We do not want to discuss or analyse the paradox but simply to use it to point out something about the way in which we may understand the statement, 'I believe it's going to rain'. The paradox hinges upon the fact that this statement may be assimilated (as we may put it) to the assertion, 'It's going to rain', *or* to statements such as: I believed then that it was going to rain; he believes it is going to rain; I will believe (when I see some evidence)...; etc. It seems to me there is a comparison to be made here between these two possibilities of assimilation and the distinction of concepts of time that yielded solipsism of the present moment. (And equally for the distinctions of the other versions). The concept of assertion may be compared with *the* present (experience), and the representation of states of belief with the representation of temporal relations in terms of past and future. The significant thing for the comparison is contained in the way in which the concept of the present moment appears to us as problematic, or of ambiguous status. For, on the one hand we want to assimilate the present moment to *the* present (which does not pass away), but on the other hand (and inasmuch as it is defined in terms of its content, and thus its temporal relations), we want to assimilate it to a moment on the calendar, when it is one point

of time amongst others. The statement 'I believe it is going to rain' can be seen to be ambiguous in a similar way to this.

Wittgenstein's early philosophy is defined by its picture theory of the proposition, but in the *Notebooks 1914-16*, where he worked out large parts of his theory, what is striking is how Wittgenstein keeps returning to the difference of picture from proposition. What he returns to is the fact that a picture does not *say* that this is how things are; the picture (or yardstick) by itself is dead; it cannot reach out and assert *that* such and such is the case. In Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore's paradox it is this peculiar ability of language to say something that is brought to our attention. Or rather, what is brought to our attention is the difference – or identity – between the assertion that p and a subject's state of belief that p. (A subject who may be myself). In this essay we have been trying to get clearer about how it is possible to say that such and such is the case by way of a focus upon the concept of intending something; but what we have not touched upon is the concept of propositional attitudes as such. The reason for this is obvious: it is that we have based our discussion upon phenomenology, and what comes out as primary from this perspective is (the intentional aspect of) assertion. It is by way of this intentional aspect that the concept of understanding manifests itself phenomenologically. Davidson's conception of theory, on the other hand, begins with the question of how to make sense of the general form of propositional attitudes – that is, what is common to A believes that p, A fears that p, etc.; in other words, A understands that p. The difficulty with this structure is that it makes it look as though the subject A stands in relation to an object – the proposition – which is then construed in terms of the concept of meaning, or intension. Davidson argues that this concept is not amenable to theory as it stands, but needs to be understood by way of the concept of truth; which has the consequence of requiring the theory to be formally at a meta level relative to the subject

language.

The remark that we want to make about Davidson's conception of theory relates to the fact that Davidson makes the move to the meta level in order to try to make sense of the form 'A understands that p'. What we want to point out is that the form 'A understands that p' already involves a move *away* from *the* first person level – as given meaning by phenomenology. This is brought to our attention by Moore's paradox through the difference between the two ways in which we can assimilate 'I believe that p': either to 'A believes that p', or to 'p'. In the latter case the subject is speaking about the world, whereas in the former case, we are speaking about the subject (a subject who apparently stands in relation to something called 'the proposition'). The question that needs to be asked here is whether the 'I' is simply one more value of the variable 'A', or whether it is *by means of* the 'solipsistic case' of assertion – the case in which the I is primary precisely because it has disappeared – that the form 'A understands that p' is to be understood.

It can be seen that the comparison we have made of solipsism with Davidson's conception has brought into view the same two ideas that we saw in the comparison of solipsism with Quine. Thus we may summarise what has come out of the two comparisons by setting out briefly these two ideas. The first idea is that the perspective from which meaning is to be determined or made sense of is not that of meta, but the limiting perspective of solipsism. (This has, of course, to be set against the fact that intersubjectivity is essential to language.) The second is the idea that we make a mistake when we try to conceive this limiting case by reference to the case which is *not* limiting. That is to say, we make the mistake of setting *within* a space (within the world) what essentially *is*, or defines, a space (is a world). (The implication being that *not* being within a space is the important thing for the possibility of intentionality (for nonsatisfaction).)

The second comment we said we would make upon the significance of solipsism for intentionality is to point out a similarity

between the subject of solipsism and our phenomenological subject. At the end of our introduction of the second interpretation of the prior intended object we argued that the phenomenological subject is not trying to *say* something, but to point out something. We clarified this by observing that if we were to give a straightforward linguistic expression of the prior semantic knowledge, it would be to say that when a subject A understands that p, he knows that *'p' says that p*. The statement, "p' says that p' has an obvious similarity with the statements through which the solipsist attempts (but fails) to express his position.

The third comment upon the significance of solipsism for intentionality we make indirectly, by quoting some passages from the *Philosophical Grammar* discussion of intentionality. (The same series of passages from which we quoted (a later version of) the remark about going up to what we mean, but not being able to observe ourselves doing so.) Although the exact nature of the connection between what these passages say and what has come out of our discussion of solipsism is not wholly clear, the fact that there is a connection is sufficiently clear to make the quotation worthwhile. The passages (some of which we have quoted before) also serve to bring together many of the themes of our discussion. We may add that in our conclusion to the essay as a whole we shall try to bring more clearly into view the connection that these passages point towards.

> It's beginning to look somehow as if intention could never be recognised as intention from outside; as if one must be doing the meaning of it oneself in order to understand it as meaning. That would amount to considering it not as a phenomenon or fact but as something which has a direction given to it. What this direction is, we do not know; it is something which is absent from the phenomena as such.
>
> Here, of course, our earlier problem returns, because the point is that one has to read off from a thought that it is the thought that such and such is the case. If one

can't read it off (as one can't read off the cause of a stomach ache) then it is of no logical interest.

My idea seems nonsensical if it is expressed like *this*. It's supposed to be possible to see what someone is thinking of by opening up his head. But how is that possible? The objects he is thinking about are certainly not in his head – any more than in his thoughts!

If we consider them from 'outside' we have to understand thoughts as thoughts, intentions as intentions and so on, *without* getting any information about something's meaning. For it is with the phenomenon of thinking that meaning belongs.

If a thought is observed there can be no further question of an understanding; for if the thought is seen it must be recognised as a thought with a certain content; it doesn't need to be interpreted! – That really is how it is; when we are thinking, there isn't any interpretation going on.

[PhG #96]

If I said 'but that would mean considering intention as something other than a phenomenon' that would make intention reminiscent of the will as conceived by Schopenhauer. Every phenomenon seems dead in comparison with the living thought.

'Intention seen from outside' [...] 'Whatever phenomenon we saw, it couldn't ever be intention; for that has to contain the very thing that is intended, and any phenomenon would be something complete in itself and unconcerned with anything outside itself, something merely dead if considered by itself'.

This is like when we say: 'The will can't be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply *happens*, something we undergo, not something we *do*. The will isn't *something* I see happen,

it's more like my being involved in my actions, in my *being* my action. [...]

[PhG #97]

[At this point compare the two following passages from *Zettel*:

My own behaviour is sometimes – but rarely – the object of my own observation. And this is connected with the fact that I intend my behaviour [...]

[Z #591]

What does it mean to say e.g. that self observation makes my action, my movements, uncertain?

I cannot observe myself unobserved. And I do not observe myself for the same purpose as I do someone else.

[Z #592]

(Observation may be compared with setting *within* a space.)]

By 'intention' I mean what uses a sign in a thought. The intention seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation; which is not a further sign or picture, but something else, the thing that cannot be further interpreted. But what we have reached is a psychological, not a logical terminus.

Think of a sign language, an 'abstract' one, I mean one that is strange to us, in which we do not feel at home, in which, as we should say, we do not *think* [...] and let us imagine this language interpreted by a translation into – as we should like to say – an unambiguous picture language, a language consisting of pictures painted in perspective. It is quite clear that it is much easier to imagine different *interpretations* of the written language

than of a picture painted in the usual way depicting say a room with normal furniture. Here we shall also be inclined to think that there is no further possibility of interpretation.

Here we might also say we didn't enter into the sign language, but did enter into the painted picture.

[...]

'Only the intended picture reaches up to reality like a yardstick. Looked at from outside, there it is, lifeless and isolated.' – It is as if at first we looked at a picture so as to enter into it and the objects in it surrounded us like real ones; and then we stepped back, and were now outside it; we saw the frame, and the picture was a painted surface. In this way, when we intend, we are surrounded by our intention's pictures and we are inside them. But when we step outside intention, they are mere patches on a canvas, without life and of no interest to us. When we intend, we exist among the pictures (shadows) of intention, as well as with real things. Let us imagine we are sitting in a darkened cinema and entered into the happenings in the film. Now the lights are turned on, though the film continues on the screen. But suddenly we see it 'from outside' as movements of light and dark patches on a screen.

(In dreams it sometimes happens that we first read a story and then are ourselves participants in it. And after waking up after a dream it is sometimes as if we had stepped back out of the dream and now see it before us as an alien picture.) And it also means something to speak of 'living in the pages of a book'. That is connected with the fact that our body is not at all essential for the

> occurrence of our experience. (C.f. eye and visual field.)
>
> [...] [PhG #98]

> What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting. I do not interpret because I feel natural in the present picture. When I interpret, I step from one level of my thought to another.
>
> If I see the thought symbol 'from outside', I become conscious that it could be interpreted thus or thus; if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a stopping place that is natural to me, and its further interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) me. As I have a railway time-table and use it without being concerned with the fact that a table can be interpreted in various ways.
>
> [...] [PhG #99]

[With regard to the distinction that Wittgenstein makes in the above two passages between a logical and a psychological terminus, it is worth repeating what we said earlier about the *Philosophical Grammar* appearing to be transitional between the early and later philosophies.]

*

Now that we have completed our discussion of solipsism we have really brought into view all of the distinctions in terms of which we want to interpret Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality. However, before we attempt to summarise these distinctions in their interrelationship (which is all that we shall do by way of an interpretation), it is worth discussing in brief fashion one more topic. We do this in order to bring more explictly into our discussion a concept which has been with

us from the beginning, and to clarify various matters left over from our previous discussions. The discussion is also of interest inasmuch as it makes a connection – albeit one hedged with caveats – with a central topic of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

One way in which we have attempted to get clearer about Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality has been by contrasting it with the Russellian structure, with its idea of a third event mediating the transition from thought to fact. We discussed this notion of a third event at the semantic encounter by reference to Quine and Davidson, but our approach upon it, in accordance with our overall approach in this essay, was from the perspective of prior. What we shall now do is say something about this notion of a third event in the terms in which it was introduced – that is, in relation to the concept of at the semantic encounter.

The notion of a third event entered into our account in connection with the Russellian structure of intentionality, and so in connection with our first interpretation of the prior intended object (in terms of nonsatisfaction). What we want to do here, though, is comment upon it by way of the idea of a regress, and this is more usefully done in terms of our second interpretation in terms of depiction. This will also allow us to make an obvious parallel with the later Wittgenstein on rule following. It should be stressed, though, that in making this parallel we do not see ourselves as commenting directly upon the later philosophy – let alone upon the later treatment of rule following. Aside from the fact that we do not want to do more than make some simple connections, interpreting the parallel in this way would be to assimilate the concept of picture – or proposition – to that of *rule* – and we know that for Wittgenstein these are of a fundamentally different category.

We begin by going back to the *Philosophical Remarks* discussion of intentionality. As we have said, in that discussion Wittgenstein is mainly concerned to defend the notion of depiction as giving an important insight into the nature of intentionality. There are, though, some passages in which he

criticises the ('naive') idea that the intentional state depends upon the concept of a picture or image. In the following two passages he does this by asking about how the picture is supposed to work at the semantic encounter.

> The idea that you 'imagine' the meaning of a word when you hear or read it, is a naive conception of the meaning of a word. And in fact such imagining gives rise to the same question as a word meaning something. For if, e.g., you imagine sky–blue and are to use this image as a basis for recognising or looking for the colour, we are still forced to say that the image of the colour isn't the same as the colour that is really seen; and in that case, how can one compare the two?
>
> [PhR #12]

> If I understand an order but do not carry it out, then the understanding can only consist in a process which is a *surrogate* for its execution, and so in a *different* process from its execution.
>
> I should like to say, assuming the surrogate process to be a picture doesn't get me anywhere, since even that does not do away with the transition from the picture to what is depicted.
>
> [PhR #27]

What the above passages appear to be saying is something like this: the image is not (numerically) the same as its reference, and so there is necessarily a 'semantic gap' between the two; but then it is unclear how the subject crosses this gap in his application of signs.

[Does the image have shape, or degree of brightness? – in which case why not take it as a sample of either of these? And what about the question of different *shades* of the image/reference? But even if one supposes the 'mental' nature

of the image is somehow able to overcome these difficulties, it has to be admitted the image is not *numerically* the same as its reference, and so we are still left with the question of the 'transition'. Thus we may recall Wittgenstein's deviant reader of a table and argue analogously: why not make the transition at the semantic encounter by mapping the colour image across the colour octahedron. (Blue onto yellow, red onto green etc – or perhaps in accordance with a more complicated schema). Would this be incorrect because the image and reference are not then the *same*? But then: do we have a concept of 'same' or 'correct' that is independent of our (ordinary) concepts?]

A question we may ask at this point is: does the concept of a picure place *any* restrictions upon how it may be used at the semantic encounter? One might suppose it would do so in accordance with the idea that it has a certain multiplicity; and Wittgenstein did later say that the essential thing about his earlier conception was the idea that the intentional state as picture must have the same multiplicity as the intended fact. However, the following remark from the *Philosophical Investigations* suggests that on the present way of looking at things, we cannot assume even this restriction:

> [...] What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? – Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it *be* a picture?
>
> Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word 'cube', say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word 'cube'? – Perhaps you say: "It's quite simple; – if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism, for instance, and say it is a cube, then the use of the word doesn't fit the picture." – But doesn't it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a *method of projection*

according to which the picture does fit after all. [...]

[PI #139]

It is thus arguable that the picture as conceived under this criticism – in which of course the essential thing is that intention (nonsatisfaction) is not conceived as *intrinsic* to it – is (by itself) unable to determine *anything*.

What is the import of the above three passages for the idea of a third event? In our earlier discussion we in effect related the distinction between the first two passages on the one hand and the third passage on the other to the distinction between a Quinean and Davidsonian interpretation of the Russellian structure. However, insofar as we are now focussing upon the notion of at the semantic encounter, the obvious first connection to make is with the Fregean argument against the definability of truth. In that argument Frege points out that if we were given a definition of truth, we should need to determine in any particular case whether it holds – i.e. is itself true; which gives a regress. In like manner we may say that the 'semantic gap' between picture and world impled by the quoted passages cannot be closed by *representing* (depicting) the correct relation between picture and world (correct application), because that would be to beg the same question of a semantic gap between this further representation (depiction) and the world.

We had (in effect) already come across this Fregean regress towards the end of our discussion of the interpretation of the prior intended object in terms of nonsatisfaction. We quoted then from passage PhR #26, in which Wittgenstein speaks of explaining one sign by means of a further sign, and in which he concludes: 'sooner or later there is a leap from the sign to what is signified.' This notion of a leap from sign to what is signified is what suggests the possibility of a comparison with

the later Wittgenstein on rule following.

There are three additional aspects which are relevant to the possibility of a comparison. The first lies in the fact that the notion of *applying* (as against understanding or 'grasping') a rule is an analogue of the notion of *at* (as against prior to) the semantic encounter. The second is contained in the following remark, in which Wittgenstein points out that an interpretation of the rule (compare representation of the relation from picture to world) takes us no further forward:

> 'But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at *this* point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.' – That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. [...]
>
> [PI #198]

A third aspect of the matter which is relevant to the comparison is contained in this excerpt:

> This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule. [...]
>
> [PI #201]

The point here is that Wittgenstein sees his previous argument as establishing that (on a certain conception of 'grasping a rule') the rule would not determine *anything*.

As we have said, we do not want to comment upon Wittgenstein's later argument, but rather, as it were, to let ourselves be impressed by the possibility of a comparison, and then to think about it in the terms of *our* discussion. The point that

we want to take up is that expressed in the following remarks:

> 'How am I able to obey a rule?' – If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following a rule in the way that I do.
>
> If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'
>
> [...]
>
> [PI #217]
>
> [...]
>
> When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
>
> I obey the rule *blindly*.
>
> [PI #219]

It is this notion of a *blind action* to cross the 'gap' between rule and application – or blind transition to cross the 'gap' from picture to world – which we shall comment upon.

A usual way of thinking about what is at issue is this. The Fregean argument shows us that the knowledge of how to apply the picture or rule cannot be represented. From this we infer that the semantic knowledge in question is 'contained in the intentional state' in some other form. The subject knows *how* to apply the rule or determine the truth of the proposition, even if this knowledge is not of the category of a knowing *what* (knowing *something*). This notion of a knowing how is thought in terms of a 'capacity' to act – which at the semantic encounter makes possible the 'blind action' across the 'semantic gap'.

At this late stage of the essay we can see that such a notion of knowing how is comparable with the notion we have dis-

tinguished, of nonsatisfaction. Equally we can distinguish between a Quinean and Davidsonian interpretation of this knowing how; although it is clear from PI #201 (see above and our accompanying comment) that insofar as we are inclined to make the parallel, it is the Davidsonian interpretation that is applicable. Elsewhere in our discussion we have seen that the Davidsonian *as against* the Quinean interpretation accords (in this particular regard) with our interpretation of Wittgenstein. Thus we take the Davidsonian interpretation as our starting point for commenting upon this idea of a knowing how based on blindness.

Earlier we made the transition to the Davidsonian interpretation of the Russellian structure by way of the reductio of the first part of passage PI #442. We may as well begin by setting out here a version of that earlier reductio. It may be expressed in the present context by arguing that if we are to suppose the picture can be applied in different ways at the semantic encounter, then we may equally suppose – following the later Wittgenstein – an oddball interpreter who prior to the encounter has the same picture 'in his head' (or mind) as a normal subject, but who later applies it differently. If we now further suppose that the picture does not determine *anything* (until the semantic transition is actually made) and 'divide through' between us and the 'oddball interpreter', then we conclude that prior to the encounter the picture is in effect a semantic blank.

In our earlier discussion we argued that the reductio shows that the 'two criteria' – here the knowing what and knowing how – must be internally related; an idea which we introduced in terms of levels (thought by reference to perspectives), and tried to give content to by way of Davidson's conception of theory. As we characterised it, what is essential to the theory is that it links the 'levels' – or, so as not to overload our terminology – the 'sides' of the first person (represented by the signs used by the subject) and the third person (the world as fact). In this role of linking the two sides, the theory is comparable with the notion of blind action (to cross the 'semantic

gap'). Except, of course, that insofar as the meta theory is in the hands of the theorist, it is neither blind nor internal to the image. In our discussion we tried to give sense to its being internal to the (prior) image by introducing the idea of the *instantiated* meta theory. That was in the context of the question of how the outer enters in so as to yield an adequate notion of nonsatisfaction; which lead us to the difficulty of how the *instantiated* meta theory shows that it is an instantiated *meta* theory.

It should be clear what we are driving at by way of this comparison with Davidson. It is that the concept which in Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality replaces the concept of meta and makes possible the aspect of nonsatisfaction, is the concept of blindness.

[The thought expressed in the above paragraph allows us to give a nice (if metaphorical) expression of the difference between the Wittgensteinean and the Quinean conceptions of intentionality. We may say that for Wittgenstein, the darkness implied by the concept of blindness is not to be thought of as opposed to the light (to intentionality) but rather as a *condition* for the light. Whereas Quine conceives the darkness as encroaching upon the light (an 'absolutely' vague image) and as susceptible to it (to empirical discovery).]

We have arrived at the position expressed in the paragraph preceding the one above by way of the Fregean-*Philosophical Remarks* regress and a few remarks from Wittgenstein's later writing – and so not by way of any serious philosophical examination of the concepts. We have (or are claiming) a certain leeway with regard to rigour through the fact that we are not trying to construct an argument in the usual sense, but merely to make connections; but even so we ought at least to ensure that the elements of the parallel that we have made use of are in place. In respect of our basic concept – that of image – this is not obviously the case, and so before we go any further we say something by way of clarification about the way we are

supposing this concept may be understood.

In our earlier discussion of the two interpretations of the concept of the prior intended object we followed Wittgenstein in arguing that if we assimilate the image to a real picture, then it fails to work in the way that is required. Now it might have seemed as though those arguments licensed the conclusion that the prior intended object – or image – is to be thought of as (roughly speaking) a mental picture, with 'mental' interpreted as unsatisfied (and hence not something). And then in our present context the supposed parallel with Wittgenstein on rule following becomes unclear; for one wants to ask whether (once we make the move via the reductio from picture to image) the notion of a later transition (later relation to the world) still makes *sense*. (If the image is not something then how is it fitted to be a relatum?) However, we have to be careful here about the way in which we express things. What we concluded from those earlier discussions was not that the image is not something, but rather this: that the concept of prior intended object requires the concept of picture (as yielding the concept *what* is said, or intending *something*) *together* with the concept of nonsatisfaction (as yielding the notion of *intention* or *aboutness* in regard to that 'something'.) This does not say that the picture, which does not have intention internal to it, must be replaced by something else – the image – which does. In fact it is somewhat misleading to speak of the category of the picture as against the 'category' of the image. We should rather speak of the picture as not having intention internal to it – when we are assimilating it to or comparing it with a real picture taken 'by itself' – as against a picture which (somehow) has intention internal to it – which (in this essay) we also *call* an 'image'. Now the point we want to make here is that so far as *categories* go, the prior intended object or image *might* be thought of as a *real* picture *plus* the (mysterious) notion of nonsatisfaction (intention/aboutness). For the conclusion to our discussion of the two interpretations of the prior intended object said merely that both the elements of picture and nonsatisfaction must be present 'together'. Of course, this is so far merely a point about categories, and so if

it seems to sit uncomfortably with what we focussed upon in our phenomenological interpretation, this need not worry us.

The clarification of the above paragraph is 'a point about categories', but nonetheless says something important which needs at this late stage to be brought into the foreground of our discussion. In the first place and with regard to interpretation, it makes a connection with the fact that both early and later Wittgenstein make central the concept of (propositional) *sign*. (The difference being that whereas the early Wittgenstein assimilates this (with the notion of analysis) to the concept of depiction, the later Wittgenstein emphasises the idea that the sign is an external (public) item.) The (philosophical) clarification we have just given of our concept of image brings us into alignment with this central Wittgensteinean theme by allowing us to speak in the same breath (or at least to compare as far as categories go) the *use* of a sign – or the *understanding* (or '*grasping*') of a rule (as sign) – and the *intending* of a (real) picture. The *Philosophical Grammar* example of the use of a railway time-table (see below and the quotations at the end of our discussion of solipsism) may be thought of as a mediating concept here. (Compare too the opening paragraphs of PhG #1.)

Secondly, there are reasons which are quite independent of interpretation for supposing that, when it comes to the notion of a 'blind transition' (or whatever) *at* the semantic encounter, we need to bring into consideration the intended object as *real* picture – or sign. One reason is that if we think of the image as equal to real picture plus the element of nonsatisfaction, then we must say that *at* the semantic encounter the 'not yet satisfied ' ceases to apply (in the case of truth). (And cf *Zettel* #621: 'While I am looking at an object I cannot imagine it.') A second reason is that in verifying a proposition or applying a rule, the relatum on the other side of the 'relation' or 'semantic transition' is itself something real (a fact, the next pencil mark in the written series etc.), and such identity of type makes the concept of relation more plausible. (Compare too PhR #48: 'Our propositions ... must be commensurable with the present;

and they cannot be so *in spite of* their spatio-temporal nature; on the contrary this must be related to their commensurability as the corporeality of a ruler is to its being extended – which is what enables it to measure.')

Let us return now to the idea that we are putting forward, of blindness being internal to the concept of the proposition. One aspect of this idea is the familiar and relatively clear one that came out of the Davidsonian reductio. It is that the (later) 'relation between picture and world', which we are relating back to our concept of nonsatisfaction (or knowing how), does not signify a lack in the (prior) image in the Quinean sense, but rather a lack in *our* sense; that is to say, a lack (or intention) that *yields* the image. The second aspect of the idea is less clear, but also makes a connection with our discussion of Davidson. There we suggested a connection between the concept of nonsatsfaction and the perspective of the theorist, but pointed out that this has to be reconciled with two aspects of the Wittgensteinean conception, which are the first person standpoint, and the denial of a meta view. The concept of blindness now suggests that what is important in bringing these various ideas into interconnection is to say that nonsatisfaction is defined from a first person perspective through the *disappearance* of the first person. (For, of course, the concept of blindness does not signify that the subject is struggling about in darkness, but that it makes no *sense* to speak of the (intentional) subject.)

If the concept of blindness signifies the disappearance of the (intentional) subject, then this raises questions about the meaning – or meaningfulness – of the notion of a blind *transition* across a 'semantic gap'. (The concept of a 'jump' across would seem to be more in keeping – except that then it is *we* who conceive it as a continuous transition (but 'in the dark').) In connection with this we may point out that *phenomenologically*, the only sense we can give to the concept of a semantic gap is in terms of the subject *not yet* being in a position to make the verification – that is, not yet being at the semantic encounter; in which case verification would seem to correspond

more to the *disappearance* than to the crossing of such a 'gap'. However, at this late stage of the essay we do not want to attempt anything approaching a philosophical analysis or justification of the concept of blindness as we have introduced it here. Our aim in the preceding and following comments is no more than to suggest at the possibility of this idea: that the concept of blindness – which has, of course, in some manner been with us from the start – has a place *within* our account. Thus in the few comments that follow we simply indicate how the concept of blindness may be connected with the concepts we have already seen in our discussion. In doing this we shall also say something about the difference of the concept of rule from that of proposition. But we repeat that there is no intention to comment specifically upon the later Wittgenstein on rule following. In order to give a focus to our comments we begin by commenting upon the following passage (which we quoted earlier in conclusion to our discussion of solipsism):

> [...]
>
> If I see the thought symbol 'from outside', I become conscious that it could be interpreted thus or thus; if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a stopping place that is natural to me, and its further interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) me. As I have a railway time-table and use it without being concerned with the fact that a table can be interpreted in various ways.
>
> [...]
>
> [PhG #99]

In this passage Wittgenstein contrasts *using* the thought symbol with seeing the thought symbol 'from outside' and becoming conscious of different interpretations of it. In spite of the use of the phrase 'further interpretability', it is clear that the contrast in question is not to be interpreted as be-

tween our having one (the correct or usual) interpretation in mind as against having several (and being troubled by the choice). (This is of course made very clear in the argument on rule following; but compare too PhG #96, also quoted at the end of our discussion of solipsism.) Rather, what is at issue here may be compared with our distinction between the picture as *image*, and the picture (as something 'by itself') *about* which we can ask the questions which lead us to the Fregean-*Philosophical Remarks* regress. That is to say, the *use* of the 'thought symbol' neither is nor requires an interpretation – for we understand 'what *it* (the symbol) says' –; but if we do 'become conscious' of different interpretations of it, then this *itself* involves use of *other* thought symbols in order to step outside *this* thought symbol (to speak *about* it as *sign*). In other words, where we do 'step outside', we necessarily remain 'in a larger sense' inside.

According to our interpretation of Wittgenstein, the essential mistake (which need not take a single form) is to understand the 'being inside' that applies to the case of *using* a sign (intending a picture) in such a way that it presupposes a larger (or meta) 'being inside'. Or, to put it another way, we make a mistake when we attempt to apply to the *use* of the sign a notion of outside which is conceived by reference to the case where we *can* (or do) step outside (and set the sign *within* a space). We argued in our discussion of solipsism that for Wittgenstein the former, or immanent notion of outside is defined through the idea that here it makes no sense to speak of an outside.

The connection we are suggesting is between the concept of blindness and the 'immanent' notion of outside which applies when we use (as opposed to talk about using) language. In the above two paragraphs we have connected this notion of outside with its being a limit to the case where we set the signs *within* a space; which suggests it needs to be thought of in terms of the signs themselves defining or 'yielding' a space. That makes a connection from blindness to the left hand side of the basic Wittgensteinean distinction (or basic expression of what for

us is *the* distinction), between a limit to language, and a limit expressed by language. The signs yield a space, though, only through the fact that we can or do use them to say *something* – something which *is* 'within a space'. This corresponds to the right hand side of the distinction, inasmuch as when we say something, we say that things are one way as opposed to another (so drawing a boundary within logical space). In this essay we have taken the right hand side as primary in defining our categories – or have done so insofar as it allows of a phenomenological interpretation. So too here where we are connecting the left hand side with blindness, we want to say that so far as our way of approach is concerned, it is the right hand side that must be given primacy. This thought makes an obvious connection with what came out of our discussion of Davidson. In our present context, though, it is convenient to present this in a slightly roundabout fashion, by making a connection with the most obvious difference between the cases of a (mathematical) rule, and of a proposition.

[We are not supposing the concept of a limit *to* language is a wholly clear idea. (Our contention in this essay is that a lack of clarity with this concept stems from our not recognising the significance of the notion of *what* is said.) Our assertion in the above paragraph of a connection from the concept of a limit to language to the concept of blindness can be made a little clearer, though, if we bring into consideration the following three ideas. First there is the (solipsistic) idea that when we come to a boundary (of the subject/language) we do not 'go outside' but simply come to a *stop* – in relation to which the concept of 'the other side' has no *sense*. (The point being that the subject *himself* does not come to this boundary – for he is always in the realm of the *projected* picture – as Wittgenstein expresses it in the *Philosophical Remarks* – or of *what* is said.) Secondly, there is the idea that rules of grammar do not draw a boundary between sense and nonsense, but determine a boundary (define the limit of language 'from inside'). [This second idea is perhaps most helpfully thought in relation to two further ideas. The first is that while we can indeed distinguish meaningless from meaningful combinations of signs,

the latter derives from the concept *use* of signs – or *thought* – and this does not *border* on the former. The second is that grammar is to be thought of as equivalent to the notion of paradigm in an *originary* sense. (Compare Wittgenstein: 'in grammar a sign is its *own* interpretation' (my italics) – This has, of course, to be related to the fact that 'in propositions' the signs (the same signs in other combinations) are *not* their own interpretation.)] The third idea to which we may relate a limit of language is this: that when we come to a boundary of language, we can only '*turn back'* – into language. (Compare PI #217, quoted above, especially the phrase, 'my spade is turned'.)]

In order to make the transition to the difference between proposition and (mathematical) rule, we begin by pressing further the apparent similarity between them, which is seen most clearly when we take the concept of order as a mediating concept. From this we can look back to our phenomenological interpretation and point out that there is a sense, which is phenomenologically clear though difficult to grasp in words, in which in obeying an order one is 'ahead of oneself'. One knows in advance *what* one will do next. (– Because one says the words 'next I will do X'? But how can these words take the subject beyond *himself* 'into the future' to that *very* event? And yet they do so. 'In thought' we have 'gone on ahead'.) So too in following a rule one wants to say there is no logical problem with crossing the 'semantic gap' between expression of rule and the next step in the series; for when one 'grasps' the rule one knows *in advance* what comes next. Or rather, 'psychologically' there is no logical problem of how to cross the semantic gap – 'in thought' we have *already* crossed such a 'gap'.

The response to such a 'phenomenological observation' when applied to the case of a mathematical rule is, of course: so what? For here such a 'going on ahead' or anticipating *what* comes next is (unlike in the case of an order) of supreme indifference: the rule has an infinite application, so that anticipating *any* finite stretch falls *wholly* short of the essential thing,

which is *understanding* the rule.

We are not trying to interpret the later Wittgenstein on rule following, and so we may take at face value what we have said in the above paragraph. What we want to focus upon is the straightforward distinction between the case of the mathematical rule, with its infinite application, and the case of our kind of proposition (the simple and pragmatic). We have argued (or interpreted Wittgenstein as arguing) that in our case the concept of understanding has internal to it two ideas: the (phenomenological) notion of what is intended, and the denial of a meta view. In our discussion of Davidson we quoted a version of the following passage, which gives expression to both these ideas:

> Here my thought is: If someone could see the expectation itself – he would have to see *what* is being expected. (But in such a way that it doesn't require a method of projection, a method of comparison, in order to pass from what he sees to the fact that is expected.)
>
> But that is how it is: if you see the expression of the expectation you see 'what is expected'.
>
> [Zettel #57]

In the case of a rule, one is inclined to say the opposite of this: if we could 'see the expectation' connected with *understanding* the rule, then it is not the notion of *what* – the notion that links the subject to the world (to the next few pencil marks on paper) – but rather the notion of expect*ing* – or better, of *understanding* – that we feel we should have to see.

In our discussion of Davidson, one question that came into view was of whether we can make a distinction between the notions of *state* of expectation (or expect*ing*) – as something unsatisfied – and *what* is expected (through depiction). We suggested that implicit in the Wittgensteinean conception is the idea that it is only *through* the latter that the former – as

a *defined* (unsatisfied) notion – is defined. (As we put it there (with reference to P.I. #455): Nonsatisfaction is made possible *only by way of* the fact that the subject 'goes up to the thing he means' (intends *something* by way of depiction).) In our discussion we used the phrase 'for the theorist' to express the idea that the notion of intentional state is thought of as being different from what is given *to* the subject, and yet as being in some sense the same. ('A different perspective upon the same thing.') In the present context, of course, this notion of 'for the theorist' is what we are connecting with the concept of blindness.

We pointed out in our discussion of solipsism that the basic Wittgensteinean distinction is between a boundary drawn *by* language (roughly, our 'what is said'), and a boundary *to* language. It was this latter that we made a connection with a few paragraphs back when we spoke of the 'immanent' notion of outside involving the signs *defining* a space. The connection we suggested then with the concept of blindness is one that we want to suggest has to be made sense of through the equivalence of this 'defining a space' with the concept of intentional *state*. For we want to argue (in accordance with the above paragraph) that although the state (somehow) defines what makes sense (defines a space), it does so only through its presupposing (by being defined relative to) the prior distinction which enters in through the notion of what is said/depiction. How more exactly this makes comprehensible the connection with the concept of blindness may not be quite clear at this point, but we want to suggest there is a connection to be made here with our earlier 'points of doubt': the disjunction between blindness and intentionality, and the distinction between picture and image as a *first* distinction. In the conclusion to this essay (which follows next) we shall try to give expression to this connection by setting out in their interconnection the various distinctions or concepts that our overall discussion has brought into view.

[So far as a connection between a limit to language and the concept of intentional state goes, compare RPPII ## 4, 19

(and relate #19 to PhG Appendix 5 'Is time essential to propositions?').]

* * * * * * * * * * *

In this conclusion to the essay we shall do no more than summarise in their interrelationship the conceptual distinctions which we have argued to be internal to Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality. There is, though, one thing we should say at the outset. It is that the conclusion needs to be thought of not as the outcome of our discussions (which one might detach and take away), but rather as something that only has *meaning* through the essay as a whole.

The first thing we need to do in order to begin our summary – or to make the transition to it – is interpret philosophically our initial, phenomenological interpretation of our starting passage. It is convenient to do this by taking as a starting point the following line from a passage we quoted earlier:

> What is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended.
>
> [...]
>
> [PhR #21]

In our discussion of Davidson we raised the question of whether we may make a distinction between the intentional state and what is intended. The sentence quoted above raises the same question but with regard to picture and what is intended. The use of the term 'picture' does not make any difference insofar as we remain interested solely in the structure of what is going on, but it fits better with our phenomenological interpretation, which is what we want to interpret here. Also, in accordance with the apparently 'psychological' nature of our

phenomenological approach, we shall speak of the '(*mental*) picture'. Thus the question we want to ask in order to interpret philosophically our phenomenological interpretation is whether we may make a distinction between (mental) picture and what is intended (or what is depicted).

It is likely that one's first thought when considering this question of a distinction is that we need to distinguish two cases, just as we did when setting out (our version of) the paradox of an internal connection. We may then argue that in the case of falsity it looks as though the distinction between (mental) picture and what is depicted has no philosophical justification. For in that case there is no actual state of affairs to correspond to proposition or paradigm, and so the intended object is only given *through* proposition or paradigm. On the other hand, in the case of truth we are inclined in accordance with the other side of the paradox (or the requirement of an internal connection) to distinguish what is said from the proposition, because there we should like to identify what is said with the fact itself.

[Of course, even in the case of falsity the object or objects about which one is thinking (and asserting to stand in such and such a relation) exist (or existed), and so it may be argued that this gives us the basis for a distinction between (mental) picture and what is depicted. What is not clear philosophically is how they do this (for one depicts what is the case if the proposition is *true*). Here we may note that what we see are always *facts* – that is, situations that make true propositions – never the 'uncombined references'. (One might indeed postulate that objects – 'substances' – are nonetheless 'given' in some other sense; but compare the problem of the unity of the proposition). It may also be pointed out that we can construct a proposition using just predicate and relational terms – whose existential status 'outside the mind' is problematic – and the x of quantification; and we want our question to apply to this case too. Having said this much, it is clear that to try to follow this up would lead us too far astray into philosophical

territory.]

The distinction of the two cases in line with our original version of the paradox is really a philosophical answer to the question of a distinction. We want to bring out a philosophical distinction, but not by arguing philosophically but by trying to maintain as far as possible our earlier, phenomenological standpoint. That is to say, we are directing our question to or towards our phenomenological subject, and asking whether, *prior* to the determination of truth or falsity, he (or we) may make a distinction between (mental) picture and what is depicted.

We are now inclined to say that the question as it is now expressed applies to the prior intended object, and as such the comparison that is relevant is with the case of falsity. For, prior to the semantic encounter, the state of affairs that is intended is not in sight (even if it exists), and so from a first person perspective it is in a sense indifferent whether it exists or not. At that prior stage of the proceedings, what is depicted is only given (to the first person) through the picture, and so it may be argued that there is a sense of 'what is depicted' which the case of falsity makes graphic, but which applies to the case of prior irrespective of the question of later truth value. In this sense of 'what is depicted' we may argue in like fashion that there is no philosophical justification for a distinction of (mental) picture and what is depicted.

The above paragraph suggests that there is a sense of 'what is depicted' which applies to the prior phenomenological situation and for which it is not meaningful to distinguish between (mental) picture and what the picture depicts. However, while it may be that we cannot meaningfully make such a distinction, it is clear that we cannot *identify* picture and what is depicted, because that would point us towards the absurdity that when the subject thinks, he is doing no more than thinking about his own thoughts. (We may also recall at this point that in our earlier, phenomenologically based discussions of the concept of a (mental) picture, we insisted upon the idea of a depiction of something *else*.) It would thus seem that when

we try to take the perspective of prior and ask about a distinction of (mental) picture and what is depicted, we arrive at something like an ambiguity; but one which, unlike the earlier, impossible ambiguity of an internal connection, allows of an obvious interpretation. It is by setting out this interpretation that we now summarise in their interrelationship the distinctions that we want to argue are internal to Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality.

The first half of the interpretation is in accordance with what came out of our phenomenological interpretation. It is to say that *for* the subject – that is to say, phenomenologically – the propositional sign (or picture) is defined by *what* is said (by *what* is depicted). This statement is a philosophical characterisation of the prior phenomenological situation, and what it says (or wants to say) is that *from* that prior position, the propositional sign is defined by the fact in the world (if the proposition is true) or the fact that would exist if the proposition were true (in the case of falsity).

[The above statement says that the subject is *not* given a *picture* (of the fact) – nor anything *other* than the fact – but (if we are to use this term) 'something' defined at the level of the facts. Of course, if the subject is *asked* what this something is – is asked *what* it is he is saying – then all he can do is repeat the propositional sign.]

[It is of course the case that when the subject says (from the position of prior) that his proposition is defined by *what* it says (the picture by what it depicts), he is saying how things *seem* to him.]

The second half of our interpretation requires us to interpret the concept of (mental) *picture*. Here what we shall say follows on from the first half of the interpretation, which itself may be compared with the statement we made in our earlier, ontological criticism of depiction: '...a (mental) picture taken as *something* ('in view by itself') could only *get in the way* of an intentional relation to the world; for our attention would be directed *to* such a picture, whereas in thought our intent

is toward something *other* (namely, the state of affairs that 'is depicted').'

One wants to say here that the *subject* does not 'have a picture' because he is too focussed on *what* the picture depicts; rather, it is *we*, who (try to) to take a meta view *of* the language user – of the intentional subject – who find ourselves faced with (or asking philosophical questions about) the (mental) picture.

We thus define the concept of (mental) picture by reference to the *attempt* – and, in line with Wittgenstein's conception, the *failure* – to take a meta view upon what is going on. When we *try* to take such a 'view from outside' of the proposition, all that we find (according to Wittgenstein) is the *propositional sign*. In accordance with this we shall interpret the concept of *picture* as corresponding to the concept *propositional sign* (thought of as the proposition 'seen from outside')

The notions of propositional sign and of what is said relate to only *one* of the two aspects of the proposition that we distinguished through our two interpretations of the prior intended object. The other aspect we denoted by the terms 'nonsatisfaction', 'intention', or 'aboutness', and in our discussions of Quine and Davidson we associated it with the idea of a meta view. In accordance with this we now interpret the concept of nonsatisfaction – and with it the concept of *mental* (picture) – in terms of the 'relation' between or separation of the two sides of propositional sign and what is said.

[If the double notion of propositional *sign* and *what* is said corresponds to the idea that the proposition is *defined by* what makes it true, then the notion of their difference or separation correspond to the idea that the proposition – or better, the propositional sign – *defines* what makes it true. We want to say that the distinction of sign and what is said – or the point where that distinction no longer applies – corresponds to grammar (in line with the idea that in grammar the sign is its own interpretation).]

It should be clear that the fundamental thing in what we have

said so far about our interpretation is the idea of an *attempt* – and failure – to take a meta view. We want to say that the reason why we cannot take such a view of the proposition is that we have in a certain sense *already* taken a meta view of it. (The concept of *what* is said is such that it has already gone *past* what we should see if a meta view were possible.) That is to say, the first person conception of proposition (i.e. the thought) in a certain sense *already* includes or contains a meta view (as internal to its content).

One way of thinking of our interpretation of the 'prior ambiguity' is to say that it has interpreted the form that we introduced at the end of our discussion of the prior intended object as depiction: the form 'p' says that p. In this form the p may be said to correspond to the phenomenological notion of *what* is said (where the *what* is precisely what is *not* here and now); and the 'p' to the propositional sign as it is here and now (where that means somewhere *other* than the fact that p). The propositional sign 'p' is a fact in its own right about which we *may* – but outside of philosophy ordinarily do not – ask questions. If we do speak about it philosophically then we *might* say (as Wittgenstein does in the Tractatus) that the sign 'p' depicts the (possible) fact that p; but the very possibility of such a statement presupposes that the relation (of depiction) between them must be understood *immanently*. (And so not as a relation that goes (by way of a meta view) *beyond* or outside the subject.) It is this (problematic) notion of an 'immanent relation' – understood through the impossibility of a meta view – that we are interpreting as equivalent to nonsatisfaction.

We should say straighaway that the idea spoken of in the above paragraph, of an immanent relation between the two sides of the form 'p' says that p, is in an important sense misleading. For it makes it look as though there is something (bridging the 'two' sides) which we should be able to see if a meta view were possible. In this essay (through our phenomenological interpretation) we have emphasised the *difference*, as it were the unbridgeable *gap*, between the two sides of propositional

sign and proposition. So too here we want to say (in accordance with the denial of a meta view) that the subject can be on one side of the gap or the other, but that it makes no sense to speak of a *crossing* of this gap. (We want to say: this gap signifies the idea of a 'discontinuity' *of* the subject – a discontinuity across which we conceptualise a relation of depiction.) In other words, it is by reference to this 'gap' between the two sides of 'p' says that p that the concept of semantic *blindness* needs to be interpreted. (The 'crossing' of the gap would correspond to the notion of at the semantic encounter – but of course then it is not a gap but a boundary.)

Our interpretation has not yet introduced the concept of the subject. (When we said that 'for the subject' the proposition is defined by *what* is said, we were not referring to the subject but merely saying that this is what comes out of *phenomenology* (where the standpoint is in effect methodological solipsism). The idea of a gap between picture and what it depicts suggests that it is here that the subject should be introduced: as the power that 'transforms' the propositional sign into proposition. This is suggested by the passage that we have already quoted more than once:

> Here my thought is: If someone could see the expectation itself – he would have to see *what* is being expected. (But in such a way that it doesn't require a method of projection, a method of comparison, in order to pass from what he sees to the fact that is expected.)
>
> But that is how it is: if you see the expression of the expectation you see 'what is expected'.
>
> [Zettel #57]

We want to say, though, that an introduction at this point of the subject needs to be understood in the right way: that is, *not* as 'something' which has the magical power of making sign into proposition, and whose nature we must therefore investigate in order to understand how this is possible.

Rather, the subject must be defined *relatively* to the notion of a 'gap' between propositional sign (as fact in its own right) and proposition (or propositional sign defined by *what* is said). That is to say, if we want to get clearer about the nature of the subject, then we must do so by getting clearer about the concept of a prior – and blind – gap; for it is this that is the primary concept. (In other words the subject is ontologically equivalent to nonsatisfaction.)

We have said that the idea of an 'immanent relation' between the two sides of 'p' says that p needs to be replaced by the idea of a gap or discontinuity (so to speak *within* the subject). However, this second idea is also one that needs to be understood in the right way, in order that it should not give the impression of something merely psychological, or of degree. (Something that applies *more* when the subject 'is absorbed' in what is said and only later 'wakes up' to his being separated off from *what* the signs say.) What we want to say, though, *by way of* our interpretation of the propositional sign as what *we* see (from outside), is that the notion of the subject's being absorbed by what is said ('going up to the thing we mean' (PI #455)) signifies a *logical* distinction (and so is *not* a matter of degree).

The important point here is that the form 'p' says that p does *not* express the structure of intentionality. When we see or hear a propositional sign, we see or hear the sign and at the same time understand *what* it says. The subject who *uses* the propositional sign (and for whom it is defined by *what* it says), and we who 'from outside' (from a so called meta view) explictly take notice of the *sign*, are essentially the *same* subject. The distinction between the 'two sides' is thus not between two (separate) sides but is rather to be thought of as a *first* distinction, in *relation* to which the concept of propositional content has to be thought. (We might say – and so make the contrast with the Quinean conception – that 'propositional content' (the theoretical analysis) is *separated off* from the propositional sign *by way of* this prior distinction (so yielding the concept of the mental, or nonsatisfaction).) (As a *first*

distinction it so to speak guarantees that a statement such as 'the subject is absorbed by *what* is said' refers to the subject as a *whole*.)

[One way of trying to express this is by using the Tractatus characterisation of the proposition as a limiting case of a symbol, when the distinction of 'p' and p becomes that of sign and symbol. We may then say that the general form of the proposition is expressed by saying that the construction of a proposition involves adding a *sign* to a *symbol*. (So that the 'distinction' expressed by the *empty* statement 'p' says that p is a *presupposition* for the proposition.) We may then say that *for the subject* the result of adding sign to symbol is a propositional sign defined by what is said – or a proposition – but that 'in itself' (or 'for the theorist') the proposition has an *ambiguous* status between these two sides. (Compare the idea that we want a *dynamic* conception of the proposition.) It is this ambiguous status that we want to say yields the notion of nonsatisfaction. (Or: we want to say that it is in this action of adding *sign* to *symbol* that we see expressed the idea that the concept of meta is incorporated *into* the proposition.]

[In the context of the above remark the concept of what is said may be compared with the emphasis Wittgenstein gives to the start of the proposition, and the concept of the sign with its completion. And one may propose a connection here with the notions of assertion (of a positive proposition) and of negation. (That is to say, the extensional notion of 'p' is true $\Leftrightarrow$ p has a *prior* interpretation in which 'p' and p (the proposition) signify a *first* distinction, and in relation to which the concepts of positive and negative must be defined.)]

[The connection with the distinctions that came out of our discussion of solipsism is not very clear in what we have said, but it is to do with the nature of the distinction between sign and what is said as a *first* distinction. We may say that the notion of a so called 'immanent relation' between 'p' and p contains the idea that it makes no sense to speak of '*outside* the subject' in an absolute sense: the blindness that 'corresponds' to such a meaningless notion of outside is to be found in the

idea of a discontinuity *of* the subject – and so '*within*' the subject. But this has to be understood in relation to the interpretation of the sign as what *we* see (and so in relation to the idea that the notion of what is said is defined in relation to the subject as a *whole*).]

[It is worth comparing the idea of a 'discontinuity' or 'blind gap' between propositional sign and proposition with the Kantian idea of the heterogeneous origin of sensation and understanding. There is also a comparison to be made between the Kantian notion of categories (as second order concepts which in themselves are empty) and the Tractatus notion of formal concepts (as constructed by the instances (the concepts) that fall under them). The Kantian forms may be compared with the Tractatus notion of logical form (or grammar). This comparison with Kant also allows us to see more clearly how it is the Tractatus is a clarification of the Kantian project. Kant distinguishes between real and logical possibility, defining the former by reference to the forms of *intuition*, and so has to use language to draw a boundary to what is thinkable. Wittgenstein on the other hand defines sense in relation to what the *propositional sign* can depict or express ('in grammar a sign is its own interpretation'), so allowing the assertion that language limits *itself* ('Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted' (TLP 5.473)). Whence the idea that the work of the philosopher is not to make *assertions* (about the nature of things), but merely to *clarify concepts* by pointing out the grammatical connections. (– As we see it, our essay has not quite been this, but rather a step towards making such a conception of philosophy comprehensible.)]